

1969

September 1969 Review










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FOREWORD

The *Naval War College Review* was established in 1948 by the Chief of Naval Personnel in order that officers of the service might receive some of the educational benefits available to the resident students at the Naval War College.

The material contained in the *Review* is for the professional education of its readers. The frank remarks and personal opinions of the lecturers and authors are presented with the understanding that they will not be quoted without permission. The remarks and opinions shall not be published nor quoted publicly, as a whole or in part, without specific clearance in each instance with the lecturer or author and the Naval War College.

Lectures are selected on the basis of favorable reception by Naval War College audiences, usefulness to servicewide readership, and timeliness. Research papers are selected on the basis of professional interest to readers.

The thoughts and opinions expressed in this publication are those of the lecturers and authors, and are not necessarily those of the Navy Department nor of the Naval War College.

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The editorial offices of the *Naval War College Review* are located at the Naval War College, Newport, R.I. 02840. Published ten issues yearly, September through June, distribution is generally limited to: U.S. military commands and activities, U.S. military officers of the grade O-4 and above, selected government officials and civilians having a present or previous affiliation with the Naval War College.



CHALLENGE!

The observation has been made often and by many in recent months that the United States has reached a point of transition in the evolution of its foreign policy. If it be true that our attitudes on international affairs are presently in a state of flux, then it seems scarcely necessary to add that our strategic thinking may well require revision.

At the end of the Second World War, this country was swept by a wave of optimism and relief. It was a common feeling in the country that after having been drawn unwilling and unprepared into global conflict, we could at last set aside the heavy burden of international responsibility, and turn our attentions and energies toward the pressing problems of domestic needs and internal adjustment to the post-war world.

This luxury, however, was not to be permitted us. The two compelling realities of the dramatic and rapid communist take-over and consolidation of Eastern Europe and, at the same time, the destitution and weakness of practically all of the countries of the new Free World precluded American introversion. On the one hand, we perceived in Stalinist totalitarianism and its absorption of a substantial portion of Europe a menace to our own national security and that of our former allies. Simultaneously, even the most superficial survey of Western Europe and Asia yielded a depressing picture of nations economically prostrate and politically weak and unstable. Moreover, the only country remaining in a position of sufficient strength to provide significant assistance in economic reconstruction and military security was the United States.

So it was that, instead of the withdrawal and disengagement hoped for, this country launched itself on a long series of overseas commitments, exemplified by the Marshall Plan, the Truman Doctrine, the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Western European Union, and NATO. These efforts were undertaken in the confidence of the rightfulness of our position, and with the assurance which sprang from a global position of unrivalled power. Their acceptance by the American people was general, with few overtones of adverse criticism.

The situation today, though, is scarcely comparable with that of twenty-five years ago. If our military and economic position in the world remains unsurpassed, it can certainly not be said to be unchallenged. In the next decade, it may no longer be unequalled. In one of his last official utterances as Secretary of Defense, Clark Clifford expressed his mounting concern over the astonishing increase of Soviet ICBM's, which, he said, had nearly quadrupled over the preceding two years. Shortly afterward, Secretary Laird voiced similar apprehension not only about the Russian ICBM production but also about the accelerated capacity of the Soviet Union to produce nuclear submarines comparable to our own polaris submarines. Finally, our stated national goal is now sufficiency

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and parity, rather than superiority, in strategic nuclear weapons. In short, the days of unmatched U.S. nuclear pre-eminence in the world may well have passed.

Beyond the nuclear offensive area, it is abundantly clear by now that the Soviet Union hopes to establish itself on the world's oceans not just as a power equivalent in every respect to the United States but rather as the world's greatest seapower. This is documented in the lightning development of their merchant marine, oceanographic, and fishing fleets, as well as their navy. Soviet foreign trade is growing dramatically on a worldwide basis, largely carried in Soviet merchant bottoms. Their economic goals may well parallel their military goals, in a longer time frame.

The USSR is increasing its economic and military assistance to key countries of the Third World, voicing political/military support for those countries and dramatically expanding its naval operations into all the sea areas of the globe. On 12 November, 1968, party leader Brezhnev voiced the new doctrine of Soviet intervention where necessary within the "Socialist Commonwealth." On 7 June of this year, he called for an "Asian security system," comprising countries such as Japan, the Philippines, Indonesia, Formosa, India, and Pakistan. Although the long range Soviet objectives of this policy are as yet somewhat obscure, the purpose seems to be to form a collective defense arrangement in the Far East, presumably to defend against the Chinese Communist threat and presumably to be sponsored and supported by the USSR. As one observer stated, "As Americans more and more contemplate the delights of neo-isolationism, Russia reverts more and more to the kind of neo-interventionism familiar under the Czars."

Nor is there any similarity in the status of our allies today with that of two decades ago. No longer are they lacking in political and economic viabil-

ity. West Germany and Japan are examples which demonstrate the advances made both in Europe and Asia over the last two decades. The protective, paternalistic assistance of the kind long provided by the United States is no longer necessary in these and other Free World areas. In some cases, it is met with outright opposition.

Perhaps even more important than either Soviet advances or the reconstruction of war torn countries, however, is the internal alteration of U.S. sentiments and attitudes. The bitter fruits of Vietnam do not comprise the agonizing loss of men and treasure alone; they apparently also include a general frustration and disenchantment on the part of many with the fundamental concept of U.S. foreign involvement and its ramifications.

Ironically, as Soviet interests expand, powerful voices are being raised in the United States calling for reductions in foreign economic assistance and military aid (The U.S. has now dropped to seventh place among the technologically advanced nations in the percentage of GNP devoted to foreign aid), a lessening of defense commitments abroad and a reduction in our worldwide defense posture.

An entire generation has grown up in the shadow of an omnipresent tension produced by the distinct possibility of a nuclear holocaust—which could ensue from any of a myriad of minor confrontations, each of which is communicated instantly to public attention. Young people are more interested in, knowledgeable about, and hence critical of our foreign policy than any generation before them.

At the same time, disorders at home seem to cry out for remedy. Crises of race, inflation, urban renewal, and student disorders have generated a powerful impulse in many quarters toward isolationism, which reinforces that stimulated by Vietnam. At the beginning of this summer, on 25 June, the

U.S. Senate overwhelmingly approved a resolution calling on the executive branch not to undertake any foreign commitments without the express approval of Congress. In this context, it is interesting to speculate as to what the legislative reaction would be if a modern Truman Doctrine or Marshall Plan might be introduced.

It is important to emphasize that these changes just described, both in the international position of the United States, and in the trends in our society at home, are anything but ineipient. They are well nnderway. President Nixon has assured us that our combat troop commitment to Vietnam is to be reduced further and more radially. The climate among the Ameriean people, the public media, and the Congress is such that the assumption of any further overseas commitments is currently most doubtful, if not politically infeasible.


Whether or not we should maintain those responsibilities which have traditionally fallen to us seems to be a different question. President Nixon has admonished us about posing "a false choice between meeting our responsibilities abroad and meeting the needs of our people at home. We shall meet both or we shall meet neither." The real question turns on the method and manner in which these commitments are to be fulfilled.

In view of the stability and strength which now characterizes a large number of our allies, it does not seem unreasonable to assume that any viable strategy of the future must include their participation on an enlarged—and in some cases, dominant—scale, in the various regions of the world. It appears clear that the U.S. can no longer support a strategy where U.S. Armed Forces would continue to police the world

unilaterally. Various senior spokesmen in our government, including Senator Pastore in his gradnation address to the Naval War College in June, have called for new or altered defense arrangements where other counntries will share the load with us in maintaining the peace and stability of the world.

But regardless of what specific innovations are developed in U.S. strategy, the need for reassessment is clear. Now, at the beginning of a new academic year at the War College, it is to be hoped that some serious and original thinking can be produced in this vein. Secretary of Defense Laird has only recently called on the senior service colleges to search and come forth with new ideas and thinking that could be useful in addressing problems at the national level.

Academic freedom has always been a basic eharacteristic of the Naval War College. It is my helief that analysis and debate over important issues of national and military strategy are intrinsically beneficial in the educational process. And with the wealth of talent within our student body and our military and civilian faculty, it is logical to assume that we might well produce valuable studies and group research papers in response to the call of the Secretary of Defense. This could be one of the principal areas in which the Naval War College can make a truly significant contribution to U.S. national security in the years ahead.



R. G. COLBERT
Vice Adiniral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College

U.S. NAVAL POLICY

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College

by
Dr. Arthur C. Herrington
on 18 March 1969

It is a privilege and a real pleasure to be able to speak to you this morning, but it is with some trepidation and, frankly, with misgivings that I have chosen to discuss U.S. Naval Policy at the War College. There are two reasons, however, that have impelled me to tempt your patience and, perhaps, your good will.

First, I believe that we have reached a time where an explicit U.S. naval policy needs development and articulation. The lessons of Vietnam, the change of administration, mounting domestic demands for scarce resources, and, above all, the spiraling costs of naval construction and operations all argue cogently for review of our naval forces, how they support national policy objectives throughout the world, and what options we face in the future.

Second, I can think of no better place to address the subject of naval policy. Let there be no mistake—U.S. naval policy will, in the end, be developed not in OSD nor in the Bureau of the Budget nor in Congress nor even in the White House—it will be developed in the U.S. Navy. There will be many ideas which will originate outside the Navy. There will be many conditions imposed upon the Navy. But it will be within the U.S. Navy that the major debate must ensue, and it must be, finally, the Navy's own acceptance of a U.S. naval policy that will make it workable and valid.

As many of you know so well, the staff officer, whether he is attached to a fleet command, the Joint Staff, or OSD, has little time to contemplate major alternatives in U.S. national policy goals

and naval force planning. The immediate pressures and daily concerns simply take too much time. Here, perhaps, at the War College you have the opportunity to spend the time, to do the research, to calculate, to debate. It is with this in mind that I have chosen today's topic. And please let me say that we in OSD will look to you for your ideas, your opinions, your scholarship, and your support. At best, we may be able to stimulate, to advise, and to comment. In the end, the work will be yours.

The Elements of Debate. If, as I have proposed, U.S. naval policy needs articulation and debate, it is reasonable to ask what key factors must be included in that debate to make it useful to policymakers. Rather than dwell on everything that should be included in a discussion of naval policy, I should like to discuss two key items that are often omitted. The first is the clear delineation of major alternatives, and the second is cost.

How often have you read an article or staff paper that argues one side of a question or presents only one option? Or a paper that is directed to supporting a prior position without noting what the counterarguments are likely to be? It is my contention that papers of this type do not help solve the problems they address. The decisionmaker will obviously consider them one-sided and therefore suspect. At best, there may be better options than the one presented which have been overlooked because the author did not discipline himself to examine explicitly the range of possibilities. If I had to choose one source of difficulty in naval force planning, I should say, without a doubt, that failure to examine options is by far the greatest.

There are many reasons for our failure to examine alternatives. Some are imagined procedural constraints; we assume, for example, in examining the

use of sea-based tactical air that land-based air is someone else's responsibility and concern. The result is that we may omit the most important factor in the analysis. As another example, we look at the relative merits of nuclear and conventional ships and calculate the rate at which they can transit an ocean, without looking at what forward deployments of naval forces we propose for the future.

This kind of failure most often occurs when we assume the problem is one for "higher authority." For example, should an analysis of our needs for ASW forces in the North Atlantic assume a given level of shipping support to NATO, no matter how well that level has been determined? I think the answer is no; first, because it is necessary to prove that the NATO shipping requirement is the dominant factor in ASW and, then, if it is, that there are not other ways to solve the combined ASW-shipping problem (such as prepositioned stocks in Europe).

I have used these examples in part to illustrate that if there is to be a discussion of U.S. naval policy, then that discussion must consider the use of other military forces as well, both as competitors and complements. I will return to this point again a bit later on.

The second important item is the problem of costs. I do not emphasize costs because of any particular interest in immediate budget problems or any feeling about the overall level of military expenditures. I do so because cost is the only common denominator we have to compare some military forces with others or with nonmilitary Government programs. A dollar sign is really an indicator of people, material, and critical skills. In this country there is only so much of each, and, although we can slowly increase the amount of any, we are generally in the position of "robbing Peter to pay Paul." Our problem is we always know Paul, but we seldom meet Peter. Once in a while there is an

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exception, and we address the resources themselves—it is hard to get shipworkers in Boston because of the large urban redevelopment program—but, generally, we are forced to use the catchall, generic dollar sign for comparison.

Similarly, the U.S. economy has real constraints and limits. Limitations on military budgets and expenditures are not the arbitrary decision of the President or Congress—they are imposed quite severely by the economy. There are only so many goods and services to go around, and we can only increase the total slowly. If we try too much “robbing of Peter” the growth may stop, or, if we try to stimulate the growth too much we find that instead of real, productive growth we get only inflation.

Let me place some numbers behind these assertions. In the last Fiscal Year (FY 68) total Federal outlays were \$179 billion, of which \$81 billion was for defense, another \$80 billion was for programs that were essentially uncontrollable by the President (social security payments, interests on the debt, veterans payments, farm price supports, etcetera); the remaining \$18 billion was split over other controllable Government programs including NASA, foreign aid, housing, commerce and transportation, education, and the like. As you can see, the flexibility that the President has to make major changes within the \$179 billion total is extremely limited. At the same time, the receipts for FY 68 were only \$154 billion; we ran a deficit of \$25 billion which was met in part by expansion of the money supply. This resulted in heavy inflationary pressures, which necessitated increased interest rates and finally the surtax. If defense expenditures remain about the same in FY 69 (\$81 billion) and if the surtax is approved and there is expansion in the real output of the economy, the FY 69 problem should be less severe. However, I think you can see that the options for further expansion

of defense programs are limited. The goods and services summarized by the dollar figures are simply limited. Yet the implementation of the Joint Strategic Objective Plan (JSOP) in these years would have required \$100 to \$120 billion for defense alone.

Each year you, here, develop a JSOP. I can assure you that, if we could, we would buy the “reasonably achievable” forces in the JSOP, but the hard fact is that we cannot without giving up something else. In the end, the President and Congress are faced with a dilemma. I suggest that advice which offers only one unachievable alternative is not the best advice you can produce. If, in your opinion, national policy objectives are too broad to be met within reasonable national budgets, then it seems to me that you should so state. Or if you feel they might be funded by reduction of other federal expenditures, then you should examine this possibility. Furthermore, your advice on what national policies might be implemented within various budget levels is certainly of interest. In fact, the National Security Council has recently directed a multi-agency review of this particular problem.

There is a lesson hidden in the economic restrictions on defense. It is that if we are to protect the national interest as best we are able, then we must be *efficient* in the forces we buy. Any time forces cost more than is necessary to do a job, then we may be forced to give up other policy commitments because of our inefficiency. If we overbuy on strategic nuclear capability, then we may have to give up, for example, potential nonnuclear commitments in some area. I am not suggesting that this is a real alternative. I am only using it as an example of the competition for resources between different national objectives.

In this regard, let me deal with one argument I am sure you have heard before. In one form it goes: “You must

buy system X—we can't afford to compromise on defense." The answer is that, in fact, we always have compromised on national defense, even in wartime, and we always will. I like to think of defense like accident insurance—more is always better, but you are always forced to choose between more insurance and more something else. One cannot argue for more defense without proposing what else one would give up.

Before turning in detail to U.S. naval policy, I might indicate a recent and glaring example of what I mean about the lack of treatment of alternatives and costs. I am sure many of you have read the recent prize essay in the *Naval Institute Proceedings* entitled "The Encircling Sea." In it the author, who is an economist, notes the broad changes in the world since World War II, the fragmentation of the Communist empire, and the need for national policy to adapt to these changing conditions. He also notes we should be efficient: "National strategy must achieve its objectives with the least possible expenditure of resources." In the conclusion of his article, however, he recommends that we have:

A national commitment to the maintenance of a sea-air team capable of dealing with any threat to U.S. territories or communications with allies . . .

An integrated system of off-shore bases encircling the Eurasian landmass. . . .

Selected base sites [all?] should be protected by adequate garrison forces and . . . should possess ABMs and tactical nuclear weapons. . . .

Land and sea forces, capable of deployment to any threatened sector or for possible intervention on the continent at the option of the United States, . . .

And, as well, Polaris and sea-based ABM.

I can read these words to mean that we should buy and deploy a complete sea-based force prepared to engage the Soviets on their own soil. Yet, nowhere does the author suggest what the budgetary implications of such a strategy might be, whether we even have the resources to implement it, or whether this is the way to achieve what he supposes to be our national policy objectives "with the least possible expenditure of resources." What happened to foreign aid, the Army, Air Force, and, incidentally, our allies, who might be concerned? I would suggest it might be very hard to develop an explicit naval policy from such a rationale, and it would be even more difficult to convince anyone to buy it.

Past Naval Policy. If polemics about encircling the Soviets are not a reasonable means of developing naval policy, then what is? To find an answer I think it is perhaps of interest to look back at what U.S. naval policy has been in the past. The first point that has probably struck many of you already is that although the term "naval policy" was typically used to describe the concepts of sizing and deploying naval forces prior to World War II, it has been used sparingly, if at all, since that time.

From the laying of the *Dreadnought* in 1905 up to World War II, the United States, England, Germany, and Japan had remarkably accurate strategic concepts of the use of naval forces. The fundamental purpose of High Seas Fleets was to defend the extended lines of communication of empire and to attack those of the enemy. The military corollary was the calculated opposition of the battle fleets to produce the ultimate test. Before the advent of the aircraft as an offensive weapon, the broad strategy of both sides was known,

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and, in retrospect, the outcome of fleet engagements was reasonably predictable. The result, prior to World War I and again immediately thereafter, was an arms race to match fleets that has perhaps found its nearest counterpart in the United States-Soviet competition for strategic nuclear weaponry during the last two decades. It is also interesting to note that the military balance that obtained and the mounting costs of new generations of *Dreadnoughts* had two significant results. The first result was a pervasive caution about risking the fleets, a caution that constrained both naval strategy and tactics in World War I. Admiral Jellicoe was described by so acute an observer as Winston Churchill as "the one man who could have lost the war in one afternoon." The second result was that the continued commitment of immense resources to fleets whose ultimate use placed the Nation itself at risk was halted in 1921 by the Washington Treaty. This treaty, although perhaps satisfactory to none of the signatories, provided a needed time for reconsideration.

During the decades leading to World War II, the U.S. naval standard—parity with the British in capital ships yet "second to none"—appeared sufficient to support U.S. policies in the Pacific. Our naval policy was content to depend primarily on the British for containment of potential enemies in Europe. The "Rainbow" plans for the use of naval forces in the Far East were generally accurate in strategic concept and a reasonable reflection of what later occurred.

If U.S. naval policy in this era was accurate in grand strategy, it was equally in error in choice of weapon systems. It is interesting to note that in spite of their experience in World War I, the German Navy entered World War II basically unprepared for offensive submarine warfare. Yet, in spite of the mounting German submarine campaign in 1941, the United States entered

World War II similarly unprepared against Japan. And, above all, U.S. naval policy remained centered on the battleship. A quote from another prize essay is illustrative. It was by Rear Adm. J.K. Taussig and appeared in the 1939 *Naval Institute Proceedings*:

The battleships, it is conceded, form the nucleus of that major force which is organized primarily to fight battles. . . . such cruisers, destroyers, and aircraft best suited for operating in battle with these battleships, and in such numbers as may be available for making a well balanced fighting force, and for giving close security while cruising, should be assigned to the organization of which battleships are the nucleus.

Unfortunately, what was conceded in this country was not conceded in Japan. They had viewed the alternatives—we had not.

The end of World War II, world realignment, and the advent of nuclear weapons not only brought an end to the strategic concepts of the 1920's and 1930's but also spelled an end to the basis for naval policies that had lasted for over half a century. The U.S. Navy was left without its classic *raison d'être*—there was no other surface fleet to engage. In addition, the very existence of the Navy was threatened in many minds by the immense lethality of nuclear weaponry and the long range of the new strategic aircraft. The Navy itself found new justification in strategic nuclear warfare. It is interesting to note now that the first "supercarrier" was proposed to accommodate a very large four-engine turboprop aircraft. The large aircraft was required to carry the very large nuclear weapons of the time. In spite of the use of carriers in Korea, the emphasis on nuclear retaliation in naval force planning was prevalent until advent of the strategic missiles—Polaris and Minuteman—in the early 1960's.

Naval Policy Today. I would now like to make a contention that you may find, at best, unsatisfactory. It is, simply stated, that since World War II this country has not had a clear and consistent naval policy nor does it have one today. It is for this reason the term "naval policy" itself has dropped from our lexicon. The Navy has felt pressed. At times it has even felt that its existence was threatened. And it has felt unable, in the shifting sands of changing technology and national commitments, to find a firm foundation for the long-term planning that building a navy requires. Let me give you a few examples of what has occurred.

There is the problem of the 6th Fleet. U.S. naval forces were introduced into the Mediterranean in 1946 by the Secretary of the Navy, James Forrestal; by the end of 1946, after Cabinet-level review, it was announced that U.S. naval forces would be permanently stationed in the Mediterranean. Soviet troops had refused to withdraw from northern Iran, there was Communist-backed insurgency in Greece, and the Soviets were threatening Turkey over border area disputes. By 1948 the newly named 6th Task Fleet included two full-time attack carriers to support its peacekeeping role in the area. Two years later the first nuclear weapon was introduced, and through the 1950's the 6th Fleet's role became increasingly that of a nuclear deterrent with strikes aimed at the Soviet homeland. Today, with the passing of the primary strategic nuclear role to sea- and land-based missiles, and with the introduction of land-based tactical air on NATO's southern flank, the primary role of the 6th Fleet has apparently shifted again to that of a peacekeeping force. Throughout this time, force planning for the Mediterranean has been for two attack carriers on station with at least three more in the United States to support this forward deployment, plus the associated protection and support. Apparently the

6th Fleet's size has been independent of its primary mission.

What appears to be true of the 6th Fleet has also been true of our attack carrier force levels as a whole. Faced with the new world of 1946, the Navy had to make hard recommendations on the size of the postwar fleet. Not surprisingly, perhaps, in 1947 the recommended level of attack carriers, the Navy's new capital ships, was 15. This was the maximum number of U.S. battleships that had been imposed by the Washington Treaty of 1921 and was the exact number in the Navy from 1921 until our entry into World War II, 20 years later.

The Navy's 15-carrier force objective came under increasing attack in the late 1940's. With the proposed introduction of the new supercarriers, actual force levels fell as low as 11 at the outbreak of the Korean war in 1950. Korea brought a resurgence of carrier air, but, again, by early 1956 attack carrier objectives and force levels had stabilized at 15. Today we still plan a 15-CVA force for the future. Yet over this 25-year period we have seen a polarization of the world into Communist and non-Communist camps and, lately, an increasing fragmentation of both; the development of the Marshall Plan, NATO, the conversion of our enemy in the Pacific, Japan, to an ally and the conversion of our old ally, China, to an enemy; a doubling of the size of the attack carrier; nuclear propulsion; jet aircraft; and nuclear weapons! In truth, 15 attack carriers (or 15 capital ships in the U.S. Navy, if you will) appears to be close to an "eternal verity" in U.S. military planning.

Do not let me leave you, however, with the impression that what has been true of attack carriers has not been true of other forces as well. For example, in the early 1950's our attack submarine force objectives and levels stabilized at approximately 105 firstline submarines, all diesel, and primarily concerned with

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surface shipping. Since then we have seen the introduction of the nuclear submarine and, in the early 1960's, the concept that the primary role of the submarine force is antisubmarine warfare (ASW). Throughout that period we have maintained, give or take one or two, 105 firstline submarines. Furthermore, no less an authority than the CNO himself has recently stated to Congress: "I consider the ultimate force level should be about 100 to 110 SSNs. Navy analyses have consistently defined our requirements for attack submarines within this range."

It is interesting to compare this statement with one made to Congress by Admiral Carney in 1947, 21 years earlier: "The matter of undersea warfare is more clearly defined. It is so clearly defined that we feel justified in beginning a submarine replacement program. I think . . . we probably level off at a designed submarine strength of possibly 100 ships, plus or minus." It also so happens that the U.S. Navy had exactly 100 submarines in 1940*

Finally, there exists an often repeated contention that the basic requirement for the Navy is for "control of the seas." There is a fleeting satisfaction that perhaps there exists, indeed, a concept or rationale for naval power providing continuity with an earlier era and even constant force levels. Unfortunately, however, I think you will find that "control of the seas" does not provide either a sufficient or even a necessary basis for naval force planning.

Let me confine my discussion, for the moment, to nonnuclear forces and weapons. For example, "control of the seas" can today certainly be affected by land-based aircraft. Such control can be affected at least to the extent that there are likely to be areas of the world where

neither we nor the Soviets would care to venture with naval forces. There are two basic problems. First, there is the question of the complementary nature of naval and nonnaval forces which I mentioned earlier—what mix should the nation choose, given that we indeed wish to maintain "control of the seas" in some part of the world. Second, and perhaps more important, is to what areas of the world and with what intensity and simultaneity must the doctrine of "control of the seas" extend? At what cost and to implement what national objectives in the area? As an extreme example, are the White and Black Seas included? Furthermore, if I consider the use of nuclear weapons, do the areas I wish to "control" change?

From the above arguments I would suggest that if the United States has a naval policy today at all, it is one of maintaining constant force levels and adapting these forces to the exigencies of the day.

Challenge and Change. It is possible to raise at this point the following objection: Why should not our naval force levels remain constant in a changing world? If the U.S. Navy has been a reasonable tool of U.S. policy over the 20 plus years since World War II, have not the fixed force levels been effective? Granted we may have had some minor inefficiencies, but then you cannot change the size and composition of a Navy overnight.

I think the objection is reasonable, but I believe I may be able to convince you that we are now entering an era when it will be extremely difficult to plan as we have in the past. First, we are now coming to the end of our World War II ships; for the past two decades we have replaced or modernized most of our carriers, cruisers, frigates, and first-line destroyers. We have been gradually replacing old submarines with SSN's. But the bulk of our ships are still of WW II vintage: half of the submarines, the

*I am indebted to D.P. Wilson of the Center for Naval Analyses for his discussions of carrier levels and for references to the composition of the U.S. Navy in 1940.

FRAM destroyers, the CVS's, and the support and repair fleet. At the same time, the costs of the ships we now propose as replacements have skyrocketed. Let me give you some examples.

1. The *Kennedy* cost \$350 million. The *Nimitz* is budgeted at \$550 million, and it could run as high as twice the *Kennedy*. Aircraft are worse. The F-4 cost about \$3.5 million; in production, in today's dollars, the F-14 will probably cost over \$10 million.

2. Two years ago a *Sturgeon* SSN cost \$80 million. The first 688 in this year's budget will cost over three times that amount, and follow ships will be a minimum of twice the *Sturgeon* cost.

3. The DDG-2 is not a bad ship at 4,500 tons. The DX, a replacement destroyer—not even a modern missile ship—will be about 6,500 tons and will cost in mass production over \$60 million. Yet it will carry the same ASW weapons as the DDG-2. A modern "G" ship would cost perhaps \$80 million. If the "G" ship is nuclear, the cost will be close to one-quarter of a billion dollars. It does not seem probable that we will replace all our current 275 destroyers with ships costing \$60 to \$80 million each, not to mention nuclear power, even if we had the facilities and labor in this country to do so.

4. A tender or repair ship now costs about \$100 million. We have over 20 that are approaching 25 years of age.

Let us contrast to these estimates what we have spent in recent years. Over the past 10 years we have spent on the order of \$2 billion per year on shipbuilding. Our current yards could handle perhaps 50 percent more than this, but skilled labor will probably be unavailable. For the last 2 years, only about \$1 billion per year has been appropriated by Congress. Furthermore, my cost estimates on ships are probably low. The Navy has recently indicated that they now estimate FY 69 and prior

year ships now under construction will cost much more than originally estimated. This overrun is close to the *total* new obligational authority provided by Congress for all shipbuilding in FY 69.

It is possible to estimate the costs of simply maintaining the force levels we currently have by replacing ships as they near out with their counterparts that we now have on the drawing board. Over the next 10 years such a program could cost \$4 billion per year, not including probable increases in ship costs for new technology and weapons. To buy additional forces would cost even more. In short, even if the funds were available, it is doubtful that we have the shipbuilding resources in this country to meet such a program or that we can develop them in that time. Nor will the costs be limited to procurement. No matter how we may wish to the contrary, more expensive ships will cost proportionately more to maintain and operate.

In summary, the cost of burgeoning weapons technology has finally overtaken us. We have been able to maintain essentially constant inventories of ships by riding on our WW II assets, but now, 25 years later, we are entering a different world—one that will necessarily call for a new look at the role, size, characteristics, and composition of the U.S. Navy. More than ever before we need a coherent policy relating U.S. naval force planning to specific U.S. interests throughout the world.

Let me now make another assertion for you to consider. Rather than in control of the seas, our fundamental national interests abroad lie with other nations and peoples. The extent to which we need control of the access to these nations—the seas if you will—lies in how deeply we are committed to them and what fraction of our national wealth we are willing to commit to their protection.

The broad implication of this statement is that potential requirements for naval forces might be inferred by

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looking at selected areas in the world, estimating what naval forces would be needed to carry out what missions in these areas, determining what other military and nonmilitary options were available, and, finally, estimating the costs for the various options. In theory, at least, a total naval policy could result from a careful examination of a limited number of areas.

Let me suggest how this could be done. For example, we might consider the Atlantic as comprising, in naval terms at least, the 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean, the area north of Iceland, our shipping routes to Europe, and contingency operations in the Caribbean and to the south. Other subdivisions are certainly possible and might be more productive. I have only chosen this set because I want to take one area, the Norwegian Sea, and focus on it as an example.

Hypothetically, one might ask whether we should attempt to provide naval forces, including amphibious assault, to counter a possible Soviet invasion of Finland, that area of northern Norway that abuts the Soviet Union. To do so means that we would have to operate a minimum of two attack carriers and perhaps more, amphibious shipping, and support forces near Soviet submarine bases in the Kola Gulf. And we would have to do this far forward of most of our own land-based air support. For such an operation to have any chance of success, these naval forces might have to have far more intensive ASW protection than we normally provide. In addition, they would be facing an extreme Soviet air threat.

Let me focus on the carriers for a moment. There are two options. First, we could attempt to protect them for this type of operation and buy the necessary additional air defense and ASW. The second option is not to count on carriers for this role and to set carrier force levels and the extent of their

protection for other missions. When the amphibious and logistics forces and their protection are also included, comparison of these two alternatives provides an estimate of the cost to the United States to protect Finland with naval forces. Let me assume, for the moment, this cost to be an arbitrary \$10 billion over the next 10 years. A number of questions then arise: Are there other options to meet the same objective at the same or lower costs, such as strengthening indigenous Norwegian forces? If not, would we be better off spending the same amount in defending the central region in NATO rather than the northern flank? Again, if not, is Finland, in the end, worth spending \$10 billion to defend? Some of the answers may be clear—others will undoubtedly be debatable—but I think you can see that it may be possible, through the type of process I have outlined in this hypothetical example, to develop a tight tie between national interests and naval force planning. It is that tie which is the essence of naval policy.

I have no illusions about the size and complexity of the task I have proposed. One cannot attempt to size the U.S. Atlantic Fleet, for example, without a careful examination of a number of geographic areas and a number of options that are far outside the scope of naval operations themselves. Furthermore, it is necessary to consider all the major options available at once. The arguments about Finland are not meaningful unless there are alternative bases for estimating other NATO operations, the 6th Fleet, etcetera.

But I would suggest to you that the task is by no means insurmountable. In addition to the areas in the Atlantic I have mentioned, I would suggest as examples for your consideration the following possible areas for examination: the Sea of Japan and off Korea, the East China Sea (with and without a U.S. presence in the Ryukus), the South

China Sea, Southeast Asia (this is our third war there in roughly the last half century), the Bay of Bengal, and the East Coast of Africa. There is now no U.S. military presence in the two latter areas. What would its cost be, and what other options may we have in these areas at similar expenditures?

In conclusion, I should like to return to a statement I made earlier. No matter what work is done in OSD or elsewhere, U.S. naval policy must, in the end, be developed and accepted by the U.S. Navy. Regardless of the stability in force size in the last quarter century, in the coming years the size and composition of our naval forces are likely to change through economic pressures, if for no other reason. If the Navy is to remain a flexible and responsive implement of national policy, you gentlemen must guide that change. You will need to develop the tools and techniques, the new naval policy. I hope you will accept

my suggestions today as a limited contribution to assist you in that endeavor.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Dr. Arthur C. Herrington holds B.S. and Sc.D. degrees from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in Chemical Engineering. His experience includes developmental work in the chemical and nuclear fields. Immediately prior to joining the Department of Defense, he was a Lecturer at M.I.T. in Political Science and, concurrently, a staff member of the MITRE Corporation involved in problems of nuclear detection and strategic command and control.

Dr. Herrington has been the Director of the Nuclear Weapons Division and is currently Director of Naval Forces, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis).

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Naval tactics are based upon conditions the chief cause of which, namely the arms, may change; which in turn causes necessarily a change in the construction of ships, in the manner of handling them, and so finally in the disposition and handling of fleets.

*Sébastien-François Bigot de Morogues:
Tactique Navale, 1763*

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THE U.S. NAVY AND THE PUBLIC

A lecture delivered to the Naval Command Course
at the Naval War College
by
Mr. Morgan L. Fitch, Jr.
on 29 May 1969

My assigned task is to discuss the Navy League of the United States, which is known as the "Civilian Arm of the Navy." This concerns what it is supposed to do and what it does. Before doing so, it is important to reach some initial understandings or this can be very short indeed.

First, a Navy must understand that it is responsive to, and subservient to, the people. The cliché that "there will always be a Navy" will neither sustain nor maintain a modern Navy. I think that our Navy understands its responsibility to the civilian Commander in Chief and its relation to the Congress, which supplies the money. I question whether the U.S. Navy fully *understands* the next step, i.e., the direct responsibility to the people. The same

question can be asked of the naval service of any country. Does any navy understand its direct responsibility to the people? In years past the Armed Forces of the United States have prescribed their needs, and the Administration and Congress have largely followed the prescription. Within the Congress, the Armed Forces Committees, the Congressional specialists in military needs, have had their way. Three principal things have happened in America which are changing this in a significant way.

First, our enemies have found that public opinion at home is equally as potent as guns on the battlefield. Hanoi, after success with France, has achieved some success in the United States. In any event, psychological warfare is just

as clearly being fought at home as in Vietnam. Military commanders find that derogatory remarks in our press not only erode the morale of our forces but also sustain the morale of enemy forces. Indeed, critical excerpts from the American press repeatedly appear on the persons of captured soldiers.

Second, the cost of national defense is interfering with the carrying out of our obligations to the people in the fields of housing, education, and dietary deficiencies, if not hunger. There is now contest for money in Congress, regardless of the recently reported comments of the Secretary of Defense. A few nights ago a news story carried the lamentations of a medical student over cuts in scholarship funds because of support for national defense. Guns are in conflict with butter.

Third, there has been considerable loss of confidence in Government, and it is not merely a "credibility gap." A number of things are indicative of this. One Government official testified a few years ago that the Government has a right to lie to protect itself. A Supreme Court Justice has recently resigned, apparently to prevent worse revelations, and others are under attack. The Department of Defense has been caught manipulating figures to reduce overruns in Government contracts, and the overruns in number and amount have called into question the management ability of Government. The judgment in Government as to Vietnam and, subsequently, in Vietnam, have greatly reduced confidence. Here, papers carried stories that we were foolish to try to take "Hamburger Hill," and now we are foolish to let it go.

The Navy's image has been greatly tarnished in the Arbeiter situation, the *Pueblo* affair, the loss of the submarine *Scorpion*, the problems of Sea Lab II, and the dockside sinking of a nuclear submarine and the shooting down of one of its planes in the Sea of Japan. We need not debate the merits or justifiable

cause of each of these situations, but, rather, you should note the effect of them upon the public. They have greatly affected the Navy's relation to the public. On the other hand, the handling by the Secretary of Navy of the *Pueblo* crew was a coup from the point of view of the public if not from the naval command viewpoint.

The Navy, as well as the other Armed Forces, is feeling the impact of the university campus revolt by loss of Reserve officer training programs and by difficulties in campus recruiting. This is only the beginning, as the militants are targeting upon our high schools for the next 5 years and the grammar schools in the succeeding 5 years. They also seek to establish honorability among young people for those who reject military service. The attack upon universities for undertaking military research programs has been serious, and one major university has cut its relation to its research arm for this reason.

These matters have had an effect on the public mind and peril our military forces both as to personnel and as to maintenance of and obtaining facilities. It should be noted that a few weeks ago it was suggested that the Navy retire 10 *Polaris* submarines to save \$150 million per year.

What effect do these attacks in public have? A short time ago in a speech, the Chairman of the House Armed Forces Committee noted that *public opinion* is more important than the *legislature* and is only slightly less important than the Biblical Ten Commandments.

The Navy, in its traditional mission, is almost uniquely dissociated with public matters because of its duties in Washington, at sea, and abroad which inherently result in certain remoteness from the people. It suffers, as many of you do, from reliance upon the media such as television and newspapers. And here a point should be driven home. Never mistake the statements in the

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media for the will or the feelings of the American people, and this applies to representations and alleged statements of our politicians as well. The German Kaiser made this mistake, as did Hitler, and, more recently, as did Hanoi.

Another serious problem is the inherent weakness of a military man trying to convey to the people the need of a Navy. A military man is doubly handicapped, first, in his public image in a sector of our society which pictures him as playing war games and, second, in a public belief that he is speaking in self-interest.

This time has been spent in developing the thesis that public opinion is extremely important to the Navy and that it has difficulties in achieving appropriate communication with the public. It is questionable whether the U.S. Navy fully appreciates the necessity of the people's direct support and of the need for appropriate direct liaison with the people. Assuming that you are reasonably convinced that public opinion and support are needed for a Navy and that the Navy itself cannot wholly carry the word, then you need some mechanism to translate the need for and needs of a Navy to the people and, as important, to translate the feelings of the people to the Navy. That mechanism should be a civilian organization oriented toward the Navy.

If we are to have such an organization, what should it be like, and how should it function?

The organization should be civilian in character and avoid any membership from active duty personnel so as to be free from a complaint that its acts are self-serving. The organization should include members from all segments of the society so that business and labor, young and old, Republican and Democrat, liberal and conservative, and highly and lowly educated people of all races, creeds, and colors are adequately represented in the organization. The organization should avoid control by or

dependency upon defense industry, Reservists, or any group which stands to profit from the mediations or actions of the group. It should educate the people so that the people, in turn, advise their elected Representatives, and thereby the organization avoids direct involvement in the legislative processes. Basically, the organization should be independent but representative, while maintaining a maritime orientation.

The organization should be aware of the Nation's interest in the seas and should be briefed in the Navy's problems, interests, and requirements. On the other hand, it should be tuned to the feelings of the people in respect to the Navy.

The organization ideally should be able to inform the public of the maritime problems in a responsible manner, support the Navy in discharging its functions and solving its problems, and intelligently advise the Administration and the Navy of the feelings of the people. In other words, the organization should look out and look in.

It is important to question the wisdom of involvement of the organization in certain matters. In this area there is doubt as to its becoming involved in debate on public policy, matters which are political, and military strategy. The Navy has no right to question the public policy of the United States. Quite to the contrary, it is charged with the responsibility of carrying out the public policy. The Navy is prohibited by law from becoming involved in political debate or political matters since it must serve any elected political party. For a Navy-oriented organization to question public policy or engage in political partisanship is to betray a trust to the service which it espouses.

The U.S. Navy is politically weak because it does not vote. In this respect it has earned the contempt of some legislators. Insofar as concerns military strategy, the organization just cannot be sufficiently informed to pass upon this

matter. Whether we mine Haiphong, send bombers into North Korea, fire upon Russian ships off Cuba, or support the Israelis or Arabs are matters requiring much more advice than is available to a civilian organization. Equally, the selection of airplane types, ship designs, and missile capabilities are beyond the ken of a maritime-oriented civilian organization.

However, there are areas in which a maritime-oriented civilian organization can be quite effective and even more effective than a Navy. For example, a civilian can talk to audiences where a military man would be unwelcome. A civilian can work more effectively in some schools than a Navy man. By law, the Navy cannot seek forums in which to present its case on Navy matters, but a civilian organization can provide arenas. A military man has little effect upon a Congressman, but a constituent has considerable effect. The Navy is at a disadvantage in dealing with youth, particularly today. The U.S. Navy is disadvantaged in seeking its place in the field of oceanography and having its voice heard in respect to the merchant marine. A very difficult problem for the Navy is to deal with the ROTC program on campus and recruiting at the college and high school. These are but a few examples of areas where a maritime-oriented civilian organization can function to advantage.

So, I have tried to tell you of the significance of the people in maritime matters, and I have tried to tell you how a maritime organization should be constituted and how it should function. Before we consider the Navy League of the United States under the test suggested, we should look at major maritime problems of the United States today. These are not given in order of importance, but they are suggested in increasing order of specificity.

A first problem is the overall position of the United States in the field of oceanography and the nature of

involvement of the Navy. This is quite complex but, nevertheless, a significant national and Navy problem. Who will measure the Navy's involvement in oceanography?

A second and related problem is the problem of seapower, the meaning and significance of which are not understood by the people. An interesting facet of this problem is that the scope of the term "seapower" is not agreed upon within the U.S. Navy. This does not mean that the U.S. Navy does not understand seapower, but we do not have a basic definition. A recent brilliant Secretary of the Navy gave three different definitions in three different speeches. I will challenge you, as I have your predecessors here at the War College, as to the definition of seapower. I have collected over 20 definitions, running from "all things wet" to the Mahan definition of "control of the Seas" to a more recent one that "Seapower is what the Russians are doing."

A third problem is one of major Navy concern but restricted Navy responsibility and that is the deteriorating American merchant marine. The public has very little consciousness of the plight of its merchant marine and the effect of this on them. You undoubtedly have had this information in your course here.

Navy ship obsolescence and maintenance are increasing problems which lack public understanding. It should be noted that some 50 new ships have recently been cut from the Federal budget.

Maintenance of naval personnel is a fifth problem of public concern. Recruiting, retention, pay, housing, and recognition of the sailor and marine all need support of the people to maintain an adequate naval force. While the draft has alleviated current recruiting problems, the President is working toward a volunteer service with elimination of the draft, and it is obvious that the Navy is going to have to show an increased

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interest in youth for the long-range manning of its forces. The Department of Defense, in considering pay for military services, has edged away from pay "comparability" to a more amorphous doctrine of "equitability" which means that retention will have to rely more heavily on recognition of the sailor and marine by the public.

These are but a few problems of Navy-public concern, but they are problems which a Navy cannot handle alone. They are, nonetheless, problems which a maritime-oriented civilian organization could assist a Navy in handling or solving.

Now let us measure the Navy League of the United States in this environment.

First, the Navy League of the United States is civilian in its membership, and no active duty personnel belong. There is no requirement of prior naval service, and more than 25 percent have no prior Navy affiliation. Only some 10 percent of its members are related to defense industry. It is lacking in participation in minority races, members of labor organizations, and younger people. However, it is relatively apolitical and reasonably geographically distributed. Its membership is reasonably affluent and relatively influential. Accordingly, the Navy League of the United States has a generally effective membership with some weaknesses.

So far, its programs are substantially supported by membership income at \$15.00 per member, with \$10.00 going to the national office and \$5.00 going to the local council of which there are about 300 in the United States and abroad. The programs do not rely, presently, upon industry money or other special contributions so that the voice of the Navy League is not now tainted by special interests. The importance of this cannot be overemphasized, and other service-affiliated groups have lost considerable effectiveness because of outside support by special interests.

Accordingly, the Navy League voice has achieved considerable significance as an independent oracle.

The Navy League tries to draw attention and focus on particular problems of maritime concern by disseminating resolutions through all media.

The Navy League works through other organizations and its committees to achieve its ends. A listing of some of these with a brief description of what they do should give you a brief idea of how the work is accomplished.

The Navy League spawned the U.S. Naval Sea Cadet Corps, which is a separate, Federally chartered organization for training volunteer boys in the Navy. Sea Cadets are, of course, familiar to many of you here. We are at a force level of nearly 6,000, but we and the Navy project 100,000 boys in the next 10 years. Over 10 percent of the national budget of the Navy League is presently directed to the Sea Cadet program.

The Public Affairs Committee seeks cooperation with outside service clubs and other organizations to provide platforms and publications for telling the maritime story. The Navy League is trying to use this approach to achieve greater leverage. A weakness we have is in the Navy and the Navy League spending too much effort on those who are already "sold" on maritime matters and not enough effort in proselyting those who are unfamiliar with maritime problems.

Our Seapower Committee collects and disseminates information on all aspects of the Nation's maritime problems. It has staged seminars on oceanography and the merchant marine.

An Image Committee is working within and without the Navy to achieve improved recognition and understanding of the sailor and marine. This is truly a joint Navy-civilian undertaking.

Under a Publications Committee, we publish a monthly magazine—*NAVY, the Magazine of Sea Power*. Over 25

percent of the national budget of the Navy League supports this undertaking. The magazine seeks to keep the membership informed and provide information on maritime matters outside of our ranks.

We have an ADAPT-Highline Committee which is concerned with Navy personnel matters including pay, housing, family accommodations, and post-service employment. This committee is directed to showing concern for the Navy man and his family.

An Awards Committee tries to recognize men in service to show civilian concern and recognition as well as to recognize those in the Navy League.

The Navy League has tried to encourage dialog between the Navy and American industry, without becoming involved in supply or procurement, and biannually sponsors a symposium and exhibit in Washington for this purpose. We think that it is basic to a strong Navy to encourage ingenuity and accomplishment in the industrial segment of our country.

The Navy League annually sponsors Navy Day, assists in recruiting, supports various commemorative events, encourages other organizations such as the Wifeline Association and Navy Relief, cooperates with other Navy-oriented organizations, sponsors informative and nonpartisan Congressional breakfasts, and promotes Navy themes such as "U.S. Navy—the Mark of a Man," "The U.S. Navy on the Move," and "The U.S. Navy—Opportunities Unlimited."

The Navy League President travels throughout the country focusing on Navy problems. Our immediate past president has been emphasizing the need for oceanic education, and our new president says that he will stress the

plight of the American merchant marine. At other times our presidents have stressed the need for pay increases and housing improvements and have emphasized a strong and independent naval service.

We have formed Navy League Councils in some of your countries and have encouraged you to establish Navy Leagues of your own. We believe in the Navy League and that it is a necessary adjunct to any navy.

You have been given some flavor of the Navy League, but it is not possible to tell the whole story here. It was founded in the United States in 1902 with some funds from a Nobel Peace Prize given to Theodore Roosevelt. On this note and heritage of peace I will conclude.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Mr. Morgan L. Fitch, Jr., received a B.S. in chemical engineering from the Illinois Institute of Technology in 1943 and following World War II entered the University of Michigan where he earned a

doctor of law degree (J.D.). He served in World War II as a naval officer, experiencing many of the actions in the Western Pacific aboard aircraft carriers. Mr. Fitch has had a long association with the Navy League, serving as National President from April 1965 until May 1967. During his affiliation with the Navy League, he directed considerable effort to promoting the U.S. Naval Sea Cadet Program and the Navy League's Shipmate Program. He was twice awarded the Distinguished Public Service Award of the Secretary of the Navy in 1960 and 1965. Mr. Fitch is a partner of Anderson, Luedeka, Fitch, Even and Tabin of Chicago, Illinois.

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The New Left And Its Implications For Strategy In The Seventies

A research paper prepared by
Mr. Paul K. Stahnke
School of Naval Warfare

INTRODUCTION

Serious analysis of current history is never an easy task. It is doubly difficult in this period of accelerated change in which today's crises often become merely footnotes in tomorrow's history. However, this paper attempts rather brazenly to judge the place in history of the current generational revolt which has, within the past few years, become a major, and often distorted, feature in the media and a preoccupation of the public generally.

The significance of the "generation gap" becomes an intimate and unavoidably subjective question to any father (and this writer is one threefold), further complicating any analysis. How-

ever, the question cannot be avoided in considerations of the shape of the future. Its implications are manifold, but this paper will focus primarily on those likely to affect U.S. strategy in the next decade.

In the process more questions will probably be raised than answered, but the vague outlines of the changing parameters within which any international strategy will have to operate are already apparent. These, with some embellishments, become the tentative conclusions of this paper, but not until after the origins, motivations, objectives, and endurability of the New Left are explored in some—and probably controversial—detail.

I—CONSENSUS THROUGH CONFLICT

Historians have again renewed a debate begun at the turn of the century by the "progressive historians"—Turner, Beard, and Parrington—on whether American society is molded by consensus or torn by conflict.¹ Following the collapse of the illusory American consensus of the "Great Society" in the latter days of Lyndon Johnson's Presidency, the "conflict historians" appear to have won the day, and, indeed, much scholarly work is being devoted currently to rehabilitating the abolitionist and populists and even the forgotten loyalists of the Revolutionary period.

While, for example, Louis Hartz, a "consensus historian," notes that even American conservatives today hail the revolutionary heroes in contrast to France where "the royalist still curses the Jacobin."² R.R. Palmer points out that the French emigrés returned to France after the Restoration while the Americans did not:

The sense in which there was no conflict in the American Revolution is the sense in which the loyalists are forgotten. The 'American consensus' rests in some degree on the elimination from the national consciousness, as well as from the country, of a once important and relatively numerous element of dissent.³

America has been hard on dissenters, but not usually as hard as on the loyalists. Even one of the leading anti-consensus historians, Christopher Lasch, agrees that "conflict theory can't explain what made the national society cohere. It can't explain the absence of a radical tradition in America."⁴ There have, of course, been radical movements in the United States, the persistent myth of "endless normalcy" notwithstanding, but they failed to establish a tradition principally because their basic

tenets—usually modified, to be sure—eventually became accepted in the American mainstream. The populists declined as a movement when they had nothing worthwhile left to fight for; Norman Thomas started his public career as a flaming radical and ended it as a benign elder statesman, adviser to both Democratic and Republican Presidents. America was and remains a pluralistic society in which a subtly changing consensus has evolved through conflict. Martyrs to lost—and often good—causes can be found in America's past, but, on the whole, dissent has been remarkably tolerated and has played a vital role in the shaping of America's history.

Professor Hofstadter, while characterizing the consensus theory as having only "transitional merits," describes the American process as involving "a subtler, more intangible, but vital kind of moral consensus that I would call comity. Comity exists in a society to the degree that those enlisted in its contending interests have a basic minimal regard for each other . . ." Hofstadter reviews the waxing and waning phases of comity in American history and concludes, not unexpectedly, that it is presently in a waning phase.⁵

While Hofstadter cited the intolerance the Negroes now feel about having been excluded from the "covenant of comity" as the basis of America's present crisis, a subtler, and perhaps more profound, element is the distinctive new "life style" being developed through a remarkable consensus among the younger generation of Americans, both black and white, which has given rise to the so-called "generation gap."

Despite historical evidence that even the most turbulent periods of the past were held together by a degree of comity, the current time of trouble, both domestic and foreign, causes deeper feelings of concern over the future of American traditions and institutions than at any time in living

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memory. Perhaps it only seems so because yesterday's troubles tend to fade in memory; perhaps it is that current problems have crept upon us so insidiously and are so vaguely defined (when compared to such sharp and immediate crises as the Great Depression or World War II); perhaps it is in part that so many of our current problems have a highly personal quality—e.g., the chasm in understanding between the generations, the race question, the threat of nuclear annihilation or the slower poisoning of the environment by the effluence of our affluent society, the impersonalization of human relations, the breathtaking speed of technological change.

Something is "bugging" us all, not just the well-publicized "under 30's" who magnify the discontents and concerns of their fathers while discovering a few of their own. Although even the poor (with some notable exceptions) are better off materially than ever before, many Americans find the sought for and now realized comforts and accumulation of material possessions vaguely unsatisfying and even disturbing. America is in the initial stage of the technological age and wonders whether it will produce only tools of physical and spiritual destruction.

Discontent in America is being expressed in various ways, including a predictable, though well-contained, reaction to the right. However, its purest—because it is less censored or inhibited—form is discernible among the young who, in their language, have not yet been seduced by the Establishment. The seriousness or persistence of the young in their revolt against the system can perhaps be questioned. The young have always revolted against their parents and society, and many a well-established middle-aged parent solaces himself when confronting his bearded, long-haired son that this phase too will pass as did bed-wetting, puberty and acne. However, these rumblings of

discontent take on a more serious meaning when one looks through youth's clearer, though still naive, eyes at the troubled vision of the quantum jump our ill-prepared society and its institutions are taking into the technological age.

The question of whether the young will, with maturity, settle down to accepting the world as it is really has no meaning when all knowledgeable projections indicate that the very institutions of the present system will have to change radically or disappear in the face of the strains of technological change. It has become a truism to say we live in an age of accelerating change, but it remains difficult to comprehend that yesterday's world will become unrecognizable tomorrow.

In this context the young can be viewed as the still-bumbling initiators of a new "life style" that may convert us all into a new comity in which a relative peace once again becomes established between man and a completely new environment. Although, to take an extreme, hippie philosophy is not likely to become a commonly accepted lifestyle, the admonition to "make love, not war" takes on a deeper meaning in a world that is rapidly developing so many paths to self-destruction.

II—YOUTH'S DARK VIEW OF THE FUTURE

It is impossible to accede to a fundamentally new environment without experiencing the inner terrors of a metamorphosis. The child is terrified when it opens its eyes for the first time. Similarly, for our mind to adjust itself to lines and horizons enlarged beyond measure, it must renounce the comfort of familiar narrowness. It must create a new equilibrium for everything that had formerly been so neatly arranged in its small inner world. It is

dazzled when it emerges from its dark prison, awed to find itself suddenly at the top of a tower, and it suffers from giddiness and disorientation. The whole psychology of modern disquiet is linked with the sudden confrontation with space-time.

... Teilhard de Chardin¹

The Inner Distress. George Kennan, who recently became a serious and controversial critic of the student left, has noted the rapid shifting of student concern "from the Negro of the rural South to the Negro of the urban North, and then to Vietnam, and then to the disciplinary regime of the college campus" and finds this strongly suggestive "that the real seat of discomfort lies not in the objects that attract these feelings but in some inner distress and discontent with contemporary society that would find other issues to fasten to as points of grievance against the established order, even if the present ones did not exist."²

The depths of inner distress among the young is startlingly revealed in the articulate and emotional letter response to an article by Mr. Kennan entitled "Rebels Without A Program" initially published in *The New York Times Magazine* of 21 January 1968.³ Their comments tended to bear out Kennan's judgment of them as "tense, anxious, defiant and joyless."⁴ But they also possess a certain elegance, much passion, and deep sincerity. The most eloquent summation of student left views was given by a young Harvard undergraduate:

We are turned to bitterness by the impotency of our action. We cannot follow because we are not validly led. We cannot lead because we are not heard. We are unique in the history of this country. The Vietnam 'situation'

has been so indecisive and agonizing and has gone on so long that we are the first generation in history that is able to view itself as sausages endlessly being fed into a meat grinder. At graduation we face the certainty of some kind of death, moral if not physical... Is it any wonder that we 'do not go gentle into that good night'?⁵

The Vietnam situation and personal susceptibility to the draft clearly weigh heavily on their minds, but lack of patriotism should not automatically be imputed. A Columbia student is probably representative of the majority of students, even the dissident left, when he says, "I should not fear giving up my life for my country when I would feel that I were truly fighting for my country."⁶ Most have taken to heart the lessons they learned about the great democratic principles on which the United States was founded—some would say too literally and too seriously—but they see, in the words of a Rochester University student, that "cloaked in the armor of law, order, reason and God, we engage in worldwide repression all the while ignoring the pressing demands of our own society... American youth asks for a change in the way this society thinks. Priorities simply must be changed."⁷

However, the deeper, more general distress—i.e., what really "hugs" them—creeps through in a Notre Dame student's lament that "we see social regimentation, conformity, and a hard mentality in American society."⁸ They see the brave new world as faceless and fearsome and strangely different from all the lessons they have learned in school and books and from the voices of the Establishment. So, they are as terrified as the child who opens his eyes for the first time. A Princeton graduate student comments:

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We have a technology that has been husily liberating man from his sense of doing meaningful work and a society so vast and technologized that many feel they will be deprived of all individuality unless they offer total resistance My great hope is that some people will find fulfillment by refusing to have the robots do everything for them and rediscovering artisan skills and the art of tilling the soil without the interference of machinery.⁹

Will they, as the child who first was frightened of the visible world, adjust and thrive in "the system" as it is? The student left (and the New Left generally), in its present articulateness and mood, is a fairly recent phenomenon, and one can only speculate on what will happen as they pass the rather fictional landmark age of 30. There is, however, considerable evidence that "the system" will probably change more rapidly than they (of which more later). One University of California graduate of 2 years gave his answer in high irritability: "... the older many youths of my generation get, the more they see of American society, the more radical they become."¹⁰

The World of the Future. In the lifetime of all Americans over 30, visions of the future—apocalyptic or otherwise—have moved from escapist literature to scientific projections of a reality that is upon us. Teilhard de Chardin, Arthur Koestler, Peter Drucker, Herman Kahn, Marshall McLuhan, Daniel Bell, and many others provide an impressive library on the subject. Much of the writing has the impact of a strange dream, yet few will deny the reality from which it is projected or the radical changes in nature and meaning of life that it portends. Professor Brzezinski observes that "the world is on the eve of a transformation more

dramatic in its history and human consequences than that wrought either by the French or the Bolshevik revolutions."¹¹ But, he is not dramatic enough. The changes we are beginning to experience are really incomparable with any previous period in recorded human history, although if measured only in terms of human trauma the latter part of the Middle Age in Europe provides an apt comparison.

It is essential to have some appreciation of the quantum jump into a new world whose technological and material possibilities are now realistically predictable, but whose spiritual values are much less easily imagined. Without a comprehension of the uniqueness of this historic period, most of the thoughts and actions of the young become mere juvenile antics and the "generation gap" of today no more significant than those that have traditionally existed between young and old. There are those, of course, who seriously argue the traditional case, most recently Lewis S. Feuer who was a prominent member of the University of California faculty during the 1964-66 Berkeley turmoil. Professor Feuer in his review of student rebellions in the United States and elsewhere, finds them ultimately to be a species of generational conflict in which the sons attack the authority and power of the fathers.¹² The argument would sit comfortably if it were not for the fact that so many of the articulated laments of the sons are on matters equally disturbing to the fathers. And, to the surprise of both, common yearnings for the "good old simple life of the past" transcend the generation gap, for both father and son are disturbed and frightened of the future.

Visions of the future range from those of Jacques Ellul who despairingly believes that we will almost certainly be destroyed by technology¹³ to Teilhard de Chardin who sees some saving metaphysical union of matter and spirit.¹⁴

In between are writers like Herman

Kahn who simply provides a heuristic "framework for speculations" without value judgments and emphasizes problems, not solutions.¹⁵

Brzezinski has taken some of these predictions and speculated on their effects on the quality of life. His most important concern is on the effects in America that the radical changes of the "technetronic age," as he calls it, will likely bring to institutions and value systems. He notes that work will become a privilege for the most talented and that "the achievement-oriented society might give way to the amusement-focused society, with essentially spectator spectacles (mass sport, TV) providing an opiate for increasingly purposeless masses."¹⁶ Occupation of time becomes a problem and hedonism no longer a dirty word. But even the search for pleasure becomes difficult since "in the technetronic society social life tends to be so atomized . . . that group intimacy cannot be recreated through the artificial stimulation of externally convivial group behavior. The new interest in drugs seeks to create intimacy through introspection, allegedly by expanding consciousness."¹⁷

This description rings familiar to any observer of the current U.S. scene, and, indeed, Brzezinski suggests that America is the first country to have entered the technetronic age, with others still far behind, and concludes that "the technetronic society [will be] as different from the industrial as the industrial became from the agrarian."¹⁸

Caution must be exercised, however, in this area of speculation—"scientific" or intuitive—not to form too solid an image of the future. Technological change will be considerable but, as Daniel Bell says, "what matters most about the year 2000 are not the gadgets . . . but the kinds of social arrangements that can deal adequately with the problems we shall confront."¹⁹ Work may, as Brzezinski says, become an occupation of the elite, but

the possibility exists of making an elite of all citizens. Without too much imagination, one can see the means available for elimination of all physical want, for broadening and deepening education of higher quality humans, for restructuring American society and institutions to meet the requirements of the postindustrial age, and to resolve the problems of poverty and ignorance in the rest of the world, thus eliminating a major source of present international tension.

The significance of man's current control of technology is not in the physical product itself but in the fact that at the deepest level of human experience man, as we have known him, is on the verge of becoming something else by virtue of his new knowledge which permits him, for the first time in his history, to be the central agent in his universe. With traumatic suddenness man is suddenly confronted with a world which, because of his own technological achievements, removes him from the adversary posture against nature which has existed since his origin on this planet. His environment is no longer "just there" and needing to be confronted on its own terms; he can now control the environment to an ever-increasing extent.

Even in this early dawn of the technological age, one of the most significant and troubling results has been a widespread questioning of the meaning of life, particularly by the young. For historic man this question has had a very simply answer. The adversary, nature, was always there, cold and immovable except perhaps by external gods. Man's purpose was first to survive and second to try to dominate nature. Now that he is on the threshold of dominating nature, man suddenly sees a new threat, namely his own knowledge, which has the potential for destroying him as well as for creating a new Garden of Eden.

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Man is therefore no longer required to be work oriented in the traditional sense. His "work" in the future will not be the task of survival in the face of nature but in constructing a world society in which he and all men can enjoy the fruits of past achievements in an atmosphere in which life continues to have meaning. He will, in fact, have to *create* his own future and, probably, a new technological man. Frightening though the thought may be (but also challenging), he will have to assume some of the attributes ascribed to his gods.

The younger generation in America sense the significance of this turning point in the history of man more clearly than their elders. While their fathers grew up in a period in which the roots of the technological revolution were already firmly implanted, their vision of its potential was dimmed by the Great Depression. While actually representing an inability of human institutions to adjust to changing requirements, the 1930's appeared to be a regression almost to the primordial level of struggle against nature. It is no wonder that the majority of the fathers remain traditionally work oriented. But it is also no wonder that their sons, raised in the relative opulence of the postwar period, see less value in the traditional struggle. The most articulate, and therefore probably the more intelligent, among them see correctly no problem in achieving gratification of their material wants. That battle is almost won. In consequence, the old spiritual values, centering around the individual struggle for material success, no longer have meaning to many of them in this new environment—and they search for something new to replace them.

Transitional America and the New Left. Americans, more than any other people, believe in the virtues of "progress." Through experience in developing its virgin land and through the more

recent ceaseless pounding of the advertising industry, the world for Americans traditionally has appeared to be better day-to-day as the everlasting miracles of new detergents for whiter washes or fancier, faster automobiles are produced. Though Madison Avenue may still believe the pertinency of this message, many Americans have begun to doubt. Even on the more basic issues, the almost automatic optimism about an ever more perfect Union and justice and happiness for all, albeit based largely on historic myth, has begun to evaporate. In a world in which man is beginning to appreciate his possibilities as the control agent, the social blemishes of civil rights repression and the persistence of pockets of poverty, which had in the past been swept under the rug to sustain the historic American myth, are reexposed for closer scrutiny. Faith in the ability of the American socioeconomic dynamic to resolve these problems is being questioned.

Awareness of the imperfections of our social system is aided by the mass availability of higher education which, together with increasing urbanization of our population, provides massive reinforcements to the formerly isolated urban intellectuals—a group traditionally least tolerant of the complacent belief in the spontaneous goodness of American social change. Brzezinski notes the difficulty the new social rebels find in developing a concrete and meaningful program and that 19th century ideologies provide no answers. "It is symptomatic," he says, "that the 'New Left' has found it most difficult to apply the available, particularly Marxist, doctrines to the new reality." He does see, however, a parallel between the New Left and the efforts in the 19th century to develop an ideology appropriate to the industrial age. "Not fully comprehending its meaning, not quite certain where it was heading—yet sensitive to the miseries and opportunities it was bringing—many Europeans strove

desperately to adapt earlier, 18th-century doctrines to the new reality."²⁰ Marx convinced millions that he had developed the appropriate synthesis applicable to the industrial age; the ideologies of the technological age still remain to be developed.

III—THE NEW LEFT

Our work is guided by the sense that we may be the last generation in the experiment with living. But . . . the vast majority of our people regard the temporary equilibrium of our society and world as eternally functional parts. In this is perhaps the outstanding paradox: We ourselves are imbued with urgency, yet the message of our society is that there is no viable alternative to the present.

. . . . from The Port Huron Statement¹

Origins. The New Left is an idea, a feeling, a sense of "existential humanism" mostly young, mostly new, mostly American but with international links. It is in search of an ideology, but mostly of morally acceptable modes of achieving radical social change. To the extent that it is revolutionary, its aims are more cultural than political. It has organizations, but no unity within or among them. Politically, it rejects all existing ideologies—whether to the left or to the right—and is, at least in its present mood, more akin to anarchism.

Its members are identified more by words and actions than by membership cards. Its active "membership" is variable in number and changeable in participants. Most estimates indicate active membership at about 10 percent of the college student population.² In its recent survey of "Youth in Turmoil," *Fortune* suggests that the activists are drawn from a nucleus of 40 percent of college students (over 3 million) who

"appear to hold attitudes about national performance and purpose, business, and many other matters that are quite at variance with those held by the college majority and by most adults."³ However, numbers are not a principal concern in this paper. Whatever its actual active membership, the New Left has had the strength to trouble a President and contribute to his decision not to run for reelection, has helped oblige a political reassessment of our role in Vietnam, has forced universities to reassess their roles in the community, and has generally disturbed and puzzled most persons over 30. Though ephemeral in formal organization, it can be identified as a movement (i.e., "The Movement," as many of the young would have it) by an attitude, a *leit-motiv* which is, roughly, a critical questioning of all established values and institutions, freewheeling talk about (if not experimentation in) unorthodox ways of social and personal relationships, a search for alternate and more meaningful objectives in life.

Its origins, as suggested in the previous chapter, are closely related to the disquietude prevailing at the dawn of the technological age. Being a recent and still diffused phenomenon, its history is brief and confused; however, the major intellectual and ideological springs common to the mainstream of the New Left are discernible.

Philosophically, they are deeply influenced by existentialism—even though few of them could give an adequate description of what existentialism is. This does not necessarily betoken ignorance—for definition is difficult and, at best, vague.⁴ Existentialism is the antithesis of classical philosophy or scientific method which is solely based—or so it is believed—on reasoning and empirical evidence. However, the philosophy of existence suggests that there are views of reality which cannot be completely reduced to scientific formulations. Jean Wahl

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describes Kierkegaard, the forerunner of modern existentialists, as proposing the notion that

truth lies in subjectivity; that true existence is achieved by intensity of feeling. To consider him merely as a part of a whole would be to negate him . . . By dint of knowledge, Kierkegaard says, we have forgotten what it is to exist. His principal enemy was the expositor of a system, i.e., the professor.⁵

Today's student left, and perhaps a majority of the others, would wholeheartedly agree with this proposition.

In its emphasis on subjectivity, existentialism also opens the philosophical path toward greater individual control over one's own destiny. Hamlet (and therefore Shakespeare) was most certainly an existentialist, and to be or not to be has again become the question. Alternate possibilities and choice are implicit in Hamlet's statement. The same tone prevails in the Port Huron Statement, and the quote opening this chapter is illustrative. In philosophical terminology the New Left accepts Kierkegaard's insistence on the idea of "Possibility" while rejecting Hegel's idea that "the world is the necessary unfolding of the eternal Idea, and freedom is necessity understood."⁶

Politically, the origins of the New Left are somewhat less cloaked in ambiguity. In reviewing the origins of the political and social ideas of The Movement, this paper will, somewhat arbitrarily, focus primarily on the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) because this organization embodies within it most of the ingredients characteristic of the New Left. Civil rights groups and the Black Nationalists have different origins and narrower objectives and will not be examined in detail. However, they—particularly the extremists among them—share in much of the brief heritage of The Movement.

According to Jacobs and Landau, whose now slightly outdated documentary analysis of "The New Radicals" remains the most authoritative history through 1965, The Movement had international overtones from the start. It began in England in 1957 with the publication of two new left-wing political journals by a group of university intellectuals. Most were disillusioned ex-Marxists and were reacting to the traumatic events of 1956 on both sides of the Iron Curtain. At about the same time, concern for racial justice, revulsion against the excesses of the McCarthy period, and a general rejection of the symbols of American affluence were growing in the United States. Some of the young responded with the "beat" mood, others with less cultish and more politicized responses. Pacifism became a serious movement, and campus political activity generally experienced a new growth. New political journals were started, first at the Universities of Chicago and Wisconsin, later at Columbia, Harvard, and subsequently at many other universities. The editors were primarily students and young faculty members, many with Marxist backgrounds. But old Marxist dogma was decidedly out of fashion, and the period was one of search for a new ideology. In fact, there was much discussion about the use of the word "left" with many arguing that it, as well as "socialism," was so discredited as to be useless.

As new waves of younger students entered the universities, the old radical debates and animosities with roots in the thirties were thrust further into the background. These new students were more concerned with American problems and how to solve them than in "foreign" ideologies. So, by 1960, this new generation was throwing itself against American society, literally and figuratively. The activists among them began to attack concrete issues and to identify themselves by distinctive styles of dress and hair. First the civil rights

movement and later the Vietnam issue became unifying forces in The Movement. But structure and ideology were sidestepped. Indeed, Castro and Che Guevara rose as new heroes of the student radicals, whom they saw as romantic men of action, without ideology and with sole interest in bettering the life of the Cuban people.⁷

The End of Ideology? An important question, still remaining to be answered, is the extent to which the New Left has structure and ideology. Are the radical young just high spirited and slightly confused children fighting the traditional battle against their fathers, or are they in the vanguard of a process which will eventually result in a synthesis establishing a new set of values (i.e., ideology)? The question is of direct significance to U.S. strategic considerations in the decade to come, both in its domestic and international aspects, because its answer will establish, more clearly than we can now see, the parameters within which strategy can work. We are already beginning to see these parameters changing. How much they will change over the longer run is uncertain as is the influence which the New Left in its present or future form will have on it.

Before coming to an examination of that question, it is useful to review briefly the debate, which is still raging, over whether the West, especially the United States, has solved its basic political and economic problems and therefore serves as a model for all peoples, especially the underdeveloped countries. The question is: Has Western pragmatism triumphed over "ideology?" While definitions of "ideology" vary to suit the debater, its meaning in this context is fairly clear—it is Marxism, or derivatives thereof, as compared to whatever the United States has as a value system, which is not usually considered an ideology. However, looking at the debate at another level, the

debate is also directly related to the questions now being raised by the New Left about the pertinence of the American system to present and future problems. This aspect of the debate is of greatest interest here.

The "end of ideology debate" started at an international conference convoked by the Congress for Cultural Freedom at Milan in September 1955. In his summary of the conference, Edward Shils reported agreement among the participants in the thesis that the West was moving successfully both at home and abroad, while "the Soviet Union, and Marxism, . . . has lost its appeal . . . We no longer feel the need for a comprehensive explicit system of beliefs."⁸ Raymond Aron, a participant in the Conference, concluded "that the battle of ideologies belongs to the past."⁹ Seymour Lipset, also present at Milan, was somewhat more equivocal when he wrote several years after the event that "ideology and passion may no longer be necessary to sustain the class struggle within stable and affluent democracies, but they are clearly needed in the international effort to develop free political and economic institutions in the rest of the world."¹⁰

In his book, *The End of Ideology*, Daniel Bell took the question mark off the phrase and asserted "the exhaustion of Utopia" in the West.

For ideology, which once was a road to action, has come to be a dead end . . . In the Western world, therefore, there is today a rough consensus among intellectuals on political issues: the acceptance of a Welfare State; the desirability of decentralized power; a system of mixed economy and of political pluralism.¹¹

This, Bell asserts as fact. However, he acknowledged the frustrations, particularly among young intellectuals,

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which the end of ideology had brought. "In the search for a 'cause,' there is a deep, desperate, almost pathetic anger . . . The young intellectual is unhappy because the 'middle way' is for the middle-aged, not for him; it is without passion and is deadening."¹²

Regardless of the reason and logic of the "middle way," the younger generation refused to be deprived of passion—and, if necessary, ideology. C. Wright Mills, the sociologist cum social critic and pamphleteering moralist—and "intellectual father" of the SDS and other elements of The Movement in the United States—stepped into the breach in 1960 to assert that the age of ideology is not dead in the West. Indeed, he felt, it had urgent need of revitalization.

In an article entitled "On the New Left," first published in two left-wing British journals and subsequently reprinted by the SDS and others, Mills attacked both liberalism and the old "utilitarian" left. He called for the young intellectuals to recognize themselves as the new agency of social change. Liberal rhetoric is characterized as a reasoning collapsing into reasonableness—with all the sharp edges of controversy removed. "The end-of-ideology," he said, "is a slogan of complacency, circulating among the prematurely middle-aged, centered in the present, and in the rich Western societies. In the final analysis, it also rests upon a disbelief in the shaping by men of their own futures." He found the same attitude among the leaders in the Soviet Union.¹³ Mills, however, saw a trend away from such complacency in both East and West. "The end-of-ideology is on the decline because it stands for the refusal to work out an explicit political philosophy. And alert men everywhere today do feel the need for such a philosophy."¹⁴

The Port Huron Statement of the SDS in 1962 was largely influenced by the Mills article. It, too, rejected

Marxism and its metaphysical belief that the working class had a historic mission to transform capitalism into socialism. The statement represented the initiation of a search for an ideology, not the documentation of one—either old or new. It was intended to provide a general, broad critique of American society, suggesting guidelines for radical politics. It described the present age as one of "muddling through" by stagnated minds closed to the future and a "pervading feeling that there simply are no alternatives, that our times have witnessed the exhaustion not only of Utopias, but of any new departures as well."¹⁵ This view is rejected in favor of an effort "in understanding and changing the conditions of humanity in the late twentieth century, an effort rooted in the ancient, still unfulfilled conception of man attaining determining influence over his circumstances of life."¹⁶ "Participatory democracy" was proposed as the main vehicle through which "power rooted in possession, privilege, or circumstance" would be replaced by power and uniqueness rooted in love, reflectiveness, reason, and creativity.¹⁷ The statement noted that politicians today respond "not to dialogue, but to pressure" and concluded with a vision of a future world of reasonable men all agreeing on the right paths through reason and not power relationships.¹⁸

Following in the Mills tradition, Mario Savio, leader of the Berkeley revolt, redefined the position of the Establishment as representing a belief in "the end of history." In an impassioned speech on the steps of the university administration building, Savio lamented the bleak scene of a society providing no challenges, "but an important minority of men and women coming to the front today have shown that they will die rather than be standardized, replaceable, and irrelevant."¹⁹

The end of ideology debate continues, but the question has become

largely academic. What is clear from the debate is that it represents still another area of conflict between those who have radically differing visions of the future of the world and the value systems to which it should adhere. Although the end of ideology debate was not the cause of the student revolt, it coincided with the rise of the New Left and has provided an important point of attack on the Establishment.

The question "Is ideology irrelevant and dead in the West?" is not answered; it is merely redefined. Both the New Left and the liberals appear to be agreed that the ideological struggles of the thirties in the United States are completely irrelevant today. Marxism is also moribund in Europe and nearing that point in Japan. New ideologies have not risen, although the New Left is passionately searching for one. In the meanwhile, the young radicals content themselves with anarchistic action as a substitute; but the more thoughtful among them do so with high purpose and moral conviction that whatever it is that the West holds as its value system is not working adequately to maintain comity and social justice within the state or peace and economic progress in the world.

Growing Anarchism in the New Left.

One of the most interesting anomalies in the current generational strife is the degree to which the utopian longings of many in the New Left approach those of the traditional GOP conservative. Both are opposed to "big government" and the impersonal bureaucracy that it connotes; both favor political decentralization and revival of the "good old" values of communalism; both long for "a return to the soil" in a sense that would again create a whole man, conscious of his individuality and able to identify personally with the results of his actions. This conjunction of dreams clearly supports one form of argument that ideologies are dead. The

conservatives in America, and even some of the radical right, have far more in common with the New Left than either side would want to admit. This is not to say that William Buckley, Jr. or Everett Dirksen would be accepted by the New Left if only they changed their style of dress, but it does not suggest that the common villain is the liberal Establishment.

At the extremes, the radical right and left have an anarchistic tendency in common which grows out of their opposition to the established order. Paul Goodman, an apostle of the New Left, in highly concentrated venom recently wrote:

... our system of government at present comprises the military-industrial complex, the secret paramilitary agencies, the scientific war corporations, the blimps, the horse's asses, the police, the administrative bureaucracy, the career diplomats, the lobbies, the corporations that contribute party funds, the underwriters and real-estate promoters that fatten on Urban Renewal, the official press and the official opposition press, the sounding-off and jockeying for the next election, the National Unity, etc., etc.²⁰

Except for inclusion of the military and police, the statement is one the radical right might well applaud. With somewhat more reserve, they might even agree generally with Goodman's statement that "in the last decades of the eighteenth century, in many respects the Americans lived in a kind of peaceful community anarchy, spiced by mutinies that were hardly punished."²¹ They would only begin their parting of ways with Goodman's judgment that "the only pacifist conclusion... is the anarchist one, to get rid of the sovereignties and to diminish among people, the motivations of power and grandiosity."²²

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The New Left, on the other hand, sees charm and possibilities in the anarchistic approach—if only in the short run. To many of them the Establishment is too powerful, unwieldy, and set in its ways to even consider reforming. It must be destroyed and replaced by a more gentle system, not yet defined with any precision. Herbert Marcuse, the honorary high priest of the New Left, gives further impetus to the anarchistic drive when he notes that “self-determination will be real to the extent to which the masses have been dissolved into individuals liberated from all propaganda.”²³

Newspapers almost daily report increasing examples of anarchistic behavior by students, on campus and off, of which the “Confrontation at Chicago” during the 1968 Democratic Party Convention was only the most dramatic example. The confrontation tactic contains its own dangers and, possibly, death warrant. Marcuse himself doubts that “one can combat a society which is mobilized and organized in its totality against any revolutionary movement.”²⁴ Nonetheless, he, as the majority of the New Left militants, sees that any change in present society would require a total rejection, in other words, “perpetual confrontation,” of the society.

Total confrontation, however, requires some form of organization which anarchistic tendencies make difficult. There is some evidence, in fact, that whatever national organization existed at the time of the Chicago confrontation has fallen apart. Jerry Rubin, a founder of the Youth International Party (Yippies) said in January 1969 that “the age of innocence” was over for his group and that Government harassment had “bottled up resources, sapped energy and demoralized the spirit.”²⁵ But other evidence indicates that the protest movement has merely shifted (temporarily perhaps) from

national politics to issues on local campuses.

IV—THE NEW LEFT AND FOREIGN POLICY

... I am convinced the process of *disarming* each other can go on; and that if one powerful nation would give it up, other nations might well look for an opportunity to do the same.

..... Bayard Rustin¹

Foreign Policy Objectives. To the extent that it is a reform or revolutionary movement, the New Left has developed a greater coherency in thought on requirements for cultural change than it has on political reality. To some extent the choice is deliberate, particularly for those who see no alternative to revolutionary destruction of existing political institutions. This posture makes sense if the objective is revolution within the state. If the United States were an island unto itself, the development of a more peaceful, less aggressive, more loving society might be more immediately possible—perhaps even along the lines of the “participatory democracy” desired by the SDS. But the United States is not such an island, and, quite aside from the problem of controlling aggressive instincts within the American community, the difficulties of establishing international trust, confidence, and peace are even more complex.

To the extent that the New Left has involved itself in foreign policy questions, it has focused rather narrowly, and very emotionally, on issues such as Vietnam and the Dominican Republic. It appears to have nowhere seriously considered the complexities of international interactions, particularly the problem of reducing mutual distrust among the major powers in a balanced fashion. Concern about a huge and

powerful monolithic Establishment striking anonymously and indifferently at the individual American has been transferred to that of this same giant crushing the little peace-loving people of Vietnam or elsewhere.

The New Left and the Establishment are, in fact, in agreement in their distaste for war and aggression. The problem is, as in other aspects of the generation gap, that the New Left doesn't believe the official pronouncements; or, if it admits to the latter's sincerity, believes that the mechanism of the "political-military complex" is so well oiled that it moves with a will of its own. The SDS has been the prime spokesman of the New Left on foreign policy matters, and one returns to the Port Huron Statement for evidence of this mechanistic theory:

To a decisive extent, the means of defense, the military technology itself, determines the political and social character of the state being defended . . . Decisions about military strategy . . . are more and more the property of the military and industrial arms race machine, with the politicians assuming a ratifying role instead of a determining one.²

The statement went on to review the changes that technology has brought to warfare in quite realistic fashion but repeatedly stressed the sacrifices this entails for civil liberties and social welfare. "Insufficient attention [is given] to preserving, extending, and enriching democratic values . . ."³ It emphasized the needs of the developing states and the inability (or unwillingness) to fulfill them because of primary interest in protecting U.S. foreign investments and reactionary dictators as well as in maintaining a "negative anti-Communist political stance."⁴

On the positive side, the SDS outlined an eight-point program for U.S. foreign policy:

1. The United States' principal goal should be creating a world where hunger, poverty, disease, ignorance, violence, and exploitation are replaced as central features by abundance, reason, love, and international cooperation.

2. We should undertake here and now a fifty-year effort to prepare for all nations the conditions of industrialization.

3. We should not depend significantly on private enterprise to do the job.

4. We should not lock the development process into the Cold War: we should view it as a way of ending that conflict.

5. America should show its commitment to democratic institutions not by withdrawing support from undemocratic regimes, but by making domestic democracy exemplary.

6. America should agree that public utilities, railroads, mines, and plantations, and other basic economic institutions should be in the control of national, not foreign, agencies.

7. Foreign aid should be given through international agencies, primarily the United Nations.

8. Democratic theory must confront the problems inherent in social revolution.⁵

Although some of these points are subject to argument, many are incorporated in official policy, and none are revolutionary. But, significant by omission is any recommendation on how to deal with the Communist threat except, implicitly, to take it less seriously.

The above was written primarily by Tom Hayden, then SDS President, in 1962. Carl Oglesby, a subsequent SDS President partially answered the question of how to deal with the Soviet Union in late 1965 by proposing, in effect, that all the United States needs

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do is stop doing bad things such as aggressive intervention in foreign states, and the world will be a better place:

Some will make of it that I overdraw the matter. Many will ask: What about the other side? To be sure, there is the bitter ugliness of Czechoslovakia, Poland, those infamous Russian tanks in the streets of Budapest. But my anger only rises to hear some say that sorrow cancels sorrow, or that *this* one's shame deposits in *that* one's account the right to shamefulness.⁶

George Kennan's comment on this attitude, reflected extensively in the student letters cited in chapter II, is that the conscience of the young is reserved solely for American acts and that "beyond our borders, people are at liberty to commit every sort of heastiness without any perceptible engagement of the American conscience."⁷

This attitude of looking only for "international crimes" by the American "leviathan" has strong psychological roots in the father-son aspects of the generational battle but is understandable also if one accepts the principal immediate goal of the New Left to be domestic reform. In the latter case, anything that is done to discredit the Establishment is progress toward the immediate goal. After that battle is won, the world can be dealt with more realistically. However, whichever the incentive, the tone has become shriller in recent years, and the New Left has increasingly turned to Communist propaganda to support its criticism of U.S. foreign policy. It is not just the Viet Cong flags displayed at anti-Vietnam rallies or Jerry Rubin Yippie leader, appearing at a House Un-American Activities subcommittee hearing wearing "Viet Cong pajamas, a Latin American guerrilla's beard and bandoleer, a Black Panther heft, an

empty holster and a homemade VC flag draped over his shoulders Superman style."⁸ In the grossness of gesture, these suggest more than a degree of youthful prankishness. Much more symptomatic is the glorification of Castro, Che Guevara, Mao, Ho, and others as popular folk heroes, accepting them in terms of their own propaganda and turning a blind eye to the assaults these leaders have committed against the very democratic values the New Left desires to revitalize.

The change in tone from the relatively conservative statements of Tom Hayden in 1962 is reflected in a position discussion paper for the SDS National Council Meeting in August 1966 prepared by Paul Booth, a former national secretary. It reflects the increasing preoccupation of the New Left with Vietnam and the emotionalism connected with that issue. Here, while all U.S. action is dismissed as "the flaming symbol to the world of the American arrogance,"⁹ anything unfavorable about the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese actions is dismissed as "LBJ's devil theory" while "Chinese Communism is a virile alternative to the pattern of oligarchic and military dominance in the Third World."¹⁰

Echoes from Abroad. A New Left foreign policy based on the principle of goodness and trust could only be realistic if there were a reasonable expectation that the rest of the world would agree to play the same rules. There are signs that seething rebellion of the young against the Establishment in many other industrial states remarkably resembles that in the United States in origins, methods, and objectives. Visions among the young of a brave new world of universal love and nonaggression, created by a youthful new international movement, becloud reality. Yet, this idealistic vision is not completely unreal if one analyzes international trends in more conventional language.

The two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, have established a "balance of terror" which, despite its theoretical instability, has worked fairly well in the past 24 years. Because of the nature of modern armaments, war (in its traditional form) is no longer the instrument of foreign policy it once was. The absurdity of war—at least between the superpowers—has never been clearer to mankind, even to hard-bitten diplomats and soldiers. The Cuban missile crisis set subtle new rules to international conduct which, if man acts rationally, can eventually establish a new world order in which terror is replaced by confidence and a degree of trust, albeit verified. Arms limitations can be but a first logical step toward disarmament. After that an optimistic projection could come close to the world imagined by many young idealists in the United States and elsewhere.

Dean Rusk, in talking about a dialog between the generations in which he felt both can contribute something, suggested that "it may be that there is something better than collective security as a basis for organizing the peace, and if so, let's find it."¹¹ In looking for an alternative, if indeed there is one, a quick glance at what is happening in other countries among the young might be useful.

In reviewing the "class struggle between old and young" in Europe, Bo Elmgren, of the Swedish Social Democratic Party, cited three major goals of European youth:

- demands advocating struggle against commercialism,
- work for a better spirit of solidarity between human beings instead of competition, and
- increased chances for the many to influence the decisions.¹²

These aims differ only in the form from those of American students. The last

point is clearly the "participatory democracy" of the SDS.

The French student revolt of 1968 represented a denunciation of the French Establishment and a rejection of capitalist structures and the parliamentary system. Jacques Sauvageot, of the National Union of French Students (UNEF), saw the goal as the establishment of "workers' control" in the tradition of the French Revolution, again a form of "participatory democracy."¹³ Beyond this Sauvageot felt the French struggle for "student power" and "workers' control" to be a part of the larger, worldwide struggle against "imperialism," particularly the American variety. "Our solidarity with struggles in the third world cannot be overemphasized."¹⁴ Concerns about a "technocratic society" are frequently mentioned, and in an interview with Jean-Paul Sartre in May 1968, Daniel Cohn-Bendit ("Danny the Red") talked of the "uncontrollable spontaneity" with which the French movement was progressing "toward a perpetual change of society."¹⁵

Erik Blumenfeld, a prominent German politician and member of the Bundestag, has noted that a "traumatic fear of the overpoweringness of the future" appears to be a deep underlying cause for youthful demands to the older generation in Germany that the past be eliminated. He finds that the "politization" of the European Student body results from a sense of resignation before the narrowness of given possibilities.¹⁶

The frustration of living in a Europe slipping into a hackwater, both politically and technologically, is an added frustration of European youth which is not present in the United States. Another observable difference is the continuing prominence of Marxist thought and terminology among European student radicals. However, as in the United States earlier, Marxism is becoming increasingly irrelevant. A reasonable

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explanation of this lag is that there has been far greater continuity in European Marxism than in the United States. In Europe, the ideological debates of the 1930's were continued into the 1940's, and 1950's, while Marxist thought did not survive World War II as a serious force among the intellectuals in America.

The New Left: An International Movement? Philip Hanson has proposed that "the militant, student-based left . . . looks increasingly like an international movement and not a mere coincidence of separate national movements with different aims and origins."¹⁷ Others have made similar observations, and the worldwide rise in expressions of student power appears to have too many points in common to be purely coincidental.

It would be excessive and hasty, however, to conclude that the New Left is an international movement (or conspiracy, as some would have it) led in an organized fashion by some central guiding organization. All evidence points against this possibility. One of the principal characteristics of The Movement is its spontaneity, disorganizations, and near-anarchism. Nowhere has it been possible even to organize a unified national movement, much less an international one. There is no commonly accepted doctrine of values; in fact, it would appear that we may really be at the "end of ideology" since the New Left has not yet been able to come up with one.

The chaos in the New Left contrasts markedly with the well-organized and disciplined international Communist movement of the past. Certainly, the Communists will try to take advantage of the New Left's disruptive potential in the West; however, this same force is also adversely affecting their own interests; *viz.*, the revolt in Czechoslovakia, for which the young provided much of the spirit, and evidence of rising unrest

among the young in the Soviet Union itself.

The global challenges to the power elites can best be explained as originating from a universal discontent with the world as it is. This unrest is given peculiar impetus by the increasing realization, by the young in particular, that the technological revolution, if properly utilized, can place in man's hands the control of his environment and destiny. Hence, the common emphasis by the American and European New Left on social justice for the third world.

To the young in the capitalist West, the Communist East, and the underdeveloped South, the power elite have, in their preoccupation with traditional games, not demonstrated competence to confront the world of the future. These young are now better educated than ever before (ironically, because of the efforts of the power elites they now combat) and want "participation" in decision making.

V—INFLUENCE OF THE NEW LEFT ON STRATEGY

Today, it seems to me, there are signs that the lessons of the past are being forgotten. A trend toward isolationism has appeared not only in the United States but in other Western nations.

. . . . Dean Rusk¹

The New Left as a Continuing Phenomenon. If the New Left, particularly in the "student revolt" phase, is a purely transitory phenomenon, embodying the usual generational revolt, it may deserve the attention of parents and educators but not necessarily that of the society as a whole. All evidence, however, points to a greater scope and permanence. Youth is in the vanguard of the new technological society, and the New Left as its most vocal representative is trying to find new values to

cope with a radically different world. This new sense of the future has permeated the ranks of the young deeper than just the top echelons of the activists, as is apparent in the silent support most college students have given to campus revolts by the more active.

The depth of the inner distress is further shown by increasing evidence that the more anarchistic aspects of the Movement are permeating the high schools and even elementary schools. The more sensational aspects of the high school revolt, such as rising drug use, rowdiness, and alleged sexual promiscuity, have received most publicity. If it were just this (albeit quite enough), such actions could be considered merely as further evidence of a breakdown in family discipline and an affluent society gone wild. It is, in fact, superficial evidence of a breakdown in the system, but more profound than we like to imagine.

These high school "children" are, however, moving—almost unbelievably—toward the stage of "revolutionaries who have to be home by 7:30."² High school students are now organizing their own "underground" publications with such titles as "the magazine of the second American Revolution." This particular publication, put out by high school students in lower Manhattan, states in its "declaration of intent" that "our chief goal is to promote the idea of revolution in the United States . . . We feel that our only obligation is to promote the social upheavals that we feel are necessary for the welfare of man. WE WANT THE WORLD AND WE WANT IT—NOW!"³

While this publication may still represent only a small minority view among high school students in the country, there are an increasing number of such attitudes and publications cropping up elsewhere. It is a trend not to be ignored and suggests that if the current crop of 20 to 30 year olds are judged excessively impatient with the Establishment,

one had better learn to expect even more militancy from their younger brothers.

The question still remains, however, as to whether the campus radical, active or passive, will radically change his views once he dons a business suit and joins the corporation of his choice. Some studies done in Japan suggest preliminarily that the young Japanese radical privately retains much of his earlier views into his middle years but doesn't continue to fight the system.⁴ The uniqueness of Japanese society reduces the relevance of these studies to the United States, and no analyses in depth have yet been made on this question in the United States. However, past experience and common sense would lead one to conclude that it would be highly unusual for a man to abandon completely the basic philosophic predispositions he acquired in youth.

Some of the changed attitudes of young people are subjectively evident to employers. In a speech delivered to the 16th Annual Management Conference at Chicago in early 1968, David Rockefeller concerned himself with the generation gap and its meaning for business. He felt the gap was significantly larger than it had been in his and his father's time and noted that one of the principal characteristics of youth today is that of individualism, to "do your own thing" rather than conform to a preordained order. He found it is the most promising students who tend to be in the forefront of protest movements. These are the ones business wants most to recruit, but are also the ones who cast the coldest eye on business. He quoted a participant in the Harvard Business School internship program as commenting on his experience in industry: "It is about time businessmen learned that college students are not all that concerned about the profit motive." As an antidote, Rockefeller proposed that business do some rethinking in order to create an

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environment more challenging and creative for the young person and at the same time to show him that the profit motive, properly employed, can help achieve the goals our young people say they want.⁵

Rockefeller's observations are borne out in the area of Government employment as well. Impatience with traditional apprenticeship in career services is characteristic of young recruits. They want to do their thing—NOW! And in Government, as in business, they find much to criticize, whether rightly or wrongly, about a lack of openmindedness, intellectual honesty, and commitment to social progress.

In earlier chapters this paper has attempted to outline some of the underlying reasons for the current social unrest which is most visibly displayed among students. One can expect, as indeed is being seen, a sharp increase in student activities in a society where, for a variety of reasons, accepted political and social values are being fundamentally questioned. The motivations for disquietude are not likely to disappear when the student leaves college. Although the actions of the young graduate may become less blatant, he is less likely to conform to the Establishment than did his father. His commitment to a search for a more satisfying life style in his rapidly changing environment is too deep and basic. Moreover, he has greater opportunities for independence of action than did his forefathers, since economic status symbols have lost much of their meaning in a society of abundance.

Effects on International Relations. In the short term, the rise of the New Left has frustrated U.S. foreign policy in several ways, both directly and indirectly. Most direct has been its influence on Vietnam policy. Domestically, the agitation of the young radicals has reinforced the growing impatience of the general public with the war, made

the draft a contentious issue, and encouraged insubordination within the military. Internationally, Vietnam has become a popular rallying point for New Left organizations in all countries and has led to a more concentrated abuse against American "imperialism" worldwide than has ever before been experienced, thereby adversely influencing many other American objectives.

Indirectly, the New Left, in its agitation for domestic reform in the United States, has helped focus public attention on the ills of its society and encouraged the trend toward neoisolationism. It has cast doubt among foreign countries on the viability of American institutions. Its presence in other countries as a volatile political force has also been a force for isolationism, particularly in countries in which there is an American military presence. Japan is a prime example where student militancy over the past 10 years against the American alliance has had the effect of reducing the public commitment of Japanese politicians to the alliance.

The longer term effects of the new political and cultural forces brought into being by the New Left are likely to be both more profound and more difficult to predict. Perhaps most significant will be the effects of the new philosophy on both style and content of action of those presently under 30 as they begin to move toward positions of leadership. Seymour Lipset has given particular importance, in this context, to "the role of political generations." He notes that many analysts of politics and cultural styles have indicated that people tend to form a defined frame of reference in late adolescence and early manhood within which they fit subsequent experiences.⁶ Consequently, concern about unemployment statistics is greater among those with adolescent recollections of the depression, as is emphasis on the need for collective security against aggression, Fascist or

Communist, than among those who have not experienced such trauma.

By this analysis, World War I bred a generation of isolationists, while the bitter experiences leading to World War II produced a crop of internationalists. On the other hand, the new generation of college students finds little present relevance, for example, in the past evils of Stalinist communism.

Although finding no conclusive evidence on the effects of "political generations," Lipset suggests that the effect could be, as the new generation moves into power, the creation of an elite no longer believing in the system which it continues to operate. The consequent weakening of the elite could lead to its overthrow as in 1917 Russia.⁷

The model which Lipset suggests would require considerable rigidity of the Establishment, something more likely in a tradition-based society as was Czarist Russia than the United States where evolutionary change has been a tradition. It is therefore more probable that American institutions will change or be modified as the new elite moves into power. Indeed, evidence of dynamic change, the pace of which is being forced to some extent by the New Left, is all about us.

Implications for Strategy in the Seventies. "No more Vietnams!" is a cry which will haunt all strategic thinking for at least the first few years of the new decade. Its implications for U.S. foreign policy are obvious. The specter of a new isolationism disturbs all those who saw the results of an older isolationism in the 1930's. They are, however, probably overdramatizing as much as are the neoisolationists. The present period is not comparable to the 1930's. At that time the United States was a world power but preferred not to realize it in a world where this was still possible. Presently it is the most powerful nation on earth, is conscious of this fact, and cannot forget it even if it tried.

Every action or inaction by the United States has international implications, and isolation is simply impossible—doubly so because modern technology has created a far more interdependent world than existed 30 or 40 years ago.

Nonetheless, constraints against other Vietnams will be real. Quite aside from the wisdom—or lack thereof—of the manner and extent of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, another "American War" fought on the same format will be domestically impossible and, probably, internationally unwise.

Yet the continuing threat of communism cannot simply be ignored if the United States wishes to preserve a world in which its way of life can prosper. The answer may lie in a search for new forms of collective security (or, more accurately, truly *collective* security) or alternatives thereto. The former could lead to a greater multilateralization of defense efforts, while possibilities of alternatives to collective security would have to depend to a large extent on what happens in the Communist world.

It may be that the present Establishment has, because of the memories it carries from adolescence, concentrated

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Mr. Paul K. Stahnke holds a masters degree in international relations from the University of Chicago and has done postgraduate work in economics at the University of California.

He has held numerous

positions in the Department of State, the most recent being with the American Embassy in Japan in the Economics Section followed by duty with the Department in Washington in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Japan). Mr. Stahnke is a 1969 graduate of the Naval War College, School of Naval Warfare, and is currently serving with the U.S. Embassy in Somalia as Head, Economics Section.

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too much on a confrontation policy against the Communists, not seeing all the opportunities both for relative advantage and reduction of tensions provided by the radical changes in the Communist world over the past 10 or 15 years. In such phobias (if they are indeed that) as well as in all other matters, the new generation has given ample notice that it will show no filial piety.

Because the present "generation gap" is larger and deeper than those in the past, a stiffer questioning of old shibboleths on which strategic planning has been based in the past can be expected as the young, whether identified with the New Left or not, move into decision making roles. In the ensuing debate such

old truths as remain true should survive. The newer truths, honed on experience and responsibility, can lead to better policy making. No generation has a monopoly on knowledge and understanding.

The major problem, in domestic as well as in foreign policy, is whether change can be rapid enough to avoid the chaos and, even, revolution which the current questioning of all values of our society threatens. The "Now Generation" is impatient, often unreasonable, but politically potent. It can drive the United States down paths destructive of all values it and all Americans claim as their heritage and destroy the comity which has been the often thin thread holding the Union together.

FOOTNOTES

I—CONSENSUS THROUGH CONFLICT

1. Richard Hofstadter, *The Progressive Historians* (New York: Knopf, 1968). Hofstadter reviews the writings of Turner, Beard, and Parrington in the light of the sociological environment in which they lived.

2. Louis Hartz, *The Founding of New Societies* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1964), p. 82.

3. Robert R. Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution: the Challenge* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 189-190.

4. Christopher Lasch, quoted in John Leo, "U.S. Historians Swing Pendulum from Consensus to Conflict," *International Herald Tribune* (Paris), 3 January 1969, p. 5:3.

5. Hofstadter, p. 452, 454-455.

II—YOUTH'S DARK VIEW OF THE FUTURE

1. Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, *The Phenomenon of Man* (New York: Harper, 1959), p. 225.

2. George F. Kennan, *Democracy and the Student Left* (New York: Bantam Books, 1968), p. 134.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 3-18.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 125.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 25.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 26.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 52.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 63.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 29, 32-33.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 35.

11. Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, "America in the Technetronic Age," *Encounter*, January 1968, p. 16.

12. Lewis S. Feuer, "Conflict of Generations," *Saturday Review*, 18 January 1969, p. 53.

13. Jacques Ellul, *The Technological Society* (New York: Knopf, 1964), p. 436.

14. Teilhard de Chardin, p. 285-290.

15. Herman Kahn and Anthony J. Wiener, *The Year 2000* (New York: Macmillan, 1967), p.

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16. Brzezinski, p. 17.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 19.
18. *Ibid.*
19. American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Commission on the Year 2000, *Toward the Year 2000* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1968), p. 6.
20. Brzezinski, p. 20.

III—THE NEW LEFT

1. Paul Jacobs and Saul Landau, eds., *The New Radicals* (New York: Random House, 1966), p. 151. The Port Huron Statement, reprinted in part in this book, came out of the 1962 convention of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) at Port Huron, Mich., and established the basic guidelines for this organization in ideology and action. It is primarily the work of Tom Hayden, then President of the SDS.
2. Jacobs and Landau offer the following sanguine comment: "How many people are in the American Movement? Certainly it is possible to count those who are members of the organizations within the Movement, but that would be to misunderstand one of the basic facts of its nature. The Movement is organizations plus unaffiliated supporters, who outnumber by the thousands, and perhaps even hundreds of thousands, those committed to specific groups. The Movement's basic strength rests on those unaffiliated reserves, who are just as much a part of it as the organization youth." *Ibid.*, p. 4.
3. Louis Banks, ed., *Youth in Turmoil* (New York: Time-Life Books, 1969), p. 9.
4. See Jean Wahl, *A Short History of Existentialism* (New York: Wisdom Library, 1949). Professor Wahl, a well-known French philosopher and poet, presents one of the clearest expositions of existentialism, but even he is better able to identify existentialist statements than to define the term.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 304.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 6.
7. Jacobs and Landau, eds., p. 9-13.
8. Edward Shils, "Milan Conference," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, February 1956, p. 39.
9. Raymond Aron, *The Opium of the Intellectuals* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1957), p. xviii.
10. Seymour M. Lipset, *Political Man* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1960), p. 417.
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12. *Ibid.*, p. 374-375.
13. Jacobs and Landau, eds., p. 104.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 106.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 151.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 152.
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18. *Ibid.*, p. 161-162.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 230-234.
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24. "Marcuse Defines His New Left Line," *The New York Times Magazine*, 27 October 1968, p. 30.
25. John Leo, "Yippie Aide Finds 'Innocence' Ended," *The New York Times*, 26 January 1969, p. 45:1.

IV—THE NEW LEFT AND FOREIGN POLICY


1. James Finn, *Protest: Pacifism and Politics* (New York: Random House, 1967), p. 333.
2. Mitchell Cohen and Dennis Hale, eds., *The New Student Left* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), p. 293.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 295-296.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 298-299.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 301-305.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 316.

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7. Kennan, p. 167.
8. Bernard Kalb, "Life's Little Circus," *The New Republic* 14 December 1968, p. 8.
9. Cohen and Hale, eds., p. 323.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 324.
11. Dean Rusk, "Some Myths about Foreign Policy," *Department of State Newsletter*, November 1968, p. 5.
12. Bo Elmgren, "Dialogue and Participation," unpublished manuscript used as a basis for discussion at a seminar at Bergneustadt, Sweden, 16-19 February 1969.
13. Herve Bourges, comp., *The French Student Revolt* (New York: Hill & Wang, 1968), p. 28.
14. *Ibid.*
15. *Ibid.*, p. 76, 78.
16. Erik Blumenfeld, "Die Studentische Unruhe und die Zukunft Europas," *Europa Archiv*, 25 September 1968, p. 670.
17. Philip Hanson, "Ideology and the New Left," *New Society*, 26 December 1968, p. 943.

V—INFLUENCE OF THE NEW LEFT ON STRATEGY

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2. Nicholas Pileggi, "Revolutionaries Who Have to Be Home by 7:30," *The New York Times Magazine*, 16 March 1969, p. 26.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 120-121.
4. Seymour M. Lipset, *The Possible Effects of Student Activism on International Relations* (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, 1968), p. 36-37.
5. David Rockefeller, "The Generation Gap and Its Meaning for Business," *The University of Chicago Magazine*, July/August 1968, p. 3-6.
6. Lipset, *The Possible Effects*, p. 32-33.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 37.



As the excited passions of hostile people are of themselves a powerful enemy, both the general and his government should use their best efforts to allay them.

Jomini: Precis de l'Art de la Guerre, 1838

SET AND DRIFT



21st Global Strategy Discussions.

Some 140 distinguished and prominent citizens from throughout the United States and 32 active duty admirals and generals of the Armed Forces took part in the 21st annual Global Strategy Discussions conducted at the Naval War College from 16 to 20 June 1969. These specially invited guests of the Secretary of the Navy joined 104 senior Reserve officers of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard who were then attending a 2-week naval warfare course at the War College. Approximately 420 resident students, staff, and faculty members of the Naval War College also participated in the week-long discussions.

These discussions are held annually as the culmination of a year of intensive study by the Naval War College students. Their purpose is to provide an opportunity for a valuable exchange of ideas between the faculty and students of the College and the specially invited guests selected for their eminence in a wide range of professional interests or for their leadership in civic efforts. In doing this they bring together the divergent viewpoints of business, labor, the clergy, the bar, the press, the academic community, the Government, and the Armed Forces in an effort to arrive at an understanding of the problems confronting the United States in formulating global strategy. During the week, classified discussions delineated the current world situation, the major forces and trends affecting the formulation of global strategy, and all of the factors—geopolitical, economic, technological, social, and ideological—that impinge upon national security.

In view of the current strategic importance of the subject, the Soviet maritime challenge was emphasized as the overall theme of the 1969 discussions. A special effort was made to comprehend the expanded economic and strategic options which the possession of a modern fleet and merchant marine offers to the Soviet Union.

Highlighting the 5-day program were scheduled guest lecturers, each a recognized authority in his particular field. These speakers addressed the participants on subjects of major significance which must be considered in the formulation and implementation of global strategy. On the first day of the discussions, the opening remarks were delivered by Vice Adm. Richard G. Colbert, U.S. Navy, the President of the Naval War College. On this day, also, the Honorable U. Alexis Johnson, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, presented the first address on "National Security and the Current World Situation." On the second day of the discussions, Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, addressed the participants on the subject "Military Considerations in National Strategy." On Wednesday, 18 June, the Honorable William S. Mailliard, a member of the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee of the House of Representatives, spoke on "Seapower and the Merchant

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GLOBAL STRATEGY



Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, speaking before the nearly 700 participants



Congressman W. S. Mailliard (R-Calif.) (Rear Admiral, USNR) delivering an address



Edgar L. Prina, military affairs editor for the Copley News Service, answers a question



Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, U. Alexis Johnson, talks with another participant



Noted physicist Dr. Edward Teller ponders a question



Brig. Gen. S. L. A. Marshall, an author prominent in military literature, chats during a break in the Discussions

DISCUSSIONS 1969



Adm. Richard G. Colbert, President, Naval War College, with the Chief of Naval Operations



A profile view of Secretary of the Navy John H. Chafee



Retired Adm. George W. Anderson, former Chief of Naval Operations, and Ambassador to Portugal



Vice Adm. Benedict J. Semmes, Jr., Commander of the Navy's Second Fleet, expounds a point



One of two panel discussions closing out the week



Retired Adm. Jerauld Wright exchanges ideas with colleagues

(Navy photos by PHC W. M. Powers)

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Marine." The final guest speaker on Thursday was Secretary of the Navy John H. Chafee, who spoke on the topic "United States Strategic Concepts."

The discussions were brought to a conclusion on Friday, 20 June, in a plenary session. A panel of selected Global Strategy Discussions participants, representing a cross section of attendees, fielded questions from the audience and summed up the important issues discussed during the week.

Distinguished Visitors. Vice Adm. Chanien Rujibhan, Royal Thai Navy Director of Education, visited the Naval War College on 23 May 1969 as part of a 2-week Military Assistance Program sponsored tour of the United States.

The Thai admiral, accompanied by Capt. Dumrong Sacanandana, Royal Thai Navy, and a U.S. escort officer, was in Newport to become acquainted with the administration, organization, and mission of the War College and review the curricula of its schools.

In addition to meeting with Comdr. Sombat Kongyai, Royal Thai Navy student in the Naval Command Course, Admiral Chanien had an opportunity to talk with Col. Paul B. Haigwood, USMC, a School of Naval Warfare student, who had known the admiral when he was the Senior Marine Advisor in the Military Assistance Advisory Group to Thailand from 1963 to 1965.

**Remarks of U.S. Senator John O. Pastore
at the Graduation Exercises of the
Naval War College
Newport, Rhode Island
Wednesday, 25 June 1969**

I count it an honor to share this graduation day with you. You are men who have here perfected the talents which have already distinguished you in patriotic service—in the ways of war, but with the fundamental purpose of peace.

Particularly I express my felicitations to those graduates who have come to us

from some 25 free world nations. Here and beyond these college walls I am sure they have found a welcome, ready and warm. I trust that those ties of friendship will never be broken by distance or dispute.

To your families and loved ones I have an understanding appreciation of what this day means to them and what they mean to you. It is a day of satisfaction for them in these further honors that come to you, and you love them the more for the sacrifices they have borne and the inspiration they have been in all your years of service.

I hope that your fond memories of this day will be framed in the hospitality of our friendly people of Rhode Island and the Providence Plantations. Ours is an old love affair with this college, a friendly neighbor for some 85 years. We have a deep sense of gratitude for its graduates—men like you whose learning, loyalty, and lives stand between us and every threat to our own lives and liberties.

The ship of your destiny may take strange courses from Coasters Harbor Island. Who would have thought, 85 years ago, that men of the services would be sailing around the moon and looking down on the rest of us some 200,000 miles out in space.

Soon we will be landing a man on the moon, at an investment of \$24 billion. We will have enlisted the skills of some 300,000 Americans. We have used the resources of 165 universities in this partnership of perfection. The journey to the moon, you will remember, was the determination and decision of a young sailor who learned the arts of war in these Newport waters and went on to become, 8 years ago, the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States.

John F. Kennedy was a President of the missile age. His was the courage of the Cuban crisis. His was the commitment to peace in the nuclear test ban

treaty. His was the call to preparedness as our power for peace.

The primacy of our power had catapulted us into a place of world leadership. We have continued as sort of a caretaker in a world in a delicate balance between optimism and frustration. Our power has always been subject to challenge by others and subject to change by ourselves. From time to time we have appraised and reappraised the extent of our world responsibilities within the limitation of our resources.

I am reminded of such a time 6 years ago. It was in March of 1963 at a time when we were considering a multilateral force for our Atlantic Alliance. At his invitation, I had a long discussion with former President Kennedy on this very subject. During the course of our meeting, I asked President Kennedy, "Mr. President, what will we do when Red China becomes a nuclear power?"

He reflected for a moment and then said very solemnly, "John, at that time we will have to reappraise the balance of power in the world."

On 16 October 1964—scarcely a year and a half later—Communist China exploded its first nuclear device well ahead of expectations. Within a short two and a half years, and with six atmospheric tests, the Red Chinese have successfully tested a multimegaton thermonuclear device.

In January of 1967, as Chairman of the Joint Committee of the Congress on Atomic Energy, I undertook extensive hearings with reference to the impact of Red China's nuclear weapons progress on U.S. national security. Our committee rendered an exhaustive and revealing report in July of 1967 indicating that Red China had conducted thermonuclear explosions in December of 1966 and June 1967, a feat that surpassed even France which, at that time, had been testing for over 7 years. Moreover, testimony by experts from our intelligence, the Defense Depart-

ment, and the Atomic Energy Commission's Los Alamos and Livermore nuclear weapons laboratories indicated that by the early 1970's the Chinese Communists probably would achieve an operational intercontinental ballistic missile.

The information developed during this study led me, on 9 September 1967, at the launching of the *Narwhal* submarine at Groton, Conn., to call upon the Administration to speed up its development of an antihallistic missile system. It was in that same month, less than 2 weeks after my statement, that former Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, realizing this new peril, announced the so-called Sentinel System by way of a speech in San Francisco.

Today, as you all know, the so-called Safeguard System advocated by President Nixon is under serious attack. The Senate is sincerely divided on this important issue. This division has reached into the Senate Armed Services Committee, and the probability is that an attempt will be made to compromise the already sealed-down defense system. Any drastic curtailment would be, in my opinion, unfortunate and could well be dangerous to our security in this divided world. Furthermore, it is my strong conviction that any delay to develop a defensive weapon on our part can be suffered only—and I repeat, only—if meaningful and productive talks take place to limit all weapons.

Disarmament is not only our hope—it is our prayer.

Here again I must indulge in some history. In December of 1964, in conjunction with my senatorial responsibilities, I visited our nuclear weapons laboratory in Livermore, Calif. While there I was shown a photograph of an atomic weapon which had all the characteristics of an antiballistic missile and which had been paraded by the Soviets in their previous May Day celebration. Further study and testimony before our

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committee by Mr. John McCone, then Director of the CIA and formerly Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and other experts confirmed this, and time and events have borne out the accuracy of that conclusion.

Today the Russians have ringed Moscow with 67 antiballistic missile sites, and we have none.

Will the Russian ABM system work? I don't know, and maybe they don't know either. But at least the Russians must believe so. I know that the leaders of the Kremlin are cunning and crafty, but they are not stupid. I don't think that they would be investing their money in a weapon that they didn't believe would work. And if they believe that theirs will work, how can they possibly conclude that the nation that was able to circumnavigate the moon on two occasions and will place two men on the moon next month is incapable of producing on its own part an antiballistic missile that will work?

Thus you have here the one important point that is being seriously overlooked; namely, that an ABM which is purely a defensive missile and not an offensive weapon will insure the credibility of our deterrent power which is our best guarantee against the mad act of a surprise attack and a nuclear holocaust.

Why do I say this? Merely to corroborate what President Nixon said to the graduates of the Air Force Academy only a short time ago when he remarked: "You are entering the military service of your country when the Nation's potential adversaries abroad were never stronger." And I might add that the gap is fast closing and that the prophecy of President Kennedy is fast becoming a reality.

A reappraisal of the balance of power in the world is in order. But in saying this, I must make one point very clear. This is not the responsibility of America alone. Those whom we lifted from despair and defeat must make a greater

effort in our joint endeavor for security and peace than they have been inclined to do heretofore.

We went into South Korea practically alone, and we are there today, after a score of years still heavily committed, and again practically alone.

We are now in Vietnam practically alone—an engagement which has cost us dearly in lives and money and dissension among our own people.

We are heavily involved in Europe in men and money, and yet we find that those whom we are defending are doing business as usual with those against whom we are defending them. This, too, has caused dissension among our people and could, unless remedied, lead to precipitous and damaging withdrawals from our Atlantic Alliance.

We have often said that America cannot and should not police the world alone. But as we look around this world we can well understand that we are doing exactly that. Thus the frustration and discord at a time in history when our people, and we and our allies, should be united.

There is no question that America must be strong, and I am sure that its people are willing to make whatever sacrifices are necessary for freedom. We shall always be ready to carry out the admonition of President Kennedy on that cold Inaugural Day of January 1961 when he said: "Let every nation know, whether it wish us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend or oppose any foe in order to assure the survival and success of liberty." But this is a task that requires the cooperation of all nations and all people who believe in freedom. It goes without saying that we shall always be ready to travel more than our share of the road to disarmament and peace. This has been our guide and our goal since the Baruch plan of 1946. But until the day of understanding comes—and I sincerely hope that it will come soon—experience teaches us

that it would be disastrous to attempt to pursue the journey from a posture of weakness.

Peace with honor has its source in material as well as moral strength. Defense of freedom deserves all that is necessary to sustain it. But, let me add, we should write no blank check, not even for national defense. Waste in military procurement is not to be condoned. It must be condemned as deplorable and unforgiveable.

But, make no mistake, we pledge ourselves to a sufficiency for security. Our fighting men deserve no less. For, after all, our first line and our last line of defense is the same—it is you men in

the uniform of our country that you serve so nobly and so well.

A civilian leadership imposes upon you tasks that call for sacrifice to the limits of life and beyond. And you carry them out with a devotion beyond the call of duty. Your uniform is indeed the robe of nobility, whether it be the camouflaged fatigue of the jungle or the ribboned magnificence of the flagship deck.

We salute you proudly, you who wear the uniform proudly.

We bid you Godspeed, safe journey on the course where duty calls, and a fair haven in the ports of peace.



Senator Pastore
addressing the graduates

**Presentation
of diplomas**



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List of Graduates

NAVAL COMMAND COURSE

Captain Ho-Chien Liu, Republic of China Navy
Captain Torbjorn Johannessen, Royal Norwegian Navy
Captain Chong-ho Yi, Korean Navy
Captain Klaus Kietrich Hecht, Federal German Navy
Captain Jose A. Alvarez, Argentine Navy
Captain Massimiliano Marandino, Italian Navy
Captain Misao Matsui, Maritime Self Defense Force, Japan
Captain S.M. Ahmed, Pakistan Navy
Colonel Teddy Natanegara, Indonesian Navy
Captain Alfredo A. Bello, Venezuelan Navy
Captain Hernan Quiros, Peruvian Navy
Captain Federico S. Sinlao, Philippine Navy (*Diploma
awarded posthumously*)
Commander Robert G. Loosli, Royal Australian Navy
Commander Fernando Salas, Spanish Navy
Commander Henry W. Vondette, Canadian Armed Forces
Commander Hector H. Cabanas, Uruguayan Navy
Commander Sombat Kongyai, Royal Thai Navy
Commander Jaime Torres, Colombian Navy
Commander Geraldo S.C. Guimaraes, Brazilian Navy
Commander Nguyen Huu Chi, Vietnamese Navy
Commander Norman R.D. King, Royal Navy
Commander Irfan S. Tinaz, Turkish Navy
Commander Osvaldo Fourzan, Mexican Navy
Commander Odyssefs N. Kapetos, Royal Hellenic Navy
Commander Berhanu Tesfaye, Imperial Ethiopian Navy
Commander Ahmed Madani, Imperial Iranian Navy

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Major James D. Smith, U.S. Army
Lieutenant Commander Ronald E. Smith, U.S. Navy
Lieutenant Commander Ronald E. Sorna, U.S. Navy
Major Edwin L. Stanford, U.S. Air Force
Lieutenant Commander William H. Stillwell, U.S. Navy
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Lieutenant Commander James O. Sullivan, U.S. Coast Guard
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Lieutenant Commander John H. Touchton, Jr., U.S. Navy
Lieutenant Commander Robert C. Truax, U.S. Navy
Lieutenant Commander Jerry O. Tuttle, U.S. Navy
Lieutenant Commander Thomas L. Vannaman, SC, U.S. Navy
Commander Everett L. Vernon, U.S. Navy
Lieutenant Commander George E. Wales, U.S. Navy
Lieutenant Commander Eugene E. Wanglie, U.S. Navy
Lieutenant Commander Thomas C. Weller, Jr., SC, U.S. Navy
Commander Billy J. White, U.S. Navy
Commander Robert K. White, CEC, U.S. Navy
Commander David G. Wilson, U.S. Navy
Lieutenant Commander Morton S. Winchester, U.S. Navy
Major Richard W. Wood, U.S. Air Force
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Commander John C. Gould, MC, U.S. Navy Reserve

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Commander Orrin B. Ross, SC, U.S. Navy



As to rewards and promotion, it is essential to respect long service and at the same time open a way for merit.

Jomini: Precis de l'Art de la Guerre, 1838

Impact Of Senior Service College Education On Naval Officer Promotion

A lecture delivered at the Naval War College

on 29 April 1969

by

Captain Edward R. Day, Jr., U.S. Navy

In the spring of 1968 some 160 naval officers received orders to attend one of the senior service colleges. Commanders were in the majority, but many selectees were already captains. Most were probably surprised, although pleased, with the orders. Surprised because the "war college list" is one of those closely held documents at the Bureau of Naval Personnel, and pleased because natural reaction is that such orders are indicative of high standing among contemporaries.

Individual letters of congratulations and welcome soon arrived from the presidents and commandants of the several colleges. The letters probably cited the great potential of the officers selected and related the mission of the colleges to prepare them for the very

highest positions of military leadership, responsibility, and command. Many officers tried to analyze and rationalize their assignments to particular colleges, and those few that checked with their detailers learned that all the colleges are considered equal and that assignments were largely random.

Words of congratulations from juniors and contemporaries were welcomed, and the counsel of seniors likely encompassed a broad spectrum of diverse positions on the essentiality of senior service college education, the relative merits of certain colleges, and the impact on future assignments and promotion. Those more inquisitive officers that reviewed official directives found no comprehensive statement of Navy policy on the importance or

operation of the professional post-graduate education programs and the impact which such programs have on individual careers. Recollection of some short articles in the military periodical literature revealed that some increased promotional opportunity is enjoyed by senior service college graduates.

Determined to get the most out of the 1-year sabbatical and to well represent the Navy at the assigned college, most individuals approached fall orientation with the greatest of expectations and no small measure of personal satisfaction. Welcoming remarks by the college presidents or commandants appropriately raised expectations and curricular enthusiasm. Students earned that one out of three, or perhaps one out of four, of them would achieve flag or general rank.

Within a matter of days, these senior naval officer students saw some of their contemporaries in the other services sporting accelerated promotions to colonel. Then the bubble burst! The Navy line captain selection list was promulgated and revealed the astonishing fact that many of their classmates at the senior service colleges were "passed over" for promotion.

If the mystery associated with the paradoxical incident which caps this scenario provided the basic stimulus for this effort, the disclosures of initial research amply provided a continuing motivation. The task is to examine the various nuances of the impact of senior service college education on naval officer promotion, and the goal is to delineate conclusions and advance constructive recommendations which may contribute to development and promulgation of a comprehensive statement of Navy policy on the professional education of senior officers. Such a task necessarily encompasses a brief examination of the war college institutions themselves, a delineation of authoritative consensus on the qualifications of naval leaders, a determination of the

contribution of the war colleges to development of those qualifications, an understanding of the Navy program to utilize the available war college facilities and the products of those facilities, and, finally, an analysis of the abrasive interface between the senior service college and promotional selection systems. With no intent whatever to suggest that the Navy should emulate the program of any other service, comparative data will be presented where they contribute to fuller understanding.

There are five war colleges within the Defense structure. The National War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, both located at Fort Lesley J. McNair in Washington, are under the supervisory control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Naval War College at Newport, R.I.; the Army War College at Carlisle, Pa.; and the Air War College at Maxwell, Ala., are responsive to the direction of their respective Military Departments. The Marine Corps has no senior service college but utilizes the facilities of all the colleges. Senior naval officers attend all five of these war colleges, and an additional few are assigned as students at the Imperial Defence College, the Joint Services Staff College, the Canadian National Defence College, the Inter-American Defense College, the NATO Defense College, and the Foreign Service Institute.

The mission statements, objectives, educational philosophies, and curricula of the five war colleges are quite similar, notwithstanding some minimal variations in academic concentration. Each college stresses understanding of the broad factors of power potential and emphasizes the preparation of highly selected senior officers for high command, staff, and policy making positions. While the Industrial College of the Armed Forces concentrates on the economic, industrial, and managerial aspects of national security, it can no longer be considered a college for logisticians. All of the war colleges reflect

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the highest standards of graduate-level, professional military education.

Prior to any determination of the contributions which the war colleges make to the development of the essential qualifications of top naval leaders, it is germane to explore those qualifications. Concerned as he was with the matter of flag selection criteria, then President John F. Kennedy addressed a personal letter to Secretary of the Navy designate Paul Nitze, on 7 November 1963, in which he stated:

I believe that military and political factors are so interwoven that they cannot be separated into clear, well-defined categories, and that both must be mastered as a prerequisite to sound military and naval concepts. High ranking officers who hold positions of responsibility in the military departments must be thoroughly aware of the delicate sensitivities involved throughout the broad spectrum of international policy. The education, duty patterns, and promotion processes of the officer corps must be designed to achieve this result.

Again, President Kennedy, this time referring to the Cuban missile crisis, commented:

We needed in October—and we had them—and we shall need in the future—and we shall have them—military commanders who are conscious of the enormous stakes in the nuclear age of every decision that they take, who are aware of the fact that there are no purely political decisions, or purely military decisions: that every problem is a mixture of both—men who know the difference between vital interests and peripheral interests . . .

Examining the recommendations made to flag and captain selection boards by the several Secretaries of the Navy since 1954, one finds frequent reference to future potential, qualifications to command at sea, broad appreciation of the politico-military aspects of national security policy formulation, effectiveness in the joint or combined staff environment, early selection, and technical knowledge. In his guidance to the Fiscal Year 1969 Flag Selection Board, Secretary of the Navy Paul Ignatius, acknowledging the importance of proficiency at sea and technical expertise, called for "the accelerated promotion of junior captains," addressed the importance of assignments "outside the Navy proper," and related the need for flag officers of "broad national perspective."

The importance of war college education in the development of the essential qualifications of future naval leaders was well expressed by a past President of the Naval War College, Vice Adm. John T. Hayward. In a 1966 report to the Chief of Naval Personnel, he stated:

As the unrestricted line officer progresses in his career, the nature of his assignments and his responsibilities gradually turns his interests outward—away from concentration upon the details of his specialty and subspecialty toward greater involvement in the direction and management of integrated naval and other military forces. Proficiency in these complex, varied and demanding, more generalized responsibilities calls for a breadth of knowledge well beyond that which can be obtained by experience alone.

War college professional education helps to prepare officers for the complete spectrum of higher responsibilities implicit in the term 'unrestricted line officer.' It

benefits the widest range of subsequent assignments and is not directed toward preparation for any restricted number of specific billets.

If the war colleges' mission is to improve an officer's competence for higher responsibility, and if the highest positions of responsibility are held by flag officers, it follows that flag officers should have received a war college education prior to attainment of the rank and responsibilities.

In 1966 the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower) conducted a searching study of officer education. One dimension of the study involved an extensive survey of flag officers and captains. Most respondents recommended that increased numbers of officers be educated at the senior service colleges, and the vast majority observed that graduates performed "considerably better" than non-graduates. Interestingly enough, the more senior the officer questioned, the more importance he placed on senior service college education.

Authoritative opinion from outside the Defense organization indicates that the service college system is a sound one and is meeting its objectives. John W. Masland and Laurence I. Radway conducted an intensive analysis of war college academic contributions. In their book *Soldiers and Scholars*, they observed: "We are very much impressed by the accomplishments of the colleges. They make a direct contribution to the security and welfare of the United States, their resources are of high order and their accomplishments are substantial."

Having established a direct relationship between senior service college education and the essential qualifications of top naval leaders, attention now can be turned to an examination of the

Navy program for utilization of the available war college facilities and the products of those facilities. Such examination necessarily encompasses a review of the senior service college selection system, subsequent school assignment criteria and procedures, and a tentative analysis of the overall Navy program for professional postgraduate education. However, the task is complicated by the apparent absence of any comprehensive statement of Navy policy on the importance or operation of the program and the sharing of responsibility for program conception and implementation between the Bureau of Naval Personnel (BUPERS), the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV), and the Naval War College.

Each May a formal service college selection board is convened at the Bureau of Naval Personnel. The board is headed by a rear admiral, usually from the Washington area, and is organized with unrestricted line, restricted line, and staff panels. The unrestricted line panel may consist of six captains, one each from the Naval War College, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, the National War College, OPNAV, and two from BUPERS.

The sole selection criterion is "performance," and only fitness report jackets are submitted to the board. Each year group is screened just prior to the 16th and 21st years of commissioned service for attendance at the senior service colleges during the 16-20 or 21-25 year periods. Year group quotas are based on projected captain strength at the 21st year point and equality of year group opportunity to attend. Selection opportunity has been running about 23 percent, or about 44 percent of year group projected captain strength by the end of the period of eligibility. Principal selectees are not arranged in any order of merit; and alternates, in a number up to 50 percent of the year group but not more than two per

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principal selectee, are identified. This is admittedly an oversimplification.

Quite natural questions concern the reasons for two screenings and the matter of changes in performance subsequent to selection. The "second look" is to insure that officers showing improving performance and those unavailable for early assignment are given additional consideration. In addition, the rank detailee can "board" officers of declining performance for "selection out" and "late bloomers" for reconsideration at any time. "Deep selectees" are automatically "boarded" as are "late pickups." Officers "passed over" for commander are not considered.

Selected officers are "hanked" or placed on the "war college list." Individuals cannot determine if they are on the list until they receive orders, and even then cannot know if they were principals or alternates. This secrecy is ostensibly intended to reduce the demotivating impact on officers that are not selected; but it acts, quite obviously, to enhance "detailing flexibility." The entire system is designed to insure equality of opportunity and to minimize the impact of availability on selection. With the possible exception of the powers granted the detailers to "board" individuals in special cases, the selection system appears to be entirely equitable and quite well conceived.

The matter of assignment of an officer from the "war college list" to a particular college is by no means as clear cut. The first problem is one of availability. Top performers are always in demand, and detailers are frequently faced with a choice between the immediate needs of the Navy and the needs of the individual. This is difficult to rationalize in light of the fact that the greater and longer range needs of the Navy are identical with the needs of the individual selectees. In any case, there is some evidence to indicate that it is possible for a principal selectee never to receive orders to a senior service

college.

With little more than the guidance that all senior service colleges are to be considered coequal and with a "war college list" reflecting no order of merit, the detailers are tasked to assign some 160 officers to the five principal colleges. The quota plan delineates the billets for unrestricted line, restricted line and staff officers at the various colleges. For example, in a particular year one restricted line or staff officer may be ordered to the National War College, 11 to the Industrial College, and 14 to the Naval War College. The remainder would be unrestricted line officers. Only the Industrial College has attempted to influence assignment criteria by requesting officers that have not earned a master's degree in business administration during the preceding 5 years. This is to provide compatibility with an established cooperative degree program.

Any analysis of the matter of assignment leads to the compelling conclusion that the detailers are all-powerful and that the relative impact of their decisions on an individual's career may even challenge those of the senior service college selection boards. They determine availability, decide which college one is to attend, decide when he is to attend, and may even decide if he is to attend any college. Granting the absolute impartiality of the detailers and acknowledging their professional wisdom, there is apparent latitude, within this career-making smörgasbord, for the exercise of subconscious bias concerning the relative merits of individuals and service colleges.

The number of Navy students assigned to the various war colleges is delineated in table 1. The demands of the war in Vietnam have acted to reduce attendance; however, a reversal of this trend occurred in Fiscal Year 1969. Historically, about 50 percent of naval officer participants have attended other than the parent senior service college.

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TABLE 1—SENIOR SERVICE COLLEGE INPUT OF NAVY STUDENTS,
FISCAL YEARS 1965 to 1969, INCLUSIVE

College	FY-65	FY-66	FY-67	FY-68	FY-69
NWC (National)	26	26	27	27	26
ICAF (Industrial)	40	36	39	39	37
NAWC (Naval)	100	85	86	39	72
AWC (Army)	10	10	8	7	8
AIRWC (Air Force)	10	10	10	10	10
Other	8	4	10	8	10
Total	194	171	180	130	163

A Program Change Request is currently being developed by the Navy that would increase the number of naval officers attending the Naval War College to 160 by Fiscal Year 1980. Acknowledging the ultimate goal that all unrestricted line officers attend both a junior and a senior service college, the present trend is toward the compromise position that all unrestricted line captains should have attended either a senior or a junior course. Justification for future expansion is complicated by Navy reluctance to identify specific billets as requiring a senior service college graduate and thus developing numerical requirements for officers so educated. It is felt that placement officers do identify some billets for their own purposes but that such practice is essentially a quality control device. There appears to be no stated policy with respect to the future assignment of war college graduates.

Attention now can be turned to examination of the impact of senior service college education on promotion. The relationship between such education and promotional opportunity provides an acid test of the coherence of the Navy professional postgraduate education program and promotional policies. In an attempt to minimize resort to empirical estimates and statements of opinion, a statistical approach will be taken. After some general

observations on promotional opportunity, the flag and captain communities will be explored in more detail.

The current philosophy on promotion is to provide a viable career structure and pattern that will optimize incentive and equalize individual opportunity for succeeding year groups. Flag selection opportunity is planned to continue at about 13 percent through year group 1945, with the probability of an increase to 15 percent thereafter. Flag selection zones are set at 29 years of commissioned service, with most selections made from below the zone. Eligibility has been based on 3 years in the rank of captain; however, all time-in-grade restrictions may soon be suspended by executive order. The opportunity for selection to captain will likely be maintained at 60 percent, with selection zones including officers completing 20 or 21 years service.

Selection opportunities in the other services are quite similar, but, except for the Marine Corps, there is a far greater tendency to accelerate the promotion of a large number of more outstanding officers. While the junior flag selectee is from year group 1944, the Army and Air Force are selecting some generals from year groups 1948 and 1947 respectively. Most Navy captain selectees from year group 1948 are still waiting to "make their number." Navy flag selectees are 2 to 5 years older than general

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officer selectees. Many officers may still remember Secretary of Defense McNamara's criticism of the Navy for "failure to promote on merit and continued emphasis on service-in-grade as a basis for promotion."

The unrestricted line flag community was examined by using the 1968 *Register* and including all subsequent selectees. Some 88.5 percent of the 278 officers are Academy graduates, a figure far exceeding that of any other service. Service dates range from 1927 to 1944, with the median 1937. The oldest officer is 61, the youngest 43, and the median age is 53. There is no apparent pattern with respect to decorations, and 20 have none at all. Only 14 have multiple qualification designators, 17 have special technical qualifications, 31 percent hold advanced degrees, and ordnance engineering and international relations are the two areas accounting for the bulk of graduate study. The senior service college education of the 278 flag officers and flag selectees is reflected in table 2. Surprising as it may seem, 18 percent of the officers have no senior service college education. About 8 percent have attended only junior service college. A far greater percentage of general officers are senior service college graduates, and practically all Army generals are graduates of both junior and senior service colleges.

TABLE 2—PROFESSIONAL POST-GRADUATE EDUCATION OF UNRESTRICTED LINE FLAG OFFICERS AND SELECTEES

College	Number	Percentage
NWC	90	32.4
ICAF	27	9.7
NAWC	105	37.7
AWC	1	.4
AIRWC	1	.4
Other	4	1.4
None	50	18.0
Total	278	100.0

Table 3 depicts the flag and general officer selection opportunity of senior service college graduates. College classes 1951 through 1960 were selected for analysis, as most graduates of these classes have reached the stage of "practical consideration" for star rank. While the number of graduates for each service is almost exactly proportional to the number of star hillets authorized under Senate limitations, the Navy graduates had the lowest opportunity for selection. The preferential position of graduates of the National War College is apparent. No service regarded the graduates of its own war college as badly as did the Navy. Navy graduates of the Army War College had the lowest opportunity, 5 percent; however, one in three of its Marine Corps graduates made general.

The Fiscal Year 1969 unrestricted line flag selection list was examined in an effort to determine recent changes in trend. Of 24 selectees, eight had no senior service college education, four each were graduates of the National War College and the Industrial College, and eight were products of the Naval War College. This would indicate some moderation of the higher flag selection opportunity of National War College graduates, but a continuing trend away from service college graduates as a group.

Examination of the captain community indicates that year group 1943 is the junior group that has entered the "practical zone" of consideration for flag rank. On that basis, about one-half of all active captains have had a good chance at flag selection. Of those not selected, 672, or about 50 percent, are senior service college graduates. Thus, while 18 percent of all unrestricted line flag officers are not senior service college graduates, some 25 percent of all unrestricted line captains are non-selected senior war college graduates.

The unrestricted line section of the 1968 *Register* contains the names of 115 senior service college graduates who

TABLE 3—FLAG AND GENERAL SELECTION OPPORTUNITY OF SENIOR SERVICE COLLEGE GRADUATES, CLASSES 1951 to 1960, INCLUSIVE

College	USN	USA	USAF	USMC
NWC	109/263-41 ^a	225/336-67	148/321-46	27/66-41
ICAF	40/335-12	92/417-22	57/392-15	8/63-13
NAWC	81/981-8	6/118-5	9/68-13	7/114-6
AWC	1/22-5	390/1,665-23	7/45-16	11/34-32
AIRWC	27/54-50	15/113-13	202/1,261-16	6/53-11
Total	258/1,655-16	728/2,649-27	423/2,087-20	59/330-18

^aNumber selected/Number of graduates—percentage

have been "passed over" for captain. None were National War College graduates, and only two attended the Industrial College. The Fiscal Year 1969 captain selection opportunity for unrestricted line "in zoners" ran about 48 percent. The opportunity for senior war college graduates was 68 percent, a considerable edge. The incredible thing is that any were "passed over" for captain, as the promotional opportunity far exceeds the senior service college selection opportunity. Even assuming that performance subsequent to graduation can account for nonselection, it is difficult to explain why 20 percent of the Fiscal Year 1969 resident students failed of selection. For comparison purposes, virtually all Army officers that attend senior war college make colonel. Examination of the unrestricted line "deep" selection for captain indicates that only three of 23 selected in Fiscal Year 1968 had senior service college education. In Fiscal Year 1969, none of the 13 "deep selectees" had attended. From these statistics it is apparent that senior service college education enhances selection opportunity, but by no means insures selection to the rank of captain.

Based on this examination it now is possible to conclude that:

(1) One of the essential qualifications of future naval leaders is a thorough understanding and appreciation of the

broad factors of power potential as they relate to national security policy.

(2) The attainment of such qualifications involves the acquisition of a special knowledge and conceptual framework which cannot be obtained by experience alone.

(3) All of the senior war colleges well provide the opportunity, the facilities, and the curriculum to impart exactly that knowledge.

(4) There exists no comprehensive statement of Navy policy on the importance and operation of the professional postgraduate education program.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Captain Edward R. Day, Jr., U.S. Navy, did his undergraduate work at Ohio State University, holds a masters degree in international relations from American University, and is a graduate of both the Naval

War College, School of Naval Command and Staff, and the Army War College. He has had a wide and varied career in aviation—his most recent assignments being Commanding Officer of Antisubmarine Squadron 27 followed by Operations Officer of the U.S.S. *Essex* (CVS-9). Captain Day is currently serving as Assistant Head, Policy Coordination Branch in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.

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(5) There is a marked lack of coherence in the Navy program to both educate and promote those officers best fitted for future leadership.

(6) The Navy places less emphasis on its professional postgraduate education program than does any other service and, to a degree, has squandered its senior service college resources.

The development of a revitalized, understood, and coherent program for the professional education and promotion of those best fitted to act across a new and broader spectrum of professionalism will insure the Navy of the future the same high quality of leadership that it has enjoyed throughout its history. While such a task is well beyond the scope of this effort, certain rather obvious courses of action are advanced with respect to the professional postgraduate education program.

(1) As the requirements of administration are a constantly changing quantity and the mission of organization is never complete, consideration should be given to centralization of the broad spectrum responsibility for management of the service college programs. The Bureau of Naval Personnel probably is best equipped for the task. In addition, a Special Assistant for Senior Officer Career Management might well extend the capabilities of the Chief of Naval Personnel to monitor matters of service college selection, college assignment, detailing and further qualifying of graduates, and promotional patterns.

(2) Early promulgation of a comprehensive statement of Navy policy on the importance and operation of the professional postgraduate education program would enhance understanding and motivation in the officer corps.

(3) Since revolutionary change would inflict injustice on many fine officers, an evolutionary approach should be taken toward achievement of a viable and disciplined senior officer career pattern encompassing the orderly progression of the best fitted officers

through junior service college, commander selection, basic command assignment, senior service college, captain selection, qualifying command, major command, and flag selection. Similar programs could be developed for restricted line and staff officers. At each succeeding stage of progress, selection opportunity would be reduced to insure quality control. Only in very rare cases would selection boards identify "late bloomers" for inclusion in the pattern. Academic postgraduate education could be easily accommodated.

(4) Some expansion of the war college facilities is essential to implementation of any such program; however, justification should be based on the necessity to progressively educate the best fitted officers, rather than on bringing the vast majority up to some minimal standard. In order to insure proper utilization of graduates in career sensitive billets and to provide a basis for justifying war college facilities, the identification of billets requiring war college graduates is essential.

(5) As an interim measure, action should be taken to insure that:

(a) The policy of selecting the best fitted for service college education is continued and that selectees are ordered regardless of other short-range requirements or considerations of expediency.

(b) Assignment officers and selection boards are reinstructed on the coequal status and prestige of the senior service colleges and that an order of merit listing of selectees be required in order to insure equal distribution of quality.

(c) Captain and flag selection boards are specifically instructed on the importance of service college education.


(d) Qualifying and major command selection boards are instructed to give maximum consideration to senior service college graduates.

In summary, senior service college

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education does not now have a proper
relationship to naval officer promotion.
If the Navy is to meet the challenges of

tomorrow, it must select, educate, and
then promote those best fitted for
leadership today.



For promotion cometh neither from the east, nor from the west, nor
yet from the south. And why? God is the judge; he putteth down one,
and setteth up another.

Psalms 75, 7-8

OFFICER PROMOTION PLANNING

A lecture delivered at the Naval War College

by

Commander James K. Martin, U.S. Navy

What is my promotion opportunity? This a question that all officers ask periodically from the time of commissioning until departure from the naval service. While this may seem a simple query, it, in fact, demands a rather complicated response.

Promotion opportunity is a consequence of personnel planning, and the opportunity for selection is a statistical analysis of selection board results. Promotion opportunity is composed of three factors: (1) the prescribed number—the number of officers that shall be maintained in a grade or combination of grades for a particular category, (2) the flow point—the total commissioned service accrued prior to entering the promotion zone, and (3) the promotion percentage—a percentage description of

the number of officers authorized to be selected divided by the number of officers in the promotion zone. In the unrestricted line these three factors are established for each grade above lieutenant and are interdependent. For the grades of lieutenant and below, promotion percentages and flow points are established, but prescribed numbers are not required. The number of officers in these grades is a product of the ensign input which is a function of the total strength authorized.

Prescribed numbers are established for lieutenant commanders and above in the unrestricted line and limited duty officer communities and for the combined grades of captain, commander, and lieutenant commander in the restricted line. The staff corps has no

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grade ceilings; instead, total corps ceilings are established by law as a percent of the unrestricted line strength. For example, the total ceiling for the Supply Corps and Civil Engineer Corps active list officers is 12 percent and 3 percent, respectively, of the existing unrestricted active line strength.

Since promotions are made to vacancies in the grades of lieutenant commander and above in the line, the number to be selected must necessarily be a function of vacancies. Vacancies as defined by law "occur whenever and to the extent that the actual number of officers in a grade or combination of grades falls below the prescribed number." Thus it can be seen that the prescribed numbers establish the ceilings for the respective officer grades, and the annual vacancies created therein reflect the number to be selected.

Flow point, the second factor, takes the time element into consideration for planning. Current flow points are shown in figure 1, and for comparative purposes similar information for the other services is included. The differences which exist do not necessarily indicate a "better chance" but rather that different services have different laws, different needs, and vastly different personnel situations.

The third factor to be considered is the percentage description of the number of officers to be selected from the zone and is commonly, but mistakenly, referred to as the "promotion opportunity." If 70 officers in the unrestricted line are authorized to be selected from a zone of 100, this amounts to a 70 percent factor and is referred to as "line fraction." By law, the restricted line is guaranteed not less than line fraction. The difference is small, but distinct. For example, a zone of 12 officers at a promotion percentage of 70 percent in the unrestricted line would result in eight selections (8.4 rounds down to eight). In the restricted line this same situation would result in

nine selections simply because eight selections would be 66.6 percent which is less than the 70 percent line fraction.

Figure 2 is the unrestricted line officer structure as seen by a promotion planner. For each grade the three factors which make up promotion opportunity are shown. Each year the Secretary of the Navy reviews this structure. Decisions are made for the flow points, promotion percentages, and prescribed numbers starting with the captain grade. Each grade, in turn, supports the one above; and changes of any of the three factors in any grade are closely studied for the effect on adjacent grades. Ensigns are promoted to lieutenant (junior grade) by their commanding officers on an all qualified basis. Thereafter, all promotions in the unrestricted line are by selection board actions to the next higher grade.

With the above discussion in mind, let us now turn to the actual development of a promotion plan. This process is carried out in three basic steps:

1. Estimating vacancies.
2. Making 10-year projections by assuming fixed or variable values for:
 - a. Prescribed number
 - b. Flow point
 - c. Promotion percentage
3. Extracting next fiscal year's plan from the 10-year projection (which is updated each year).

Vacancies are estimated for each year group based on the development of attrition factors, exclusive of known statutory losses, for each year of commissioned service. Using this information, 10-year projections are constructed in order to quantitatively examine the three promotion opportunity factors and to maintain equal opportunity consistent with the needs of the service.

Figure 3 is an example of a 10-year projection for the grade of lieutenant commander in the unrestricted line. Note that the fiscal year 1969 prescribed number is stated as 7,900, and

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FLOW POINT

Grade	Navy	Army	Marines	Air Force
Lt (jg.)	1 year	1 year	15 months	1½ years
Lt.	3 years	2-3 years	34 months	3 years
LCdr.	9 years*	7-11 years	8-9 years	11 years
Cdr.	14 years	14 years	16 years	17 years
Capt.	20-21 years	20 years	22-26 years	22 years

*Projected at 8 years for FY 1970

Figure 1

UNRESTRICTED LINE OFFICER STRUCTURE FISCAL YEAR 1969

Grade	Flow Point	Promotion Percentage	Prescribed Number
Capt.	20-21 yrs.	60%	2,500
Cdr.	14 yrs.	75%	5,300
LCdr.	9 yrs.	85%	7,900
Lt.	3 yrs.	95%	Adjusts to meet authorized end strength
Lt.(jg.)	1 yr.	All qual	
Ens.	—	—	

Figure 2

note further in this projection that for subsequent fiscal years the number in grade declines and then levels off in the 7,000 range. The prescribed number, one of the promotion opportunity factors, is being permitted to vary whereas the other two factors, promotion percentage and flow point, are being held constant at 85 percent and 9 years,* respectively. This does not mean that this situation will remain as depicted but only that in order to make the projection at all, certain assumptions must be made. This example projection is only one of almost an infinite number that could theoretically be made.

To continue, below the standpipes is the number to select for each fiscal

year. This number is derived from the estimated vacancies (selections = vacancies). By applying the promotion percentage to the number to select, the size of the zone is determined, i.e., in 1969, 1,027 is 85 percent of 1,208. Conveniently, for this projection at any rate, the zone size corresponds with the size of the year group each year. This, of course, is not always true. The flow point is required in order to construct the projection but is not necessary for computation of the numbers to select or the size of the zone. A change in the flow point would, however, change the zones and either the number to select or the prescribed number. At the bottom of the projection are shown the lieutenant year groups, a through j, under the corresponding fiscal year in which they will be in the zone at the 9-year point.

*The flow point for LCDR's for Fiscal Year 1970 is projected to be 8 years.




Figure 3

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The basis for a 1969 lieutenant commander promotion plan could be extracted from this projection. Such a plan would provide for 7,900 lieutenant commanders in grade and selection of 1,027 lieutenants at an 85 percent promotion percentage. The zone year group is year group a in the 9th year of commissioned service. Obviously, if more emphasis is placed on maintaining a particular prescribed number and permitting either the promotion percentage or flow point to vary, this projection would take on a different character altogether.

The value of such a projection, however, should be placed in proper perspective. While the advantage of being able to make comparisons "down the pike" provides substantial assistance, the projection still remains a possibility (one of many), not a commitment.

After the projections are constructed and all feasible options in each grade studied, the promotion planners will then turn to other aspects directly affected by promotions. The approved Navy-wide personnel requirements by grade and category are compared against the predicted results of the promotion plans in order that the real-life business of running the Navy is given full value. The size of the nonselected community in each grade is reviewed, as the up-or-out concept is essential to maintaining an equitable promotion flow.* The unequal size of succeeding year groups is considered. Maintaining optimum quality control in each grade, attracting top-quality officers, and retention are additional considerations that must be given attention. These and many other related factors are sifted through, and a structure, such as represented in figure 2, is assembled.

*While a nonselected officer may not be judged as best fitted to be promoted in the next higher grade by a selection board, this by no means infers that he is unsuited for his current grade. Such an officer is usually quite competent in the grade in which he is serving.

To provide detailed backup for the promotion structure, promotion plans for each grade are drawn up based on the information contained in the 10-year projections. Figure 4 is a sample promotion plan which illustrates the various aspects of a typical plan. On the left side the necessary elements are listed, and on the right side a pictorial representation of the year group numbers is given.

In this sample plan the grade is identified as the grade of captain. The prescribed number is 2,500. Vacancies have been estimated to be 265; therefore, the selections authorized are 265. By applying the approved promotion percentage of 60 percent to the number of selections authorized, the number in the zone is determined to be 442. At this point let us pause and define what is meant by "zone." Title 10 USC states:

The promotion zone in each grade shall be composed of that number of the most senior such officers under consideration, who are eligible for selection for promotion to the next higher grade and who have not previously failed of such selection, that must either be selected for promotion by the particular board or be considered as having failed of such selection, in order to maintain a flow of promotion.

The top of the promotion zone is identified as the most senior officer not failed of selection. In this case it is Commander Alfa. By counting down 441 names, the junior officer, Commander Bravo, is identified, and the zone of 442 is established. This zone, incidentally, includes all of year group 1948 and about one-third of year group 1949, which explains how year groups can become split for promotion.

When the selection board is convened, the number of selections authorized and the identification of the

SAMPLE PROMOTION PLAN

GRADE: CAPTAIN

PRESCRIBED NO: 2,500

EST. VACANCIES: 265

NO. TO SELECT: 265

PROMOTION PERCENTAGE: 60%

NO. IN ZONE: 442

SENIOR OFFICER - ALFA, B. C.

JUNIOR OFFICER - BRAVO, C. D.

ELIGIBLE:

JUNIOR OFFICER - CHARLIE, D. E.




Figure 4

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zone are given to the board. These are the interim numbers. Seventy-two hours prior to the expected completion of the board's deliberations, the final number to select is determined. This is done by making a precise count of the officers actually in the zone on the day the board convened and applying the approved promotion percentage which gives the final number to select. The final number to select is always very close to the interim numbers given the board and amounts to a refinement of the interim numbers.

Referring again to figure 4, Commander Charlie is identified as the junior officer eligible. The criterion for below-zone eligibility is simple: permit each officer in the Navy at least two considerations for early selection, beginning with the grade of lieutenant eligible for lieutenant commander. This is a new policy which will go into effect in Fiscal Year 1970. The total number eligible also includes all above-zone officers that are in a nonselected status but still on active duty. Eligibility does not include retired officers on active duty who are, by law, not eligible for consideration for promotion. In the sample plan, year groups 1943 through 1947 are above zone. Of the 265 selections authorized, not more than 5 percent may come from below the zone. This below-zone limitation is the only restraint imposed by law on the board within the numbers authorized. The selection board is otherwise charged to establish a single best fitted standard for selection to be applied to all eligible officers whether in, above, or below the zone.

Thus, it may be seen that while the approved promotion percentage is 60

percent and that the determination of this is integral to the zone, the practical application of selecting the best fitted officers from among those eligible will reduce the in-zone percentage by a factor equal to the number of selections made out of the zone. The intent of the law is to provide equal opportunity for succeeding years, to provide for early recognition, through selection, of those few who are outstanding or "head and shoulders" performers while also providing that prior nonselection should not prejudice an officer's future opportunity for selection.

These then are the essentials of the promotion planning process. There are no simple answers to questions concerning promotion opportunity, and implicit in any understanding is knowledge of the promotion planning process. In the end, selection or nonselection is a function of relative values, the most important of which is the man himself.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Comdr. James K. Martin, U.S. Navy, did his undergraduate work at the University of Texas and is a graduate of the Naval War College, School of Naval Command and Staff. He has had duty in destroyers,

both in the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets, and has served on a cruiser and in the amphibious forces. He is currently Head of the Officer Promotion Plans Section of the Bureau of Naval Personnel and recently was awarded the Navy Commendation Medal for development of new concepts in officer promotion planning.

Stephen Bleeker Luce



An article prepared by

Rear Admiral John D. Hayes, U.S. Navy (Ret.)

Stephen Bleeker Luce served in the U.S. Navy for 70 years, and 60 of them were spent on active duty. His pre-eminence was not achieved in war but rather in the trying sphere of preparing for it. He entered the Navy as a midshipman 5 years before the Mexican War, and he thus was able to have a part in the first of America's overseas conflicts. He served as a seasoned officer during the Civil War and perceived with his keen professional understanding the purpose of a Navy and the needs of the men who compose it. He never afterwards allowed himself or those who followed him to forget that the two foundation stones of their calling were war and the preparation for it. His acumen, zeal, and untiring energy throughout the next half century helped

bring about a revolution in naval thought that has had its impact to this day, not only on his own Navy, but on the other navies of the world. Luce died a few months after the United States entered World War I, but he lived to see the Nation to which he contributed so much take its first decisive steps toward world power.

The prime of Luce's life was spent in the period when the U.S. Navy was at the lowest point in its history. After the Civil War the American people turned their eyes and efforts inward to the development of their heartland and away from the sea which had been the basis of their prewar outlook. The Navy and the merchant marine were neglected and forgotten. Most senior naval officers were content to reflect upon the glories

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of their war days, and even Luce's contemporaries generally chose to look backward. Luce's thoughts, however, were kept focused on the future of war and war's handmaiden, strategy. His happy enthusiasm transmitted this ardent and unselfish professionalism to the younger men who were to create the U.S. Navy of the future: Alfred T. Mahan, William T. Sampson, Robley D. Evans, French E. Chadwick, Henry C. Taylor, Bradley A. Fiske, and William S. Sims.

Luce thereby forms the link between the two great periods of our naval history, that of the sail and wooden navy with its revolution during the Civil War and that of the steam and steel navy which did not have its beginnings until 20 years after the war. He, almost alone, preserved and carried forward the spirit and tone of the old Navy through those barren years and infused it into the modern Navy of today. One of his contributions in doing this was his insistence that men were as important as weapons and machines. He also constantly pointed out that the purpose of a navy is to wage war, and regardless of how remote war appears to be, it is the officer's function to study war and train his men for it.

It is difficult to measure in tangible terms the contributions that Stephen B. Luce made to his profession and to his country's naval power. One of the ablest of his disciples, Bradley A. Fiske, defined it best by saying, "Luce taught the Navy to think." Luce's concrete accomplishments, however, were many.

He prepared the first comprehensive textbook on the seaman's craft published in the United States. His *Seamanship*, first printed in 1862, went through several editions before it was replaced in 1901 by Knight's *Modern Seamanship*. Luce's work, however, is still in print, having been republished by the Cornell Maritime Press of Cambridge, Md., in 1952.

He was Commandant of Midshipmen at the Naval Academy from 1865 to 1868 during the superintendency of David D. Porter, which were perhaps the Academy's most dynamic years.

He was an early advocate for training and licensing merchant marine officers and in 1875 organized the New York State Maritime Academy, the first of such institutions. He did this by getting legislation enacted extending the noted Morell Act of July 1862, which created our land-grant state universities, to include nautical as well as agricultural and mechanical training.

Luce conceived and initiated in 1872 a successful system for training enlisted apprentices which evolved into the present naval training stations. His objective was to replace the foreigners who then filled the enlisted billets with native Americans and to create a permanent body of enlisted men such as existed in the navies of Europe. By the turn of the century, the first had been largely accomplished. He never succeeded in doing the second because of the short term of enlistment in the United States and the attractive inducements in civilian life for the skills that were acquired in the Navy. He succeeded, despite apathy and a lack of funds, in improving the rations of enlisted men and their recreational facilities. He also designed the present enlisted dress blue uniform.

Luce also made many contributions to contemporary naval literature. He saved many of the sea chanties of the days of sail with his book *Naval Songs*, which was first published in 1883 and reprinted in 1889, 1902, and 1908. For over a decade and a half, after the influential *Army and Navy Journal* was founded in 1863 by William C. Church, Luce was virtually its anonymous editor. Church remained editor in chief until 1917, and the two men were friends for 56 years. Luce contributed to the paper almost until his death. The leading article in the first issue of the

Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute was written by Luce. He was President of the Naval Institute for 11 years, and 25 of his articles were published in the *Proceedings* from 1874 to 1911.

Luce is best known for establishing the Naval War College at Newport, R.I. What is not so well known is that he spent the next 20 years preserving it. Opposition came not only from those who did not believe in such education but also from a large group who maintained that the proper place for the institution was in Annapolis or Washington.

Luce gave Alfred Thayer Mahan his great opportunity by selecting him for the faculty of the new war college and by choosing him to be his successor. Mahan's lectures evolved into his first two literary works on seapower on which his reputation mainly stands. It is interesting to note that the original title of the series of lectures was not "The Influence of Sea Power upon History" but "The Influence of Naval Power on the Growth of Nations," which more adequately expressed Mahan's maritime thesis.

Finally, Luce was senior of a group of forward-looking naval officers who, after almost 40 years of effort, succeeded in creating in 1915 the office of the Chief of Naval Operations in the Navy Department.

Luce accomplished all this by teaching, writing, and promoting. He had a flair for public relations far ahead of his time which did not always have the approbation of his contemporaries. But he was, above all, a philosopher, always putting his thoughts on paper. He was "persistent in his demands and prolific with his suggestions," as the biographer of W.C. Church put it. He made these demands and suggestions in letters to friends in high places and in periodicals, both professional and national. This gave him influence in his time that enabled him to make a lasting

impression on the Navy, but it also contributed to his being forgotten when the men who knew him passed on. He never took the time to compose his thoughts into books, as Mahan did, and he refused to write an autobiography. His thoughts and ideas were therefore not easily available on library shelves but had to be searched for in unpublished letters and uncataloged publications.

A resumé of Luce's more important professional writings was published by this author in the Winter 1955 issue of *Military Affairs*, a military history journal, under the title of "Writings of Stephen B. Luce." Thirty-six articles are listed and annotated, largely in Luce's own words. They are arranged by categories of subjects to indicate the extent of Luce's interests and thinking. These are naval organization and administration, military ethics, naval warfare, naval history, officer education, and enlisted training. Twenty-two were published in the *Proceedings*, the remainder mostly in *North American Review* and *the United Service*.

Luce was undoubtedly the most learned man that the U.S. naval profession has produced. His learning was not of the analytical and specialized character so current, but rather a vast and comprehensive synthesis. Researching the references in his writings is a liberal education in itself. His familiarity with foreign languages enabled him to know firsthand the extensive French military writings of the 19th century. He had a much better knowledge of the French Navy and of French strategy than did Mahan.

Luce's devotion to his profession kept him a poor man all his life, unable even to give a college education to his son. On active duty he preferred posts of usefulness to those of status and power. He was a sincerely religious man as his letters, journals, and his three articles on military ethics indicate. His affiliations were Episcopalian, tending

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to High Church. His good health, active mind, and genial sense of humor all, no doubt, contributed to his long life.

Unfortunately, a definitive biography of this man is not possible. Although the collection of his papers in the Naval Historical Foundation fills 16 boxes, there are no more than a half dozen personal letters among them. The correspondence between him and his wife was destroyed by Mrs. Luce after his death, over the protests of his son. Luce's last living descendant was Dr. Stephen B. Luce, a grandson, who is now deceased. This grandson provided the information concerning the destruction of the Luce correspondence, but he did not know if the destruction was accomplished at Luce's request or on his wife's decision. There are lacunas also among Luce's nonofficial correspondence; his papers contain almost no evidence of his long and singular connection with the *Army and Navy Journal*. And, in at least one case, the draft of an official letter preserved in his papers is radically different from the original in the National Archives.

Luce's character is best summarized by his contemporaries.

John S. Barnes, the founder of the Naval Historical Society, served with Luce on two ships and at the Naval Academy. He later resigned to pursue a successful legal and business career. Of Luce he said:

Stephen B. Luce, all through his distinguished career, was one of the most capable officers in our or any navy. Besides his professional accomplishments which were great, his scientific and literary knowledge, increased by constant studying and reading, made him an ideal naval officer, fitted to fill any office with dignity and power within the scope of government action. My intercourse with him, then and later, I regard as one of

the most fortunate intimacies of my life.

Adm. David D. Porter said to Assistant Secretary Fox in 1866: "He is a straightforward fellow and nature has not given him soft manners possessed by people who are all smiles to your face and abuse you behind your back."

Bradley A. Fiske, in the obituary in the *Proceedings* of the U.S. Naval Institute, said in 1917:

Luce taught the Navy to think . . . to think about the Navy as a whole. . . . He saw that a navy in order to be good must be directed as an entity along preconceived and definite lines of strategy. . . . More clearly than any other man in American history, he saw the relations that ought to exist between the central government and its military and naval officers. . . . Luce saw strategy as clearly as most of us see a material object. To him

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Rear Adm. John D. Hayes, U.S. Navy (Ret.) is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy in 1924, holds a masters degree from the University of California, has done advance work at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, and has attended the Army and Navy Staff College, the Naval War College, and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. During his naval career he served on destroyers, cruisers, and battleships; served on the staffs of the 3d and 7th Amphibious Forces in the Pacific in World War II; and commanded Service Squadron 1 during the Korean war. As a retired naval officer, Rear Admiral Hayes resides in Annapolis, Md., where he is active as a writer on modern applications of seapower for professional military and naval periodicals.

more than any other officer who ever lived are naval officers of every nation indebted for the understanding they have of their profession.

Robley D. Evans described him as "that master of his trade," and Albert Gleaves ended the only biography of him with "to such as he there can be no successor."



None other than a Gentleman, as well as a Seaman both in Theory and Practice is qualified to support the Character of a Commissioned Officer in the Navy, nor is any Man fit to Command a Ship of War, who is not also capable of communicating his Ideas on Paper in Language that becomes his Rank.

John Paul Jones, 1747-1792

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WRITING FOR PUBLICATION

An article

by

Mr. Roger C. Taylor

In writing an unsatisfactory fitness report on Alfred Thayer Mahan, a critical senior used this blunt statement: "It is not the business of naval officers to write books." Yet today there are numerous reasons why naval officers should write for publication. Perhaps the most important is the preservation of one's knowledge and wisdom in a particular area.

Consider Mahan, and contrast him, if you will, with Adm. Raymond Spruance. Here are two men with obviously great strategic acumen—men with great knowledge and wisdom in strategic affairs. Mahan recorded his knowledge. Spruance, unfortunately, has not, and we who study naval strategy are the poorer for not having his great knowledge available.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Mr. Roger C. Taylor did his undergraduate work at Harvard University and holds a masters degree in journalism from Boston University. He served on active duty as a naval officer in both destroyers and submarines from 1953 to 1957, and since 1959 has been on the United States Naval Institute staff. He recently took leave of his position as Editorial Director of the U.S. Naval Institute and is now affiliated with International Marine Publishing Company of Camden, Me.

There are many kinds of professional naval writing, of course. There is the article; the essay; the book; the monograph; the book review; the letter to the editor; the humble, enjoyable sea story. Seagoing officers sometimes underestimate a publisher's desire for simply a good sea story from which lessons may be learned and which will give shore-bound readers just pure enjoyment. The editors are always trying, for example, to get more salt water on the pages of the *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*.

Many officers are doubtless deterred from writing by a pessimistic prognosis of their chances for publication. To many, the editor is stereotyped as a critical and merciless evaluator, prejudiced in favor of those authors whose

names are already well established. In reality, an editor approaches each manuscript with an optimistic attitude. Certainly there are manuscripts that must be rejected—because the author missed his target, was too careless with his gunnery, or perhaps failed to set his sights properly. However, as a rule, except for a few acknowledged lapses of editorial judgment, good writing is published, and bad writing isn't.

When any author writes for publication, he must have a specific audience in mind. Consideration of the readership of the applicable publication is mandatory, and the only way to discover their interests and, hence, those of the editor is to read the publication.

Beginning writers often find themselves in a quandary over the choice of a subject, for they often wonder what subjects will find approval in the eyes of editors. Yet we find that officers in the fleet, being naval professionals, are much better at creating article ideas than are editors. My advice is simply to write about your own ideas and experiences that will add to the body of professional knowledge. Far from being presumptuous, this is just common sense.

If you're going to write for publication in a professional sense, obviously there is research involved. The tape recorder is a useful research tool that can lighten considerably the burden of taking notes. It is my firm belief that every naval officer should own a tape recorder, and every naval officer's wife should be able to transcribe from the tape onto paper via the typewriter accurately, quickly, and cheerfully. There are tape recorders on the market today which have amplification adequate to record a voice so low it would not raise a librarian's eyebrow. Notes can be taken in this manner and transcribed with a minimum of effort. They should be placed on index cards, one note per card, to facilitate organization later.

The tape recorder has other advantages as a research tool. It often happens in this day of telephone calls that an important phone call leads to an important decision. In many cases the only way to get the information is to interview the man or men who were immediately involved, and the best way to do that is with a tape recorder. It is also profitable for you to record your own experiences before they are lost forever. When you go through an important operation or participate in making an important decision, you should sit down afterwards and record your observations in some detail. That record may become the basis for important writing later on.

The single most important quality in writing is clarity. As you write on a professional subject, you should think of yourself as leading a reader through new country. You know the significant landmarks, and you find your way around the subject area very easily because you are the expert. The reader is like a man coming into new terrain for the first time, and you must lead him clearly and logically through your subject area.

Two other qualities publishable writing should possess are precision and accuracy. If there's anything an editor doesn't like, it's a manuscript filled with generalities. Give the details of your research, and put a little color into them. Lead up to your generalities with specifics or, if you prefer, back up your generalities with specifics. Assure the accuracy of your statements by careful research and rechecking. Joseph Pulitzer, the famous editor of the *St. Louis Post Dispatch*, had a large sign on the wall for his reporters: "Accuracy! Accuracy! Accuracy!"

I recommend to you four particular books as tools for better writing. One is *Language in Action* by S.I. Hayakawa, who has put into a small book some good advice about the use of the English language. *A Manual of Style*, published by the University of Chicago Press, can

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solve many problems of literary style. Its best feature is a complete index. A good guide to the uses of naval English is found in an article by Samuel Eliot Morison that was published in *The American Neptune* in January 1949. And, finally there is *Roget's Thesaurus*. It is less sporting, perhaps, to look up a word rather than think it up, but it is certainly no less effective.

When you finish a manuscript you must become your own editor and critique the work. Before beginning this process, I strongly recommend that you lay the manuscript aside for a week or two and forget about it. When you return to it later, those great ringing phrases may not stand up to your skeptical analysis. For organization and clarity, a good test for your own writing is to read it aloud. If a manuscript is easily read aloud and makes sense aloud, it is well written.

As we write, it is inevitable that we will use the ideas, facts, and words of others. The proper way to do this is to document the ideas and facts of others via the footnote and to document the exact words of others that you may want to use with quotation marks and a footnote. Footnotes should be sent in with the manuscript that you are submitting for publication, whether or not the publication has a policy of printing footnotes. Editors like to have documentation to know where the ideas and the words came from. It is also the writer's responsibility to obtain permission to quote more than 300 words of another man's work, and this can be accomplished by writing to the author of that work and asking his permission.

Another important form of documentation is the bibliography, and here again the author must visualize himself as the guide. The reader, being unfamiliar with the sources which are used in the work, needs enlightenment. The author, who knows the quality of the sources, should share that knowledge with the reader in an annotated

bibliography. Brief comments about illustrations, the writing style, or the availability of certain otherwise unpublished information in the work referenced are examples of the kind of information that may be extremely helpful to the reader.

The subject of libel should perhaps be mentioned here. Professional naval writing is highly unlikely to be libelous, for three conditions are necessary to have a libelous statement: (1) the person or persons libeled must be identifiable in the piece of writing; (2) the writing must be published, that is, distributed to readers; (3) the writing must hold the person or persons up to ridicule or contempt. You are well advised to consult a copyright attorney if you have any doubt as to whether a statement in a manuscript is libelous.

When you are ready to submit your manuscript, you need send the editor only an original. The typewriting should be double spaced, and the pages should be numbered; but the manuscript need have no staples or binding. An editor will be so interested to see if you have anything of value to say about the Navy that he'll probably read your manuscript in almost any form, but these details do make the job easier for him. They have, however, absolutely nothing to do with whether or not your writing will be published.

Detailed instructions on clearing writing for publication are found in *U.S. Navy Public Affairs Regulations*, section D, 1703. A naval officer or other person working for the executive branch of the Federal Government must submit for clearance a manuscript that deals with national security policy if he plans to submit that manuscript to an outside, nonofficial publication. If he is writing for an inside, official publication, he should file a copy of the manuscript with the Chief of Information. The definition of an inside, official publication includes all Government publications, service journals (such as the

WRITING FOR PUBLICATION 83

United States Naval Institute Proceedings and the *Marine Corps Gazette*), scientific and technical journals, and encyclopedias. The author has the responsibility of eliminating classified material from his manuscript, but at the Naval Institute, for example, the editors protect authors by submitting for clearance any manuscript which they think might inadvertently include classified material. Navy regulations also require a disclaimer with an author's published writings which identify them as his own opinions and not those of the Navy Department.

One quality a writer needs to have when he finishes his work is patience. However, should you submit a manuscript to an editor and fail to get an acknowledgment back in 10 days or so, you might write to determine if your manuscript was received. If there has been no decision whether or not to publish within a matter of several weeks, you are quite justified in writing the editor a letter and asking for a prediction as to when a decision will be made. In cases where the editor has decided to publish your writing but has not published it after several months, you should seek confirmation on a publishing date.

Naval officers are sometimes unaware of the financial aspects of writing for publication. Magazines usually pay on acceptance, but some of the smaller journals pay on publication. The word rates are to be found in a book called *The Writer's Market* published by *The Writer's Digest* at 22 East 12th Street in Cincinnati, Ohio 45210. A contract for a book should allow you at least a 10 percent royalty on the list price of every copy sold. A book is sometimes sold for paperback or foreign language editions, and your contract should allow you three-quarters of any income from the resale of such secondary rights. The publisher will arrange for any such sale, and for this service he receives the remainder of the profits. He should also

be willing to agree to advance you \$500 or \$1,000 against your royalties.

Often the question comes up as to the propriety of an officer on active duty writing about his profession, having that writing copyrighted, and taking money for it. If you write on your own initiative, rather than as part of your official duties, and if you write on your own time, rather than on the Navy's time, then legally, and ethically it seems to me, you are writing as is any private citizen, except for the clearance restrictions cited earlier.

The writer and the publisher each have definite responsibilities when a piece of writing is accepted for publication. The publisher is responsible for protecting the writer's and his investment by copyrighting the manuscript, and he is also responsible for obtaining any photographs that might be required to illustrate the writing. He may ask your assistance in locating such photographs, but any fees should be borne by him. The writer may also be asked to provide a rough sketch of any reference art that is required.

I believe that the title of a piece of writing, whether it's an article or a book, should be left to the publisher. This can be difficult where the writer has already taken the step of titling the work with words that might have special meaning to him; however, the writer should leave this decision to the publisher as the expert on the impact of words on the reader.

One of the publisher's chief responsibilities is editing. The purpose of the editing process is not just the elimination of grammatical errors; it involves a thorough rethinking of every aspect of the writing. The publisher should help the writer with his facts, his logic, his conclusions, his syntax, and the questions he raises in the minds of the readers. The purpose is to improve the work by drawing on the editor's mental efforts to reinforce those of the writer.


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The editor, of course, hopes the writer will take his editorial advice, but inevitably there are disagreements. Such disagreements can almost always be settled by mutual discussion, and even this is rarely necessary. If it should happen that the editor cannot convince the writer of the wisdom of his editing, he should really publish the writing as the writer wants it or not at all, for it is the writer's name that will appear on the finished product.

The publisher should show the writer galley proof of exactly how the writer's words will appear in print. This is the time for the writer to correct the proof; this is not the time for the writer to

decide how the article should have been written in the first place.

Let me record one final thought. As we study naval warfare, we read the writing of those who have gone before us. We reap a harvest produced by people who have taken the trouble to record their wisdom and their knowledge on paper. Each of us has some knowledge, and each of us has some wisdom, and it seems to me that each of us has the responsibility as a student and as a reader to perform a like service for students who will follow in our wake. The responsibility is clear—to record our knowledge and our wisdom for the use of others.



Information is power.

*Arthur Sylvester: Remarks at
Sigma Delta Chi dinner, New York, 1962*



THE BAROMETER

(The following, from a letter received from a reader, comments on Captain Godfrey's article, "Mahan: the Man, His Writings and Philosophy," in the March *Naval War College Review*.)

.....

[This] article well summarizes the essence of Mahan for those who must read him quickly; and it identifies Mahan's concepts that are still valid. (When in doubt, assume that more, not less, of Mahan is valid.)

About 15 years ago—when the Armed Forces were being organized and reorganized again and again—I took several pages of Mahan's *Principles of Naval Administration* and, without iden-

tifying them, read them aloud to a group of officers and civilian employees in one of the Navy Department buildings.


One of the officers said, "You better watch it, . . . that kind of talk can get you in trouble with the higher ups."

A civilian asked, "Is that an advance copy of some military or political prize essay?"

All thought the words were contemporary—yet Mahan had been writing before 1900.

Incidents like this indicate the continuing basic validity of Mahan the prophet.

Frederick C. Dyer



National strength lies only in the hearts and spirits of men.

S. L. A. Marshall: Men Against Fire, 1947

PIRACY IN THE AIR

A research paper prepared by

Lieutenant Colonel James S.G. Turner, U.S. Marine Corps

School of Naval Warfare

INTRODUCTION

Aircraft hijacking has become a major problem, not only for the United States of America, but also for the Caribbean republics. In the month of January 1969 alone, eight scheduled U.S. commercial airliners were hijacked to Cuba, three more Latin American airliners also were hijacked to Cuba, and one more attempted U.S. hijacking was foiled by the aircraft crew. In addition, a Greek airliner was hijacked to Egypt in the same month.

These increasingly frequent hijackings not only represent an unwelcome interruption to normal air commerce and an inconvenience to passengers but also result in significant financial loss to both airlines and passengers. Their most

serious aspect, however, is the potential they hold for tragedy. The use of firearms or violence against the crews of commercial airliners could easily result in the death of a hundred or more passengers through the crash of a loaded jetliner.

This paper analyzes all reported hijacking incidents to determine the conditions which give rise to hijacking, the motivations of the hijackers, and the reasons why past efforts to suppress hijacking have met with little success. Both current and proposed international law are analyzed to assess their adequacy to cope with this problem. The paper demonstrates that current international practice impedes effective suppression of hijacking through prosecution of the hijackers and then

examines current diplomatic and technical efforts to create new procedures for the suppression of hijacking.

I—PATTERNS OF HIJACKING

The Effects of Hijacking. The most serious effect of hijacking is the potential it holds for tragedy. A hijacking, by definition, is accomplished by violence or threat of violence against the crew or passengers of an aircraft in flight in order to seize control of the aircraft and force its diversion from its scheduled destination. It takes little imagination to visualize the dangers inherent in the employment of firearms, grenades, or explosives by nervous, desperate, and possibly unbalanced persons in a loaded passenger jet flying at 30,000 feet. It seems a miracle that a hijacking attempt has not yet caused the crash of a U.S. airliner, although several airliners of other nations are reported to have crashed as a result of hijacking attempts, including at least one Cuban and one Soviet aircraft. As President Kennedy said, "an airliner is a peculiarly unsuitable shooting gallery. There are usually only two or three persons aboard who can fly it, and if they are killed or incapacitated, the chances of landing safely are practically nil."¹

Even if the aircraft commander peacefully complies with the demands of the hijacker, he is usually unfamiliar with the foreign airport at which he is directed to land, sometimes encounters linguistic difficulties in communicating with the control tower, and the destination airfields frequently are not equipped with the sophisticated landing aids which contribute to safety in landing jet aircraft. Thus, many dangers to the innocent passengers are inherent in any hijacking.

Hijacking also represents a substantial economic loss to the airline involved. Not only does it have to defray the direct costs of landing fees and care and feeding of its passengers, but it also

suffers a far more substantial loss in being deprived of the use of a multi-million dollar airliner scheduled for other subsequent tasks. For example, the average direct charge levied against the airline by the Government of Cuba has been about \$2,000, with the most expensive item being the feeding and care of the passengers in Cuban tourist accommodations. The indirect costs of loss of use of the airliner are far higher, with various airlines estimating losses of up to \$25,000 per incident.²

The mere threat of hijacking has caused the U.S. Government to restrict the travel of certain officials. Newspaper and magazine accounts indicate that Government officials having sensitive security information are no longer permitted to fly on commercial aircraft in the southeastern United States. Key aides commuting between Washington and President Nixon's vacation White House in Florida now travel by Government aircraft to avoid the risk of being hijacked to Cuba. The CIA also has forbidden its personnel to travel by commercial air, and employees of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission are required to use trains or government aircraft when traveling with secret documents.³

Scope of Analysis. Through analysis of past hijacking incidents, clues and patterns can be sought which may point the way toward effective measures to suppress this practice. The analysis in this chapter is based on the 77 international hijacking incidents occurring between 1 January 1960 and 31 January 1969. Although other hijackings have occurred since January 1969, they have not been included in the statistical analysis, primarily because so little information about them has yet emerged as to make it impossible to determine the identity, background, or apparent motivations of the hijackers. This hijackers problem also applies, to a large extent, to the January 1969 cases, but

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they have been included because they demonstrate the astronomical growth in incidence of hijacking.

For the purposes of this analysis, unsuccessful attempted hijackings are included since they seem to reflect the same patterns as successful hijackings and represent an equal, if not greater, danger to passengers. The growing problem of hijacking is analyzed in terms of nationality of the aircraft involved, destination of the hijackers, attitudes of the states in which the aircraft landed, and reported prosecution of hijackers.

Growth Of The Problem. Hijacking of aircraft was practically unknown before 1960. The earliest reported incidents involved three Czechoslovakian aircraft seized by refugees who compelled the pilots to fly to the U.S. Zone of Occupied Germany in 1950.⁴ A few Cuban aircraft were hijacked to the United States in 1959 by refugees from the Castro regime, but these generally were reported only as the arrival of political refugees, and the newspaper accounts do not contain sufficient data to determine which were hijackings and which were merely unauthorized flights of privately owned aircraft out of Cuba. Although only eight such cases have been documented by this writer, President Kennedy was quoted in August 1961 as saying that 25 Cuban aircraft had been brought to the United States by defectors.⁵

As shown in table I, the incidence of hijacking remained relatively low until 1968, with an average of only four cases per year. In 1968 there was a tremendous increase with 31 hijackings, and 1969 promises another significant increase with 13 cases reported in the first month alone. Although some portion of this increase might be ascribed to the general increase in air commerce, the recent phenomenal growth in the number of hijacking incidents far exceeds the corresponding growth in air travel.

States of Registry. The state suffering most from aircraft hijacking up to 1961 was Cuba. In 1961 Premier Castro installed police state controls on aircraft travel and the number dramatically dropped so that only one Cuban aircraft has been successfully hijacked since 1961. Commencing in 1961, the United States began to have a serious problem, with four aircraft of U.S. registry being hijacked to Cuba in that year. The number then declined until 1968 when hijackings burst forth in full fury. During 1962-1967, an average of three hijackings per year occurred, involving aircraft of the United States, the Netherlands, Venezuela, the U.S.S.R., Cuba, Argentina, Egypt, the United Kingdom, and Colombia. The tremendous increase in 1968-69 has affected only aircraft of United States and Latin American registry. The number of incidents involving aircraft of other nations never has risen above three per year.

Destination. As shown in tables I and III, the pattern of destination of hijacked aircraft has changed with time. The three 1950 Czech hijacked airliners landed in the U.S. Zone of Germany. Of the five hijackings reported in 1960, four landed in the United States. Commencing in 1961, Cuba became an important recipient of hijacked airliners. Even though the total number of hijackings remained low between 1961 and 1967, 12 of the 27 incidents involved Cuba as a destination state. In 1968, 28 out of 31 hijackings involved Cuba, and in the first month of 1969 12 out of 13 were destined for Cuba.

Nationality of Hijackers. Except for hijackings of aircraft of United States or Cuban registry, there is no discernible pattern of nationality of hijackers. The one exception to this general statement is the Colombian and Venezuelan aircraft hijacked to Cuba. In those cases the hijackers were generally Colombian or Venezuelan nationals who were

engaged in Cuban-supported insurgencies in their homeland. For U.S. aircraft there is clearly discernible pattern, as illustrated in table II. Of the 26 cases in 1968-69, 17 were hijacked by U.S. citizens, six by Cubans, and three by nationals of other states. Thus the popular newspaper stereotype of the lonesome Cuban refugee hijacking an airliner to return to his homeland is only true in less than one-fourth of the cases.

Apparent Motivation of Hijackers. In 58 of the 77 cases there is sufficient data available to establish motivation of the hijackers. These motivations fall

into five general groupings, each of which is discussed below.

Escaping Political Refugees. The seizure of an aircraft by a desperate political refugee seeking to flee an oppressive regime was an important motivation in early years. The three 1950 Czech cases, the four attempted hijackings of Soviet aircraft, and almost all of the 1959-1961 Cuban cases fall into this category. However, since 1966 only one hijacking incident can be ascribed to this motivation, so it is no longer of major significance.

Escaping Criminals. Only five

TABLE I—INCIDENCE OF HIJACKING, 1960-1969

Year	Total Hijackings	Type of Service		Ultimate Destination		
		Scheduled	Charter	Cuba	U.S.	Other
1960	5	5			4	1
1961	9	8	1	4	2	3
1962	2	1	1	1		1
1963	2	1	1	1		1
1964	2	1	1	1		1
1965	3	3		2		1
1966	4	4			1	3
1967	6	4	2	3		3
1968	31	24	7	28		3
January 1969	13	13	—	12	—	1
Total	77	64	13	52	7	18

TABLE II—NATIONALITY OF PERSONS WHO HIJACK U.S. AIRCRAFT

Year	U.S.	Cuban	Other
1961	2	1	1 (France)
1962	1		
1963	1	1	
1965	1	1	
1967	1		
1968	11	6	1 (Unknown)
January 1969	6		1 (Unknown)
	—	—	1 (Dominican Republic)
Total	23	9	4

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TABLE III—MOTIVATION OF HIJACKERS

Date	Aircraft Registry	Landed In	Hijacker's Background		Apparent Motive
			Mental	Criminal	
5 July 1960	Cuba	United States			Political Refugee
19 July 1960	Australia	Singapore*			Unknown
28 July 1960	Cuba	United States			Political Refugee
29 Oct 1960	Cuba	United States			Political Refugee
8 Dec 1960	Cuba	United States			Political Refugee
1 May 1961	United States	Cuba	X		Attention Seeker
3 July 1961	Cuba	United States*			Political Refugee
24 July 1961	United States	Cuba			Unknown
3 Aug 1961	United States	Cuba*	X	X	Unbalanced
9 Aug 1961	United States	Cuba	X		Attention Seeker
9 Aug 1961	Cuba	United States*			Political Refugee
10 Sep 1961	U.S.S.R.	Unknown*			Political Refugee
10 Nov 1961	Portugal	Spanish Morocco			Political Act
27 Nov 1961	Venezuela	Curacao			Political Act
13 Apr 1962	United States	Cuba			Unknown
16 Apr 1962	Netherlands	East Germany*			Unbalanced
5 Aug 1963	United States	Cuba*			Unknown
28 Nov 1963	Venezuela	Trinidad			Political Act
18 Feb 1964	United States	Cuba		X	Criminal Fugitive
Fall 1964	U.S.S.R.	Unknown*			Political Refugee
Spring 1965	U.S.S.R.	Unknown*			Political Refugee
26 Oct 1965	United States	Cuba*			Transportation
17 Nov 1965	United States	Cuba*			Unbalanced
27 Mar 1966	Cuba	United States*			Political Refugee
7 July 1966	Cuba	Jamaica			Political Refugee
Spring 1966	U.S.S.R.	Turkey*			Political Refugee
28 Sep 1966	Argentina	Falkland Islands			Political Act
7 Feb 1967	Egypt	Jordan		X	Unknown
23 Apr 1967	Nigeria	Nigeria			Political Act
30 Jun 1967	United Kingdom	Algeria		X	Political Act
6 Aug 1967	Colombia	Cuba			Transportation
9 Sep 1967	Colombia	Cuba			Transportation
20 Nov 1967	United States	Cuba		X	Unknown
9 Feb 1968	United States	Hong Kong*			Escape
17 Feb 1968	United States	Cuba	X		Unbalanced
21 Feb 1968	United States	Cuba		X	Criminal Fugitive
5 Mar 1968	Colombia	Cuba			Transportation
12 Mar 1968	United States	Cuba			Transportation
16 Mar 1968	Mexico	Cuba			Unknown
22 Mar 1968	Venezuela	Cuba			Transportation
19 Jun 1968	Venezuela	Cuba			Transportation
29 Jun 1968	United States	Cuba			Unknown
1 July 1968	United States	Cuba			Transportation
4 July 1968	United States	Mexico*		X	Criminal Fugitive
12 July 1968	United States	Cuba			Unbalanced
12 July 1968	United States	Cuba*	X		Unbalanced
17 July 1968	United States	Cuba			Transportation
23 July 1968	Israel	Algeria			Political Act
4 Aug 1968	United States	Cuba		X	Unbalanced
22 Aug 1968	Bahamas	Cuba			Unknown
11 Sep 1968	Canada	Cuba*		X	Criminal Fugitive
20 Sep 1968	United States	Cuba	X		Transportation
22 Sep 1968	Colombia	Cuba			Transportation
22 Sep 1968	Colombia	Cuba			Transportation

TABLE III—MOTIVATION OF HIJACKERS (continued)

Date	Aircraft Registry	Landed In	Hijacker's Background		Apparent Motive
			Mental	Criminal	
6 Oct 1968	Mexico	Cuba			Unknown
23 Oct 1968	United States	Cuba			Unknown
4 Nov 1968	United States	Cuba			Attention Seeker
18 Nov 1968	Mexico	Cuba			Unknown
23 Nov 1968	United States	Cuba			Transportation
24 Nov 1968	United States	Cuba			Political Act
30 Nov 1968	United States	Cuba			Transportation
3 Dec 1968	United States	Cuba			Transportation
11 Dec 1968	United States	Cuba			Unknown
19 Dec 1968	United States	Cuba			Unbalanced
2 Jan 1969	United States	Cuba		X	Attention Seeker
2 Jan 1969	Greece	Egypt			Political Refugee
7 Jan 1969	Colombia	Cuba			Transportation
9 Jan 1969	United States	Cuba			Attention Seeker
11 Jan 1969	United States	Cuba	X		Unbalanced
11 Jan 1969	Peru	Cuba			Unknown
13 Jan 1969	United States	Cuba*	X	X	Unbalanced
19 Jan 1969	United States	Cuba			Unknown
19 Jan 1969	Ecuador	Cuba			Unknown
24 Jan 1969	United States	Cuba			Escape
28 Jan 1969	United States	Cuba		X	Criminal Fugitive
28 Jan 1969	United States	Cuba			Unknown
31 Jan 1969	United States	Cuba			Unknown

*Indicates unsuccessful attempted hijacking. State shown is the intended destination of the hijacker.

cases clearly fall into this category, although several recent cases might be so classified if more information were available on the background of the more recent hijackers. However, it is most significant that four of these five cases occurred in 1968-1969, and all but one went to Cuba, the inference being that these fugitives felt they would be safe from prosecution if they reached Cuba.

Political Acts. Eight cases were clearly political acts committed by dissidents or insurgents. Three of these cases involved hijacking of airliners in order to drop political leaflets. The famous El Al case (23 July 1968) in which Arab terrorists hijacked an Israeli airliner to Algeria as an "act of war" and the famous Tshombe case (30 June 1967) also fall into this category. It is significant to note that only one of these eight

cases involved either the United States or Cuba and that six of them occurred before the dramatic increase in hijacking cases in 1968. Thus, this motivation is not responsible for the rapid rise in hijackings.

Transportation. Sixteen hijacking cases can be ascribed to persons seeking transportation to Cuba, and they fall into two distinct groupings. Eight cases, all in 1967-69, involved Castroite guerrillas from Colombia or Venezuela seeking transportation to Cuba. Scheduled commercial air service between Cuba and these countries does not exist,⁶ and even if it did, the guerrilla hijackers probably would have been unwilling to risk the required governmental customs and immigration check to board a scheduled international flight.

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The other eight cases, seven of which occurred in 1968, involved Cuban refugees in the United States returning to Cuba. These are the only cases which fit the popular newspaper stereotype of the lonesome refugee returning home, and almost all of these cases involve refugees who were not only lonesome but also spectacularly unsuccessful in the United States. Most of them had been fired recently from their jobs, many had health problems, and some had psychiatric histories. These hijackers were among life's losers and, to that extent, possibly could also have been classified in the next category.

Unbalanced Persons. This category, which includes both attention seekers and other unbalanced persons, accounts for the largest group or 16 out of the 58 cases in which apparent motivation can be classified. It is also responsible for a major portion of the 1968-1969 increase in hijackings. These cases cannot be dismissed merely as mental aberrations, however, since 15 of the 16 hijackers wanted to go to Cuba, indicating a clear pattern of rational thought.

The Chief Surgeon of the Federal Aviation Administration has hypothesized a "hijacker's syndrome," in which the hijacker believes he can prove himself an effective human being by commanding an airliner to go to Cuba and being welcomed there as a hero by Castro.⁷ A few examples of cases which clearly fall into the category of attention seeking include:

1 May 1961: The hijacker listed his name on the ticket as "El Pirata Cofresi," the name of a famous 18th century Caribbean pirate.

17 February 1968: A white U.S. hippie, married to a Negro go-go dancer, who had recently been fired from his job, hijacked a

plane to Cuba saying he "planned to go to Ilanoi."

4 November 1968: A "Black Nationalist Freedom Fighter" hijacked a U.S. airliner to Cuba. He collected the passenger's pocket money, saying it was "contraband of war," and announced "we're taking a new ship every day for 100 days for a new Africa, to show the white people we're keeping them down."

9 January 1969: A Purdue University student hijacked an airliner to Cuba, saying he hated the United States, had just completed a Communist mission, and was fleeing from the FBI.

Another grouping of cases involves inadequate, unsuccessful persons who have a long history of criminal, mental, marital, and financial problems and who are running away from an unsuccessful life to start over in Cuba. Examples of hijackings by such "losers" are:

3 August 1961: A U.S. citizen with a long mental and criminal record and his 16-year old son attempted to hijack an airliner with the intention of selling it to Castro.

12 July 1968: A suspected homosexual, who had serious financial problems and had recently been fired as a teacher in Williamsport, Pa., hijacked a plane to Cuba.

4 August 1968: An Army deserter, recently divorced, picked up his 3-year old daughter from his estranged wife for a day's visit and hijacked a plane to Cuba, taking the daughter along.

13 January 1969: The hijacker had been unemployed for over a

year, had a history of mental problems, a criminal record, and also had marital difficulties. When the stewardess fled into the pilot's compartment and locked the door, he meekly sat down and waited to be arrested upon landing.

The common thread that runs through this whole category of cases is the idea in the hijacker's mind that he could start life anew in Cuba, gaining fame, glory, and recognition in the process.

Attitudes of Destination States. Important clues towards solution of the problem of hijacking can be gained from a study of the actions taken and the statements made by the governments of the states in which the hijacked aircraft were landed. For this purpose, only three states are significant: the United States, Cuba, and Algeria.

In every case in which an aircraft has been hijacked from some other state to the United States, the U.S. Government has treated the hijackers as political refugees, granting asylum and admitting the hijackers as residents. Asylum even was granted in a case where a Cuban Government guard aboard the aircraft was murdered by the hijackers. Conversely, in every case in which the United States has obtained custody of a hijacker of an aircraft of U.S. registry, the hijacker has either been vigorously prosecuted or committed to a mental institution. In the case of Cuban aircraft hijacked to the United States in 1959-1960, many were seized to satisfy court judgments for Cuban Government debts, and at least nine were sold.⁸ Only after Cuba had detained a hijacked U.S. airliner in July 1961 did the U.S. Government adopt a new policy of releasing hijacked Cuban aircraft for return to Cuba. As a 1961 editorial in *The Nation* observed, "it makes some difference whose aircraft is hijacked."⁹

The first U.S. airliner hijacked to Cuba (1 May 1961) was released immediately for return to the United States, although the hijacker remained in Cuba. On 24 July 1961, Castro refused to release a hijacked U.S. airliner until the United States released Cuban aircraft held in the United States, although he did release the passengers promptly. Since the U.S. Government commenced returning Cuban aircraft, Cuba has consistently released hijacked aircraft, usually within 24 hours or less.

A consistent Cuban procedure has emerged. Upon landing, the hijacker is taken away by Cuban guards. Then the passengers and crew are debarked and interrogated, usually being asked propaganda-type questions such as their attitude toward the war in Vietnam. Negroes are frequently asked about their attitude toward life in the United States. Until mid-1968 the passengers and crew then reboarded the aircraft and returned to the United States. The same procedure was followed for Latin American aircraft, except that the Cubans occasionally gave a party for the Latin American passengers and attempted to impress them with progress in Cuba under the Castro government.

Commencing on 1 July 1968, the Castro government has maintained that the Jose Marti Airport at Havana is unsafe for the takeoff of loaded modern jets. The crew and empty airliner are released and allowed to return. The passengers are bused to Varadero where they are returned aboard propeller aircraft chartered by the U.S. State Department for the daily Cuban Refugee Airlift. That this is a minor form of harassment or twisting of Uncle Sam's tail was evident from the fact that loaded Iberia Airlines DC-8's and Soviet jet airliners operate regularly out of Jose Marti.

Two changes in the consistent Cuban pattern emerged in February 1969. On 10 February 1969, the Cuban Government allowed a U.S. airliner to return

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directly to the United States with its full passenger load, detaining the hijacker in Cuba.¹⁰ This apparently represents an abandonment of the harassment policy and may signal an improvement in United States-Cuban relations. A second change in pattern occurred on 11 February 1969 when the Cuban Government delayed for 5 days the release of a hijacked Venezuelan airliner in reprisal for Venezuelan seizure of a Cuban fishing boat last November.¹¹

Information on the fate of hijackers in Cuban hands is far more difficult to obtain. Newspaper accounts, reports filtering back to relatives, and the stories of the few hijackers who have returned voluntarily indicate that the hijackers are invariably detained in Cuban jails for a period ranging from a few weeks to a few months while they are screened to determine whether they are CIA agents or mental cases.¹² After screening, Cuban refugee hijackers usually are allowed to return to their former homes. Others are assigned as agricultural workers, usually on the Isle of Pines. Non-Cuban hijackers who tire of life in Cuba occasionally are allowed to depart.¹³ In one case the Cuban Government, which still has normal diplomatic relations with Mexico, granted a Mexican request for extradition and returned the hijacker to Mexico for trial.

Although only two aircraft have been hijacked to Algeria, the international significance of these two cases is so great and the actions of the Algerian Government so unusual as to require analysis.

The Tshombe case involved the hijacking of a British aircraft carrying Moïse Tshombe, the former Premier of the Congo. Tshombe, who had been granted political asylum in Spain, was en route from Ibiza, Spain, to Palma, Mallorca, when his chartered aircraft was hijacked on 30 June 1967 by a member of his party and forced to land at Boufarik Military Airfield in Algeria.

Although the Algerian Government claimed to be surprised at the hijacking, the two British pilots commented that the reception committee at the Algerian military airport seemed to be unusually well organized on such short notice.

Tshombe had been tried in absentia by a Congolese court and sentenced to death. The Congo now requested extradition of Tshombe. The Algerian Supreme Court authorized extradition on 21 July 1967, but heavy international pressures caused the Algerian Government to withhold final approval. At last report, Tshombe was still in Algerian custody, 2 years after the hijacking.

The two British pilots were detained by Algeria for nearly 3 months, being released on 22 September 1967 only after lengthy diplomatic negotiations and a threatened stoppage for all commercial flights in and out of Algeria by the International Federation of Airline Pilots Associations. The aircraft was not released until 18 April 1968, 9 months after the hijacking. The hijacker, François Bodenan, a Frenchman with a very long criminal record, is believed to be still in Algerian custody.

The other Algerian case is equally famous, involving an Israeli El Al airliner hijacked to Algeria on a flight from Rome to Israel on 23 July 1968. The hijackers were Palestinian Arab refugees using Indian and Iranian passports. Algeria released immediately the non-Israeli passengers, but retained the aircraft, crew, and Israeli passengers on the basis that Algeria was still at war with Israel. After substantial international pressure and indignation, Algeria released the Israeli women and children 4 days later. On 14 August the International Federation of Airline Pilots Associations announced a boycott of all commercial flights to Algeria if the crew were not released by 18 August. After further negotiations with both IFFALPA and Italy, which was acting as mediator, the boycott was called off, and Algeria

released the crew, remaining passengers, and aircraft at the end of August, apparently as part of a bargain involving the release of a number of Arab terrorists who had been captured by Israel.

Prosecution of Hijackers. The available information on prosecution of hijackers is far from complete. However, it clearly indicates that each state has vigorously prosecuted hijackers of aircraft of its own registry whenever it could secure custody of the hijackers. Punishments inflicted tend to be very severe.¹⁴ The evidence also indicates a complete lack of interest in prosecuting hijackers of foreign aircraft which have landed within the state. There is no recorded instance where a hijacker has been prosecuted by the foreign state in which he landed; instead, the almost universal practice is to grant asylum.

Having examined the problem of hijacking, the motivations of the hijackers, and the attitudes of the states in which hijacked aircraft have landed, it is now necessary to examine current and proposed international law and its adequacy to deal with this problem.

II—CURRENT INTERNATIONAL LAW

Sovereignty in Airspace. Article I of the Paris Convention of 1919 firmly established the principle that every state has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory.¹ The wording of the provision was repeated, practically unchanged, in the 1928 Havana Convention and 1944 Chicago Convention and is reflected in U.S. Federal law.² Sovereignty here means that the laws of the state in whose airspace an aircraft is in flight apply to offenses committed aboard the aircraft.³

Nationality of Aircraft. A concept of nationality of aircraft has evolved similar, but not identical, to nationality

of ships. Article 6 of the 1919 Paris Convention and article 17 of the 1944 Chicago Convention provide that aircraft have the nationality of the state in which they are registered.⁴ Nationality serves to identify the state which is responsible for the aircraft and entitled to come to its protection under international law.⁵ The importance attached to the concept of nationality of aircraft is demonstrated by the Chicago Convention of 1944 which devotes a whole chapter of five articles to nationality.⁶

Jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is the authority by which courts and judicial officers take cognizance of and decide cases.⁷ International law does not grant jurisdiction. Rather, it sets forth the basis under which states recognize the right of other states to assert jurisdiction. "When speaking of jurisdiction . . . one must be careful to distinguish the jurisdiction to enforce from the jurisdiction to prescribe. The former is inherently territorial, the latter is inherently personal."⁸ Johnson describes five principles upon which jurisdiction may be founded: the territorial principle, the active nationality principle, the passive nationality principle, the universal principle, and the protective principle.

The territorial principle of jurisdiction, which holds that each state may punish crimes committed on its own territory,¹⁰ is a fundamental principle of all systems of law¹¹ as well as being the primary basis of jurisdiction in the United States.¹² However, in modern international law, to a great extent the rigid territorial basis of jurisdiction has been broken down.¹³ In the case of aircraft hijacking, one difficulty with rigid adherence to the territorial principle is that the state in whose airspace the crime was committed usually is not the state in which the aircraft lands while the latter state may not have any real interest in suppressing hijacking.

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The active nationality principle of jurisdiction provides that each state may punish crimes, wherever committed, of its own nationals¹⁴ and is universally recognized.¹⁵ The assumption of jurisdiction over ships and aircraft registered within the state (the "law of the flag") is a corollary of the territorial principle regarding ships and aircraft as having some of the properties of movable pieces of territory. It also draws upon the active nationality principle by regarding ships and aircraft, for some purposes, as legal persons having the nationality of the state in which registered. Thus, it is accepted law that the flag state has jurisdiction over its vessels anywhere in the world, but the applicability of this concept to aircraft is not so well established.¹⁶

Many states also assert penal jurisdiction under the passive nationality principle,¹⁷ claiming the right to try offenses of which their nationals are victims, wherever situated.¹⁸ O'Connell says this "is a corollary of the rule that any State may protect its own citizens abroad . . . The *Lotus* decision . . . is best rationalized on the passive personality principle."¹⁹ However, jurisdiction on this basis is far from settled under international law, and is not recognized by many States, including the United States.²⁰

The universal principle allows all states to take jurisdiction of heinous crimes which threaten the international community as a whole.²¹ The best universally recognized example of such a crime is piracy.²²

The protective principle of jurisdiction, under which a state may punish a crime committed by anyone anywhere which affects its national security, is in reality an extension of the territorial principle. While recognized by many states, it is generally regarded as an auxiliary basis for jurisdiction to be exercised only when no other basis applies.²³

While all five of these bases for

jurisdiction have been applied by some states, only territoriality and active nationality are universally recognized,²⁴ and these two principles seem to be of greatest importance in prosecution of aircraft hijackers since they cover the subjacent state and the state of registry in most cases. All of these principles might operate simultaneously to vest concurrent jurisdiction over a single aircraft hijacker in a large number of states. This situation can be illustrated by an actual 1961 case involving Alberto C. Cadon, a French citizen of Algeria temporarily resident in the United States, who hijacked a Pan-American DC-8 jet with 81 passengers over Mexico City on a flight from Mexico City to Guatemala and forced the pilot to land in Havana. Mexico could claim jurisdiction under the territorial principle. Since the hijacker was still in control of the aircraft when it landed in Cuba, the offense was presumably continuous so Cuba also could claim jurisdiction on a territorial basis. Since the hijacker was a French national, France could claim jurisdiction under the active nationality principle. The airliner was registered in the United States, so the "law of the flag" presumably would justify U.S. jurisdiction. Under the passive nationality principle, the states of the 81 kidnapped passengers, including the United States, Mexico, and a host of other states all could claim jurisdiction. If aircraft hijacking can be regarded as a form of piracy,²⁵ any state having custody of the offender could exercise jurisdiction under the universal principle. Finally, since the hijacker was threatening to shoot the pilot, Mexico could have exercised the protective principle since the potential crash of an uncontrolled jet in Mexico City certainly endangered the security of Mexico. In fact, Cuba returned the hijacker to Mexico for trial.²⁶

While several states may have concurrent jurisdiction, international law

may not compel states to take jurisdiction when they lack it under their domestic law, nor can it compel a state to exercise its jurisdiction in any case.²⁷ Apprehension, detention, trial (including gathering of evidence and witnesses), and punishment is an expensive and time-consuming process which a state will not undertake in the absence of a substantial interest in suppression of the offense concerned.

Existence of Law. Both legal scholars and legislators have expressed concern over the absence of established international and municipal law covering crimes committed aboard aircraft in international flight. Lord McNair writes that "the position with regard to aircraft outside the territorial limits of criminal jurisdiction is regrettably obscure at common law."²⁸ Several scholars and legislators have expressed the fear that hijackers and other airborne criminals may go unpunished through the lack of applicable law conferring jurisdiction.²⁹ This fear may be unwarranted if hijacking is regarded as a continuous offense, punishable not only where it first occurred but also in all states through whose airspace the aircraft passed or landed.³⁰

In the United Kingdom, McNair states that "such extensions as there are of the criminal jurisdiction . . . so as to cover acts done outside of the United Kingdom . . . apply only to British subjects."³¹ A 1956 case, *Regina v. Martin* held that British jurisdiction did not extend to cover drug offenses committed by a British subject in flight aboard a British aircraft in the Middle East.³² A later case, *Regina v. Naylor* (1962) affirmed jurisdiction in similar circumstances.³³

In the United States the problem is also complicated by the question of venue. *United States v. Cordova* (1950) held that no Federal statute covered offenses committed on board a U.S. aircraft in flight over the high seas.³⁴

The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 cured this defect, but it still left unsolved the problem of venue, since it is extremely difficult to prove the exact location at which a crime occurred in an aircraft traveling at 500 miles per hour and crossing dozens of states and Federal judicial districts.³⁵ The Aircraft Piracy Act of 1961 enacted amendments to the 1958 Federal Aviation Act, defining a new crime of aircraft piracy, punishable by death, and providing for trial in any district in which the offense was committed, continued, or was completed.³⁶ Thus, even though international law may recognize jurisdiction over hijackers, conviction and punishment is dependent upon the existence of adequate municipal law authorizing jurisdiction as well as the will to exercise the jurisdiction so authorized.

Piracy. The definition of aircraft piracy as a crime under U.S. municipal law does not necessarily make hijacking piracy under international law.³⁷

According to international law, piracy consists in sailing the seas for private ends without authorization from the Government of any State with the object of committing depredations upon property or acts of violence against persons. The pirate . . . is a sea-robber, pillaging by force of arms, stealing or destroying the property of others and committing outrages of all kinds upon individuals.³⁸

Oppenheim holds that piracy can only be committed on the high seas.³⁹ Piracy, as an offense against all nations, may be punished by any nation.⁴⁰

Some legal scholars maintain that the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas redefined piracy in article 15 to cover both ships and aircraft, but narrowed the definition of piracy so that acts committed on board a ship or

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aircraft by the crew or passengers and directed against the aircraft itself cannot be regarded as acts of piracy.⁴¹ Although numerous U.S. Senators and countless editors have referred to aircraft hijackers as pirates,⁴² it must be concluded that no aircraft hijacking incident which has occurred so far can be characterized as piracy under either the Geneva Convention or customary international law.

Extradition and Asylum. Extradition is "the process by which persons charged with or convicted of crime against the law of a state and found in a foreign state are returned by the latter to the former for trial and punishment."⁴³ Since extradition is a process of international relations, diplomatic relations between the states concerned normally must exist in order to provide a channel for extradition requests and procedures. Although extradition is possible in the absence of a specific extradition treaty, it is normally covered by detailed bilateral treaties listing the procedures, offenses covered, conditions, and restrictions on extradition. Extradition treaties normally provide that the crime must be a recognized serious offense under the laws of both states.⁴⁴

Under the laws of many countries, the extradition of nationals of the requested state is prohibited.⁴⁵ In other cases the treaty frequently allows an option as to whether nationals will be extradited. For example, the existing extradition treaty between the United States and Cuba provides that "neither of the contracting parties shall be bound to deliver up its own citizens."⁴⁶ Since many of the aircraft hijackings to Cuba have been committed by Cuban refugees, such a provision allows the Cuban Government to refuse extradition if it so chooses. Another problem is that extradition applies only to persons accused of an offense and does not cover witnesses.⁴⁷ Thus, the inability to

secure the attendance of essential witnesses might preclude conviction.

A major provision of many extradition treaties is that they cover only offenses committed in the territory of the requesting state; the United States follows this policy in its extradition treaties.⁴⁸ Although the U.S. extradition treaty with Cuba covers offenses "committed within the jurisdiction" of either state,⁴⁹ the United States as recently as 1953 interpreted these identical words in a similar treaty with Greece to cover territorial jurisdiction only.⁵⁰ Thus, the treaty would not cover the hijacking of a U.S. airliner committed outside the territory of the United States, unless international law were construed to hold that a U.S. aircraft anywhere in the world is U.S. territory.⁵¹ Furthermore, with the high speed of modern aircraft and the fact that an aircraft can pass through the territorial airspace of a number of small states in a relatively short space of time, it might be impossible to establish jurisdiction for extradition if the territorial principle were strictly followed.

Since the penal laws of many states prohibit the death penalty, the laws of those states usually prohibit extradition for capital offenses unless the requesting state agrees that the death penalty will not be imposed.⁵² Air piracy under U.S. Federal law is punishable by death.⁵³ This death penalty may complicate or prevent extradition of hijackers from other states.

Another bar to extradition may be classification of the person as a political offender. "We are confronted with the impressive fact that in the legislation of modern states there are few principles so universally adopted as that of non-extradition of political offenders."⁵⁴ Whiteman devotes 59 pages to reviewing the history of nonextradition for political offenses, clearly demonstrating that each state has the option to extradite or refuse to extradite, as it chooses, and that the determination of what is a

political offense is at the sole discretion of the extraditing state.⁵⁵ This is particularly applicable in the case of aircraft hijacking since the uniform international practice in the hijacking cases reported in chapter I has been to construe as political offenses all hijackings committed in the course of escaping from an oppressive regime.

This concept is closely bound up with the so-called law of asylum. The notion of a political offense is fundamental to the concept of asylum. It is now recognized by all civilized states that ordinary criminals are to be extradited and that persons who fear punishment for political offenses may be granted asylum by the receiving state. The problem comes in determining what should be considered a political offense. There is no clear standard or precedent defining political offenses, and the international practice, especially in hijacking cases, has been to adopt an extremely broad definition. For example, the growing emphasis on the political nature of the reasons for the flight of refugees has led to an unfortunate tendency to disregard the illegality of any act which the asylum seeker may have committed in the process of escape.⁵⁶ In every case researched by this writer of a hijacked aircraft being landed in the United States, political asylum has been granted to the hijackers, even in cases in which pilots and aircraft guards have been murdered in the process of escape.

Conclusions. Current international law is not adequate to deal with hijacking. The most significant defects or problems include:

1. Jurisdiction over criminal offenses committed on board aircraft in flight over the high seas or territory other than that of the flag state is regrettably obscure. Territoriality is the primary basis for criminal jurisdiction in international law, and the "law of the flag," although well established for ships, is not clearly established for aircraft. The

state with the greatest motivation for energetic prosecution of hijackers can reasonably be expected to be the state of registry of the aircraft since it is that state's property which is seized and that state's air commerce which is disrupted. Consequently, a rule vesting primary jurisdiction of crimes committed aboard aircraft in the State of registry, with full recognition of the established concurrent jurisdiction of the state(s) in whose airspace the offense occurred, would offer greatest promise of effective and energetic suppression of hijacking through criminal prosecution.

2. There are no specific provisions in international law requiring the prompt and speedy release of the aircraft, crew, and passengers by the state in whose territory the aircraft lands. There is only the general right of every nation to intercede to protect and advance the rights of its citizens and their property. The hijacking invariably causes an unscheduled delay in the flight, frequently involving a lengthy detour with consequent inconvenience and economic loss to both passengers and airline. If territoriality is the only universally recognized basis for prosecution, the state of landing may feel it necessary to detain the aircraft and passengers for investigation of the crime or as witnesses for trial. A general international obligation to expedite the release of the aircraft, passengers, and crew would help alleviate the effects of hijacking by reducing delay and economic loss.

3. Although not necessarily a defect in international law, the lack of adequate municipal law to cover offenses committed in flight outside the territorial limits of a country may operate to prevent effective prosecution of hijackers or even their extradition.⁵⁷ The only possible cure under international law for this problem would be the recognition of aircraft hijacking as a universal crime, and this development does not appear to be reasonably attainable in the foreseeable future.

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4. The limitation of extradition to only those crimes justifiable under a strict territorial basis of jurisdiction, which seems to be a self-imposed limitation in the case of the United States, may preclude prosecution of hijackers or authorize it only by states which have little or no interest in vigorous prosecution.

5. The law of some states, precluding extradition of nationals, may operate to prevent prosecution of hijackers.

6. Finally, and probably most serious, is the regrettable tendency to regard as excusable, on the grounds of its being a political offense, almost any crime committed in the process of escaping from an oppressive regime. In this case, international law is not the problem but rather the political determination by the receiving state as to whether to admit the refugee and in what status. It seems difficult to justify protecting from prosecution an individual who committed murder of an aircraft crew member and kidnapped and endangered the lives of a hundred passengers in the course of escaping. Even if asylum is granted, there is no reason why the hijacker should not be prosecuted in the courts of the asylum state, which are not tainted by the suspicion of political motivation for judgment and sentence.

III—THE TOKYO CONVENTION

Introduction. A Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft was adopted at a conference held in Tokyo in 1963 under the sponsorship of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), a specialized agency of the United Nations. Since this paper is devoted solely to the problem of aircraft hijacking, only those portions and aspects of the Tokyo Convention which are relevant to hijacking will be analyzed.

Background. The Tokyo Convention climaxed many years of work by legal scholars on the problems of crime committed aboard aircraft in international flights. The Tokyo Convention had its origin in a decision by the ICAO Legal Committee, meeting at Montreal in 1950, to appoint a rapporteur. The emphasis in this early period was primarily on the need to define the rights and duties of the aircraft commander. In 1954 the ICAO Legal Committee established a subcommittee which solicited proposals from member nations. During this period the scope of its work broadened: in 1956 the United States submitted a paper dealing with problems of jurisdiction, and in 1958 the United States submitted a draft convention to the subcommittee. The ICAO Legal Committee, meeting in Munich in 1959, reviewed the work of its subcommittee and determined that the draft convention should deal both with jurisdiction and the legal position of the aircraft commander. The United States, its interest in hijacking obviously heightened by the rash of incidents in 1961, proposed in 1962 that a chapter on hijacking be added to the draft convention. The ICAO Legal Committee, meeting in Rome in 1962, after reviewing and modifying the draft determined that it was ready for consideration by the ICAO member nations. Accordingly, a conference was held at Tokyo from 20 August to 14 September 1963. Delegations of 61 states participated.¹

Purposes of the Tokyo Convention. The broadest and principal purpose of the Tokyo Convention, that of enhancing the safety of international air commerce, is appropriate to the functions of its sponsor, the International Civil Aviation Organization. Robert P. Boyle, the Chief of the U.S. Delegation to the conference, lists four specific purposes:

1. To confirm the jurisdiction of the flag state over offenses committed aboard an aircraft in flight.

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2. To confer power on the aircraft commander in order to enhance safety of flight.

3. To define the duties of the state where the aircraft lands after commission of the offense.

4. To deal with hijacking.²

A fifth purpose, not listed by Boyle, is evident from study of the convention: to define the rights and status of a person detained in a foreign state after commission of an offense.

Analysis of the Tokyo Convention³

Applicability. The convention applies to offenses committed aboard an aircraft in flight anywhere and also to offenses committed aboard an aircraft on the ground outside its state of registry.⁴ However, the convention does not apply to aircraft used in military, customs, or police services⁵ and thus would not have been applicable to the 9 February 1968 attempted hijacking of a commercial jetliner chartered for military airlift.

Jurisdiction. Paragraph 1 of article 3 is probably the most important provision of the convention, since it constitutes recognition by the contracting states of the jurisdiction of the state of registry over offenses committed aboard its aircraft, wherever situated, thus clearly establishing the "law of the flag" for aircraft⁶ and going far toward establishment of a rule of law "regarding the aircraft for practical purposes as a tiny movable piece of national territory."⁷ As President Johnson said in his message transmitting the Convention to the Senate for ratification,

... a positive rule of international law is established between contracting states which provides that the State in which an aircraft is registered is competent to exercise jurisdiction over offenses

committed aboard that aircraft when it is in flight . . . The Tokyo Convention does not establish a rule of exclusive jurisdiction; rather it assures that at least the State of registry will have the competence to exercise its jurisdiction while permitting the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction by other countries, depending upon their respective interests in the offense and the applicability of the traditional rules of international law regarding assertion of jurisdiction.⁸

As the President said, the jurisdiction of the flag state is not exclusive, and both article 4 and paragraph 3 of article 3 confirm other bases for jurisdiction, including the territorial, protective, active nationality, and passive nationality principles. However, the primary jurisdiction of the flag state is explicitly recognized by the provision in article 4 that other states (including the state in whose airspace the offense was committed) should not interfere with the flight of the aircraft in order to exercise jurisdiction unless the offense has direct effect on the territory or nationals of that state.⁹ The convention also attempts to deal with the problem of the lack of jurisdiction, through the lack of adequate municipal law, by placing an obligation on each contracting state to "take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction."¹⁰

Powers of the Aircraft Commander. Article 6 grants power to the aircraft commander to restrain any passenger or crew member who has committed or is about to commit an offense affecting the safety of flight. Article 8 allows the aircraft commander to disembark any person he considers a threat to the safety of flight, and article 9 allows him to deliver into the custody of any contracting state any person he

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believes to have committed a serious offense aboard the aircraft. Article 10 protects the aircraft commander from both criminal and civil liability for exercise of these powers. These powers apply to international flights only.¹¹

Duties of States. Article 11, the hijacking article, imposes a duty on contracting states to assist in restoring control of the aircraft to the aircraft commander and to expedite the continuation of the journey of the aircraft, passengers, and crew. Contracting states are required to allow the aircraft commander to disembark forcibly any passenger or crew member,¹² to accept delivery of persons suspected of an offense¹³ to hold the offender in custody,¹⁴ to conduct a preliminary investigation,¹⁵ and to notify the flag state and provide to the flag state a report of the investigation.¹⁶

Extradition. Article 16 provides that offenses committed on board an aircraft outside the territorial jurisdiction of the flag state are to be regarded as having been committed in the territory of the flag state as well as in the place where they actually were committed.¹⁷ This provision is intended to facilitate the use of existing extradition treaties, many of which apply only to offenses committed in the territory of the state requesting extradition.¹⁸ However, paragraph 2 of article 16 emphasizes that the convention does not create any obligation to grant extradition, and article 2 states that the convention does not apply to offenses of a political nature.

Problems not Covered. The Tokyo Convention is as notable for what it does not do as for what it attempts to do. As an international convention, which could only come into force through ratification by states, it represents a compromise of what could be agreed to by the states participating and

generally excludes or avoids controversial matters on which states have evidenced controversial views.¹⁹

The Tokyo Convention does not define or establish a crime of hijacking under international law. Whether or not a crime has been committed may be judged only by the national law of the applicable jurisdiction.²⁰ It does, however, oblige states to remove the effects of hijacking by restoring control to the aircraft commander and expediting the onward journey.

Nor does the convention deal with the problem of priority of jurisdiction where a number of states can claim jurisdiction on various bases. The conferees were unable to agree on a system of priority or whether in fact such a system was needed.²¹ As the U.S. Delegate to the predecessor 1962 Rome Conference said, "conflicts of criminal jurisdiction had existed for hundreds of years in different fields of law, and there was no reason why those engaged in aviation should, at this time, attempt to solve such conflicts."²²

Status of the Tokyo Convention. "Conventions are agreements made with the avowed object of making the rules which they promulgate universal."²³ As a multilateral treaty, a convention does not establish international law, but is recognized in article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice as one of the sources of law "establishing rules expressly recognized by the Contracting States."²⁴ Generally, a convention is binding only with respect to contracting states.²⁵ However, a convention which has been ratified by most of the nations of the world, including the great powers, may be considered in time to have established customary international law, binding even on those states not parties to it.²⁶

Article 21 of the Tokyo Convention provides that it will enter into force after it has been ratified by 12 states.

The United States has not ratified it yet, although President Johnson submitted it to the Senate on 25 September 1968 recommending ratification.²⁷ At that time, 29 states had signed the convention, but only six states had ratified it.²⁸ In view of the leading role of the United States in drafting the convention, the 5-year delay between signature of the Convention by the United States and its submission to the Senate for ratification can only be explained as bureaucratic inertia resulting from the absence of any significant hijacking problem between 1963 and 1968. Since then, two additional states have deposited ratifications, so that only four more are required to bring the convention into force.²⁹ Whether the convention will accomplish its purpose will ultimately depend not on its ratification by 12 or even 16 states, but on the extent to which nations with important aviation interests ratify it.³⁰

Conclusions. The Tokyo Convention, if ratified, will go far toward eliminating the deficiencies in international law with respect to aircraft hijacking. The provisions for jurisdiction, clearly establishing, a "law of the flag" for aircraft, similar to maritime law, will ensure that the states with greatest interest in suppressing hijacking are competent to exercise jurisdiction. The imposition of a duty on states to restore control of the aircraft to its commander and to facilitate prompt release of the aircraft, crew, and passengers will remove some of the abuses in the Cuban and Algerian cases noted in chapter I. The imposition upon states of a duty to take custody of the hijacker and conduct a preliminary investigation will facilitate prosecution of hijackers.

However, as noted above, the convention does not define hijacking as an international crime, so that effective prosecution will still depend on the existence of adequate municipal law.

Although the convention removes one

important bar to extradition by defining an aircraft, for purposes of extradition, as territory of the flag state, it does not impose upon states a duty to extradite hijackers nor does it deal with the major problem of classifying hijackers as political offenders, thereby protecting them from extradition.

Lastly, the usefulness of the convention will depend upon how many of those nations with important air commerce and those nations which have thus far been havens for hijackers ratify it. The progress of ratification to date seems regrettably slow.

IV-SUPPRESSION OF HIJACKING

Technical Measures to Prevent Hijacking. Both the governments concerned and the airlines have devoted a great deal of attention and energy to technical measures designed to prevent hijackings. These measures generally fall into two major groupings: screening of passengers before they board the aircraft and measures designed to frustrate hijackers within the aircraft.

Screening of Passengers. The air carriers of the United States and of most other nations are in business to make a profit. Since their profit depends largely on their ability to increase their volume of passenger traffic, they are understandably reluctant to adopt any measures which frighten or discourage passengers. As one major airline executive said, "no airline is going to frisk its passengers."¹ The one reported case in which passengers were searched as a result of a telephoned tip that the aircraft would be hijacked produced no weapon, but most of the passengers "appeared frightened or irked."² To avoid this reaction and to avoid the horrendous time delays which would result from physically searching passengers at major airports, the U.S. Government has sponsored extensive research and development in an effort to find

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mechanical screening devices which will neither delay nor frighten passengers. Various electronic devices to detect metal carried by passengers have been evaluated. Unfortunately, they detect keys, cigarette lighters, and other small metal objects as readily as they detect guns. The most encouraging U.S. effort has been the recent experimental development of a device which detects the odor of gunpowder. Presumably, a simultaneous detection of metal and gunpowder would indicate a high probability that the passenger was carrying a weapon.³ Installation of such devices at hundreds of passenger loading areas at airports all over the United States from which aircraft depart for Florida would be extremely costly and would still not eliminate hijacking. No such device will stop the hijacker who uses a knife or claims to have a bottle of nitroglycerine or a package of dynamite or merely pretends to have a weapon.⁴

Resistance by the Aircraft Crew. Cuha has attempted to suppress hijacking by using police state methods. Commencing in 1960, Cuban militiamen armed with submachine guns have been stationed in the passenger compartments of Cuban aircraft. This has resulted in a number of aerial gun battles and the crash of at least one Cuban aircraft after such a gun battle but has reduced the number of successful hijackings of Cuban aircraft.

However, such methods are neither politically nor economically feasible for the United States, although some U.S. actions have been taken along these lines. One airline was reported in 1965 to be arming its pilots and armed Federal officers have ridden aircraft on a random basis.⁵ To cover all such flights with armed guards would involve prohibitive costs. For example, just one airline serving Florida (Eastern) has a flight landing at Miami every 6 minutes, so that the total number of guards required would be astronomical.

In an attempt to frustrate hijackers within the aircraft, the Federal Aviation Administration issued regulations in 1961 requiring that the door to the flight crew compartment be kept locked during flight.⁶ Many airlines have installed wide-angle vision devices in these doors so the flight crew can see who is outside before unlocking the door. The futility of these efforts to insulate the pilots from the hijackers is obvious from recent cases in which the stewardess in the passenger compartment is usually the first crew member threatened by the hijacker. If a hijacker merely remains in the passenger compartment, threatening to kill the stewardess or even a fellow passenger, the pilots will usually comply with his demands. Other suggestions for resistance by crew members have included the use of disabling gases or chemicals. These are unsuitable because they do not act swiftly enough to prevent a mentally unbalanced hijacker from shooting or exploding his bomb and because aircraft ventilating systems do not insulate the pilot or other passengers from their effects. A dosage adequate to incapacitate a hijacker swiftly may be fatal to a nearby passenger who has a weak heart or who is especially susceptible to the chemical.

Airline officials have generally concluded that resistance by crew members involves unwarranted hazards both for crew and passengers and that it is far more sensible to comply with the hijackers' demands. Typical of current airline policies are the following excerpts from instructions issued by Eastern Air Lines to its pilots:

The most important consideration under the act of aircraft piracy is the safety of the lives of the passengers and crew. Any other factor is secondary. . . .

In the fact [sic] of an armed threat to *any* crewmember, comply with the demands presented.

Do not make an attempt to disarm, shoot out, or otherwise jeopardize the safety of the flight... it is much more prudent to submit to a gunman's demands than to attempt action which may well jeopardize the lives of all on board.⁷

Extradition: The Core of the Problem. If hijacking cannot effectively be suppressed by technical measures applied within the state of registry to defend against hijacking, then the cure for this problem must be sought elsewhere. Airline executives, government officials, and legal scholars unanimously agree that the most effective way to suppress hijacking is to prosecute and punish hijackers. Even those hijackers who are mentally unbalanced exhibit an element of rational behavior by choosing to fly to a destination state where they expect to escape punishment. Thus, inevitability of punishment should act as a sufficient deterrent to reduce hijacking to a minimal level.

Experience has demonstrated that states rarely have sufficient motivation to prosecute and punish persons who hijack aircraft from another state.⁸ Unless some unusually powerful motivation is generated to reverse this pattern, effective prosecution will continue to require returning the hijackers to the state of registry, which alone has a strong interest in prosecuting them.

Extradition, the normal international process of returning wanted criminals, usually requires the existence of an extradition treaty between the states concerned.⁹ Furthermore, most extradition treaties permit extradition only for offenses listed in the treaty, and few such treaties cover hijacking. Since extradition is a process of bilateral international relations, it is virtually impossible to arrange in the absence of normal diplomatic relations between the states involved. Even if an extradition treaty which includes hijacking as an

extraditable offense is in force between two states having normal diplomatic relations, the present almost universal international practice of granting asylum to hijackers who are considered refugees or political dissidents would act to bar extradition and subsequent prosecution in the majority of hijacking cases. Therefore, since extradition and prosecution are the most effective means of suppressing hijacking, diplomatic measures must be employed to remove the obstacles to extradition, especially to change the practice of granting asylum to hijackers.

Diplomatic Measures to Suppress Hijacking. Chapter I demonstrated that the only currently important destination state for hijackers was Cuba, which was the planned destination for 43 of the last 48 hijacking attempts (August 1967 through January 1969), and that all of these 43 aircraft were registered in the United States, Colombia, Venezuela, or Mexico. It becomes obvious that agreement by Cuba to extradite hijackers would virtually eliminate the problem of hijacking or at least reduce it to minimal proportions. It also becomes obvious that analysis of the attitude and policies of Cuba is urgently required, as is analysis of possible sources of diplomatic leverage for use in persuading Cuba to assist in suppressing hijacking.

Bilateral Negotiations with Cuba.

The history of international relations clearly demonstrates that states act to promote their own national self-interest. In other words, effective international cooperation normally occurs only when there is some mutuality of interest in solving the problem or some element of reciprocity or *quid pro quo*. In the case of states having a large mutuality of interests and a long history of close and amicable relations, a state will frequently undertake, as a normal matter of promoting amicable relations, an

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action of no direct benefit to itself which is desired by a friendly state. However, between states which are hostile, such actions cannot be anticipated without some clear element of reciprocity or *quid pro quo* which results in a benefit to the accommodating state to match the benefit gained by the requesting state.

International relations between Cuba and three of the countries most concerned, the United States, Colombia, and Venezuela, can only be characterized as hostile. The United States and Cuba severed diplomatic relations in January 1961. The Bay of Pigs episode certainly did not improve relations, and the United States has been the haven for a constant stream of political refugees from Cuba, some of which have left Cuba with the consent of the Cuban Government but many of which have hijacked aircraft, stolen boats, and killed or wounded Cuban security guards in the process of escaping. As for Colombia and Venezuela, Cuba not only has no diplomatic relations with these states, but has been actively implicated in support of insurgencies in both of these countries. In November 1968, Venezuela seized a Cuban fishing boat on the high seas on the suspicion it had been engaged in supporting Venezuelan insurgents,¹⁰ and both Colombia and Venezuela have joined in OAS actions hostile to Cuba. Consequently, Cuba can only be expected to assist United States, Colombian, or Venezuelan efforts to suppress hijacking on a basis of reciprocity or *quid pro quo*.

The situation with Mexico is considerably different. Mexico and Canada are the only two American states with which Cuba maintains normal diplomatic and trade relations, and Cuba currently has scheduled commercial air service only with Mexico. There is substantial evidence that Cuba values highly its good relations with Mexico, both for propaganda and economic reasons and because Mexico provides a convenient

channel for the movement of Cuban agents to Latin America. The only case in which Cuba has ever returned to another state for trial an aircraft hijacker, was one in which Cuba returned to Mexico for trial a man, who had hijacked a U.S. airliner in Mexican airspace. More recently, three aircraft of Mexican registry have been hijacked to Cuba, and Canada suffered one attempted hijacking in 1968.

Contrary to popular belief, there is no indication that Premier Castro has ever encouraged the hijacking of aircraft. In fact, Cuba has suffered from hijacking, and there are reasons to believe that Castro has an interest in suppressing it. In the 1959-1961 period Cuba was the victim of numerous hijackings in which most of the aircraft were flown to the United States, where the hijackers were granted asylum as political refugees. In a speech on 26 July 1961, Castro proposed that the United States and Cuba negotiate a treaty providing for the mutual return of seized aircraft.¹¹ A few days later Castro formally raised the subject of punishment of hijackers:

There have been occasions when individuals have taken refuge in the United States who, in order to seize airplanes or boats, had murdered their crews. The fact that these acts have gone unpunished, thanks to the protection provided by the government of the United States to such individuals in its territory, encourages the repetition of such crimes . . .¹²

On 9 August 1961, the Colombian Foreign Minister was a passenger on an airliner which was hijacked to Cuba and quoted Premier Castro as saying "this should not happen again."¹³ A second Cuban note on 11 August 1961 formally proposed mutual extradition of hijackers:

The government of Cuba considers that one of the most appropriate measures that both governments should adopt immediately by mutual agreement is to commit themselves to the immediate return of the persons responsible for those acts to the territory of the country to which the seized ship or plane may belong.¹⁴

No formal U.S. response to these notes have been reported, but the United States did release a number of Cuban aircraft,¹⁵ and Cuba released the U.S. airliner it had been holding. The reasons for the apparent lack of interest on the part of the United States in pursuing the offer of mutual extradition of hijackers were twofold. First, while Cuba held only one U.S. hijacker, the United States had granted asylum to a number of Cuban refugee hijackers. Mutual extradition would have involved the United States in the distasteful task of returning political refugees which it had encouraged and welcomed. Second, the Cuban offer applied both to boats and aircraft, and the United States had no intention of returning the hundreds of Cuban refugees who had stolen boats to escape to the United States.

Since 1961 the Cuban Government has largely solved its aircraft hijacking problem through the repressive police state measures reported above. However, the solution adopted is costly to Cuba, since the expense of providing several armed guards on every domestic passenger flight must be substantial. Furthermore, it does not contribute to the image of a popular progressive government which Castro would like to portray, both to Cubans and to the outside world. So there is reason to believe Castro also has a self-interest in the suppression of hijacking through apprehension and prosecution of hijackers.

The Cuban Government has not recently sought to reap propaganda benefits from hijacking. The Havana press virtually ignores hijacking, reporting the arrival of hijacked aircraft in only a few lines without prominent display.¹⁶ A Cuban security official recently told two U.S. reporters that Castro strongly disapproved of aircraft hijacking and that all hijackers were jailed upon arrival in Cuba.¹⁷ In September 1968 Castro was quoted in a broadcast speech as saying: "All are welcome to Cuba except those who come by hijacking a plane."¹⁸ The Cuban Delegate to the 16th Assembly of the International Civil Aviation Organization in Buenos Aires in September 1968 voted in favor of a resolution of condemning hijacking and urging states to place in effect the Tokyo Convention.¹⁹ In fact, Cuba has implemented those portions of the Tokyo Convention which provide for prompt release of the aircraft, passengers, and crew and has even ceased its previous practice of harassing the United States by requiring the passengers to return on different aircraft.

Even though Cuban relations with the United States can only be described as hostile, there are still a number of other factors operating to persuade Cuba to take action to suppress hijacking. The first of these is the fact that further hijacking of Mexican aircraft to Cuba would probably lead to a deterioration in the presently amicable Cuban-Mexican relations, which Cuba appears to value. The second factor is that the possibility always exists that a U.S. passenger jet will crash upon landing at Havana because of pilot unfamiliarity with Havana, an irrational act by the hijacker, or the rudimentary nature of landing aids at Havana. Castro is never unaware of the power of the United States and surely must be aware of the strong anti-Cuban reaction such a catastrophe would undoubtedly cause in the United States. The third and most

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potent factor is that Cuba has been and is being hurt by the cessation of normal economic relations with the United States and must be aware of the fragile nature of her dependence on a distant power, the U.S.S.R., for both economic support and protection against the United States. Cuban-United States relations, while still hostile, are perceptibly less hostile than they were some years ago, and Castro would be ill advised to allow hijacking, from which he reaps so little benefit, to cause further deterioration in his relations with the United States.

In summary, there is no evidence that Cuba has ever encouraged the hijacking of United States or Mexican airliners, except by granting asylum to the hijackers.²⁰ There are substantial reasons to believe that Cuba would be as eager as any other state to adopt a solution to the problem of hijacking, in order to remove it as an irritant in its relations with the United States and Mexico, provided the solution did not require Cuba to appear to be bowing to U.S. pressure.

Precisely because bilateral United States-Cuban negotiations are likely to be more fruitful when conducted in secrecy, relatively little information on recent United States-Cuban negotiations has emerged publicly. Two U.S. proposals made through the Swiss Government, which represents U.S. interests in Havana, have achieved at least partial success. Adopting a suggestion by Congressman Rogers of Florida, the United States proposed to Cuba on 10 July 1968 that any Cuban refugee in the United States desiring to return to Cuba be given a free ride on the Cuban Refugee Airlift.²¹ Cuba must agree to the admission of such refugees before this proposal could be implemented. Consequently, this plan is not likely to result in the return of many refugees, since only those who have been unsuccessful in the United States are likely to desire repatriation, and such persons

would probably represent more a liability than an asset to the Cuban economy. Nevertheless, the plan offers some propaganda advantages to Cuba, and Cuba has agreed in principle to the repatriation of some refugees on a selected basis.²² The United States has submitted to Cuba through the Czechoslovakian Government an initial list of about 80 refugees desiring repatriation, and Cuba is currently studying the list.²³ The free ride offer is not likely to reduce significantly the number of aircraft hijackings, since relatively few are committed by lonesome Cuban refugees, but if it avoids a single hijacking, the effort will have been worthwhile. The second recent U.S. diplomatic initiative toward Cuba has been more successful. This was the proposal to expedite the release of hijacked aircraft and to permit the passengers to return to the United States on the same aircraft. The U.S. State Department announced Cuban acceptance of this proposal on 11 February 1969.²⁴ While this agreement reduces the inconvenience and financial loss to the passengers and airline, it contributes nothing toward the suppression of hijacking.

Press Coverage of Hijacking. It is evident that Cuba has not welcomed with open arms those who enter Cuba by hijacking an aircraft. In contrast to the impression created in hundreds of newspaper and magazine articles written in 1968 and earlier, the data presented in chapter I and in the preceding paragraphs clearly indicate that hijackers are usually treated rather harshly by Cuba. The U.S. Department of State recently commenced efforts to assist the press to portray more accurately the actual treatment accorded hijackers in Cuba in the hope that this would dissuade some of the attention seekers who hijack aircraft to Cuba in the expectation of achieving fame, glory, and financial reward. The success of this effort is evident in the markedly changed tone of

newspaper coverage of hijacking in 1969. While this change in press emphasis has not yet produced a notable diminution in hijacking attempts, the effort is sound and worthwhile and should be continued and intensified.

Multilateral Negotiations. Although the Cuban Government has reasons to desire the suppression of hijacking, it would find it difficult to adopt measures having the appearance of bowing to U.S. pressures. Consequently, multilateral negotiations or efforts through international organizations are more likely to produce Cuban agreement, especially if U.S. sponsorship of these proposals is not visible.

The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), of which Cuba is a member state, is one useful forum for efforts to suppress hijacking. As discussed in chapter III, the ICAO was the agency through which the Tokyo Convention was negotiated. While Cuba has not yet ratified this convention, it did vote in favor of the recent ICAO Resolution urging ratification of the Tokyo Convention and proposing the development of still further measures for the suppression of hijacking. Although the Tokyo Convention fails to attack the root causes of hijacking, implementation of it would alleviate the effects of hijacking and would establish procedural machinery which could be very useful if a way around the impasse of extradition could be developed. Consequently, ICAO efforts to encourage ratification and implementation of the Tokyo Convention should be continued, and the United States should not only expedite its own ratification of the convention but should also urge Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, and other states which have suffered from hijacking to ratify it.

The ICAO Council in December 1968 passed a resolution condemning hijacking and urging that member states take measures to suppress it.²⁵ Knut

Hammaraskjold, the Director General of the International Air Transport Association, and international organization of air carriers which works closely with the ICAO, announced on 13 January 1969 plans to seek U.N. action on hijacking and said hijacking should be defined as an international crime.²⁶ Hammaraskjold also visited Havana in mid-January²⁷ and may have been instrumental in promoting the measures recently instituted by Cuba to alleviate the effects of hijacking.

On 31 January 1969 the United States submitted to the ICAO a draft protocol defining hijacking as an international crime and providing for mandatory arrest and extradition of the hijacker to the state of registry of the aircraft. The draft protocol made no exception for political offenders, but did not require extradition of nationals of the requested state provided such persons were tried or punished by their own governments.²⁸ The protocol was so formulated as to allow adherence to the protocol by states which might be unwilling to ratify the Tokyo Convention as a whole.²⁹ When this draft protocol was considered by the ICAO subcommittee, a number of states, including Great Britain, France, Denmark, and Tunisia, opposed it on the grounds that they could not agree to foreclose the possibility of asylum for political offenders. Consequently, the subcommittee emasculated the protocol, reducing it to a statement encouraging either prosecution of the hijacker by the destination state or extradition to the flag state, but making neither action mandatory.³⁰

The possibility of a multilateral embargo on air commerce to Cuba has been suggested as one means to bring pressure on the Cuban Government. The International Federation of Air Line Pilots Associations threatened on two occasions to impose a boycott on air traffic to Algeria in order to force Algerian release of the crews of two

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hijacked aircraft. The IFALPA has contingency plans for a similar boycott against Cuba, but they will probably never be used because less than half of Cuban international air commerce is flown by IFALPA pilots, and Cuba has been careful to release hijacked aircraft and crews.³¹ An embargo would probably not be effective in halting Cuban air commerce with the Communist bloc and might be counterproductive in reversing the progress made so far toward inducing Cuban discouragement of hijacking.

Asylum: the Stumbling Block. The Tokyo Convention fails to deal with the problem of treating hijackers as political offenders eligible for asylum. The U.S. proposal for a protocol making extradition mandatory assumes that states will agree to dilute the time-honored principle of political asylum by excluding hijackers from its benefits. The reported negative reactions of some European states to this proposal are matched by similar negative reactions in the U.S. press.³² Some hijackings analyzed in chapter I were, in fact, political acts by organized political dissidents for which asylum would have been appropriate under traditional concepts. But these relatively few political acts are not the problem; rather the problem is the past practice of prostituting the concept of asylum into protection of criminals by granting asylum as political offenders to hijackers whose offense had not the remotest relationship to organized political opposition.

If an international agreement supplementary to the Tokyo Convention could be negotiated and implemented which declares hijacking to be an international crime, similar to piracy, and which obligates states to grant extradition to the flag state, *except for political offenses*, several of the more important bars to prosecution of hijackers would have been removed. Such an agreement appears to this writer to be

attainable, so long as it does not attempt to close the door to political asylum for purely political offenses and is not too closely identified with the United States as sponsoring power, in order that Cuba can accede to it without publicly embracing a U.S. proposal.

The problem of treating hijacking as a political offense can then be dealt with in practice. A keystone of international relations is the principle of reciprocity. The United States has already taken a useful step along this line in the announcement by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Frank E. Loy before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on 5 February 1969 of a new U.S. policy "that the hijacker of a commercial airliner carrying passengers should be returned regardless of any claim that he was fleeing political persecution."³³ While the present international climate does not indicate that states will bind themselves in writing to discard the principle of political asylum, it should be possible to induce in reciprocal practice a more limited and realistic definition of what is a political offense, so as to close this loophole for most hijackers. While this would not completely suppress hijacking, the number of hijackings which can fairly be classified as political acts has never exceeded two per year. Suppression of hijacking to such a level would make it disappear as a significant threat to orderly international air commerce.

V—CONCLUSIONS

The patterns of hijacking analyzed in this paper reveal a number of consistent trends. The incidence of hijacking is rising, and Cuba is currently the only important destination state. Although the United States suffers most from hijacking, other Caribbean states are also important victims, especially Colombia, Venezuela, and Mexico. There has been a general tendency on

the part of all nations to grant asylum to hijackers, thereby encouraging others to follow their example. The majority of hijackers are, contrary to public opinion, not homesick refugees but attention seekers and unbalanced persons. The latter group are often failures in American society and regard Cuba as a haven in which they can start life anew in a better status.

Current international law is not adequate to deal with the problem of hijacking. Jurisdiction over criminal offenses committed on board aircraft in flight over the high seas or territory other than that of the flag state is regrettably obscure. A sensible solution to the problem would entail vesting primary jurisdiction to the state of registry, with concurrent jurisdiction being granted to the state(s) in whose airspace the offense occurred. A general international obligation to expedite the release of the aircraft, passengers, and crew would help alleviate the effects of hijacking by reducing the delay and economic loss. There is also a regrettable tendency to regard as excusable, on the grounds of its being a political offense, almost any crime committed in the process of escaping from an oppressive regime.

Many of these shortcomings are dealt with by the Tokyo Convention of 1963 which was sponsored by the International Civil Aviation Organization, a specialized agency of the United Nations. This convention, if ratified, will go far toward eliminating the deficiencies in international law with respect to aircraft hijacking. It clearly establishes a "law of the flag" for aircraft, similar to that long in use in maritime law. It imposes upon all states the duty of restoring control of the aircraft to its commander and facilitating the prompt release of the aircraft, its crew, and its passengers. It does not, however, define hijacking as an international crime or impose upon states the duty of extraditing hijackers.

Technical measures to prevent hijacking can never be more than partially successful, but present efforts to devise an effective method of screening passengers before they board the aircraft should be continued until a solution can be found to the problem of extradition. Present U.S. airlines policies of discouraging resistance to the hijacker by aircraft crew members are sound, since such resistance needlessly endangers the lives of passengers.

The key to suppression of hijacking is effective prosecution of hijackers, and the core of this problem is the existing bar to extradition. The only currently important destination state for hijackers is Cuba, but, contrary to public opinion, the Castro government has done nothing to encourage hijacking. Although the Cuban Government has some self-interest in the suppression of hijacking, bilateral United States-Cuban negotiations are not likely to be very productive in the absence of a major improvement in overall United States-Cuban relations. Multilateral negotiations, especially through the ICAO, are more likely to bear fruit, particularly if the

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Lt. Col. James S. G. Turner, U.S. Marine Corps, did his undergraduate work at the University of Maryland and is a graduate of the Amphibious Warfare School and of the Armed Forces Staff College. As an infantry officer, he has served as battalion commander and has had two tours of duty in Vietnam—in 1960-61 he was an adviser to the Vietnamese Marine Corps, and in 1967-68 he performed like duties with the 2d Brigade of the 9th Vietnamese Infantry Division. Lieutenant Colonel Turner is a 1969 graduate of the Naval War College, School of Naval Warfare, and is currently assigned to the U.S. Marine Corps Development and Educational Center, Quantico, Va.

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proposals are not visibly sponsored by the United States.

The United States, working in the background through other states such as Canada and Mexico, should seek to promote ICAO sponsorship of a convention or protocol defining hijacking as an international crime for which nations would agree to grant extradition to the flag state, even in the absence of an applicable bilateral extradition treaty

and normal diplomatic relations, except in cases where the hijacking was a political offense.

Attempts to achieve formal written multilateral agreement on exclusion of hijackers from political asylum are not likely to be successful. However, it may be possible to arrive at a more limited definition of political offenses which would not apply to most hijackings.

FOOTNOTES

I—PATTERNS OF HIJACKING

1. "The Lunatic Core," *The Nation*, 26 August 1961, p. 90.
2. Interview with Mr. George Clift, Office of the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, U.S. Dept. of State, Washington, 28 January 1969.
3. "A.E.C. Protects Papers from Loss in Hijacking," *The New York Times*, 28 January 1969, p. 85:6; "The President Finds 'a Good Place to Think,'" *Life*, 21 February 1969, p. 27.
4. Marjorie M. Whiteman, ed. *Digest of International Law* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1968), v. VI, p. 808-810.
5. "Cuba Returns Electra," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, 21 August 1961, p. 50.
6. Cuba has scheduled commercial air service only to Mexico, Spain, and the various Soviet bloc nations.
7. "What Can Be Done about Skyjacking?" *Time*, 31 January 1969, p. 19-20.
8. "Cuba Returns Electra," p. 50.
9. "The Lunatic Core," p. 90.
10. Juan de Onis, "Havana Accepts U.S. Plan to Help Hijacking Victims," *The New York Times*, 12 February 1969, p. 1:1.
11. *Ibid.*, "Cuba Is Holding Venezuelan Jet," *The New York Times*, 13 February 1969, p. 90:6; "Payment Made to Cuba," *The New York Times*, 18 February 1969, p. 81:4.
12. In one case the two hijackers were deported aboard an airliner destined for the United States, apparently as suspected CIA agents. *Miami (Florida) Herald*, 13 October 1968, p. F1:1.
13. Cuba recently permitted the voluntary departure of three men who had hijacked U.S. aircraft to Cuba. All three cases involved hijackings of chartered aircraft. Leonard S. Bendicks was allowed to go to Canada then reentered the United States in October 1968. He was apprehended in New York State and was charged with air piracy. He is currently confined in a mental institution, as incapable of standing trial. The second returnee, Willis Jessie, voluntarily returned to the United States, knowing he would be tried both for air piracy and for desertion from the U.S. Army. Jessie stated whatever punishment he received would be better than life in a Cuban prison. He is currently awaiting trial. The third returnee, Alben William Barkley Truitt, was allowed to go to Canada and is currently trying to avoid deportation from Canada to the United States for trial. Interview with Mr. Clift, 28 January 1969.
14. In December 1960, Cuba executed five Cubans who had attempted to hijack an airliner to Miami on 8 December 1960. The U.S.S.R. also has executed hijackers. The United States sentenced one hijacker to 20 years' imprisonment.

II—CURRENT INTERNATIONAL LAW

1. "Convention Relating to the Regulation of Aerial Navigation," U.S. Library of Congress, Law Library, *Air Laws and Treaties of the World* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1965), v. III, p. 3085.
2. "Convention on Commercial Aviation, Article 1," *ibid.*, p. 3094; "Convention on International Civil Aviation, Article 1," *ibid.*, p. 3166; U.S. Laws, Statutes, etc., *United States Statutes at Large*, Public Law 85-726, 85th Congress (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1958), v. LXXII, p. 798.

3. U.S. Dept. of State paper (1956) submitted to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Legal Committee, quoted in Robert P. Boyle and Roy Pulsifer, "The Tokyo Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft," *Journal of Air Law and Commerce*, Autumn 1964, p. 305-354.

4. David H.N. Johnson, *Rights in Air Space* (Manchester, Eng.: Manchester University Press, 1965), p. 74.

5. John C. Cooper, "Backgrounds of International Public Air Law," *Yearbook of Air and Space Law* (1965) (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1967), p. 31-37.

6. "Convention on International Civil Aviation, Articles 17-21," *Air Laws and Treaties of the World*, v. III, p. 3171.

7. Henry C. Black, *Black's Law Dictionary*, rev. 4th ed. (St. Paul: West, 1960), p. 991.

8. Daniel P. O'Connell, *International Law* (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana, 1965), v. II, p. 659.

9. Johnson, p. 75.

10. *Ibid.*, Boyle and Pulsifer, p. 312; William W. Bishop, Jr., *International Law*, 2d ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1962), p. 443.

11. Decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice in the *Lotus* (1927), quoted in O'Connell, v. II, p. 657.

12. Bishop, p. 463; O'Connell, v. I, p. 463; O'Connell, v. II, p. 898; Statement of Representative John A. Blatnick, quoted in U.S. Congress, House, Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, *Crimes on Board Aircraft*, Hearings (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1961), p. 20.

13. Bishop, p. 659.

14. Johnson, p. 75; O'Connell, v. II, p. 896-898; Christopher N. Shawcross and Kenneth M. Beaumont, *Shawcross and Beaumont on Air Law*, 3d ed. (London: Butterworths, 1966), v. I, p. 28.

15. Harvard Research in International Law, *Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime* (1935), quoted in Bishop, p. 440, 463; Baron Arnold D. McNair, *The Law of the Air*, 3d ed. (London: Stevens, 1964), p. 277.

16. O'Connell, v. II, p. 661-666; The *Lotus*, quoted in O'Connell, v. II, p. 662. Baron McNair, p. 260-270, agrees that ships are regarded as movable territory but concludes that aircraft have not yet reached this status. Professor Cooper, *op. cit.*, p. 31-37, agrees with McNair. See also James W. Moore and Alfred S. Pelacz, "Admiralty Jurisdiction—the Sky's the Limit," *Journal of Air Law and Commerce*, Winter 1967, p. 3-38; Myres S. McDougal, et al., "The Maintenance of Public Order at Sea and the Nationality of Ships," *American Journal of International Law*, January 1960, p. 26, 82. Kamminga, in "The Aircraft Commander in Commercial Air Transportation," quoted in McDougal, et al., holds that the registry of the aircraft determines jurisdiction under the active nationality principle.

17. Also known as passive personality principle.

18. *Shawcross and Beaumont on Air Law*, p. 28; Boyle and Pulsifer, p. 312.

19. O'Connell, v. II, p. 901-2.

20. Bishop, p. 465. In the *Cutting Case* (1886) and the *Fiedler case* (1940), the United States is on record as opposing jurisdiction under the passive nationality principle. *Whiteman*, v. VI, p. 103-105; Bishop, p. 460.

21. Johnson, p. 75.

22. Bishop, p. 466-467; O'Connell, v. II, p. 715; *Black's Law Dictionary*, p. 1306.

23. Johnson, p. 75; Bishop, p. 464; Harvard Research in International Law, *Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime*, Article 7 quoted in Bishop, p. 462.

24. Bishop, p. 463-464; Boyle and Pulsifer, p. 312.

25. See discussion of piracy below.

26. Gerald F. FitzGerald, "The Development of International Rules concerning Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft," *Canadian Yearbook of International Law* 1963 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 1963), p. 240, note 24.

27. Johnson, p. 77.

28. McNair, p. 272.

29. Boyle and Pulsifer, p. 310, 316; FitzGerald, p. 230; *Crimes on Board Aircraft*, p. 20; Laurence Doty, "Air Crimes Convention Supported Heavily," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, 18 November 1968, p. 60.

30. O'Connell, v. II, p. 901.

31. McNair, p. 277.

32. McNair, p. 94. This decision was based on an interpretation that the British Drug Acts were not intended to apply outside the territory of the United Kingdom.

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33. *Ibid.* *Regina v. Naylor* involved a theft of jewelry by a British subject aboard an aircraft. The same court, with a different Chief Justice presiding, decided that the law in this case did apply aboard an aircraft in flight outside the airspace of the United Kingdom. The decision referred to the earlier Martin case and left little doubt that the present court considered the earlier decision to have been an unduly narrow interpretation of the law.

34. DeFrost Billyou, *Air Law*, 2d ed. (New York: Ad Press, 1964), v. I, p. 177-180; Francis J. Gist, Jr., "The Aircraft Hijacker and International Law," Unpublished Thesis, Institute of Air and Space Law, McGill University, Montreal: 1968, p. 51.

35. *Crimes on Board Aircraft*, p. 20.

36. Public Law 97-197 defines "aircraft piracy" as "any seizure or exercise of control, by force or violence or threat of force or violence and with wrongful intent, of an aircraft in flight in air commerce." U.S. Laws, Statutes, etc., *United States Statutes at Large*, Public Law 87-197, 87th Congress (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1961), v. I.XXV, p. 466.

37. O'Connell, v. II, p. 717; Gist, p. 5; *Black's Law Dictionary*, p. 1306.

38. Subcommittee of the League of Nations Committee of Experts for the Progressive Codification of International Law, quoted in Bishop, p. 466.

39. Quoted in Gist, p. 11.

40. "Piracy," *Corpus Juris Secundus* (Brooklyn, N.Y.: American Law Book Co., 1951), v. LXX, sec. 2; O'Connell, v. II, p. 715; Bishop, p. 466-467; McDougal, et al., p. 75-76.

41. Boyle and Pulsifer, p. 325; Gist, p. 55, 116; and Commentary to the 1956 draft of the International Law Commission on the Law of the Sea, quoted in Whiteman, v. IV, p. 658-659.

42. For example, Senators Williams, Holland, and Keating in a 1961 Senate debate reported in "Castro: One Step Too Far?" *U.S. News & World Report*, 7 August 1961, p. 37.

43. Whiteman, v. VI, p. 727.

44. *Ibid.*, p. 727-728.

45. *Ibid.*, p. 865.

46. "Extradition Treaty, 1904," *U.S. Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols and Agreements between the United States of America and Other Powers* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1910), v. I, p. 369, art. V.

47. Whiteman, v. VI, p. 727.

48. *Ibid.*, p. 889-890.

49. "Extradition Treaty, 1904," p. 367, art. 1.

50. The Secretary of State (Dulles) to the Ambassador of Greece (Politis), 8 July 1953, quoted in Whiteman, v. VI, p. 890.

51. Boyle and Pulsifer, p. 316. A recent British case, *Regina v. Governor of Brixton Prison* (1958), held that a ship was territory of the flag state, within the meaning of the term "territory" as used in a British extradition treaty. E. Lauterpacht, "The Contemporary Treaties of the United Kingdom in the Field of International Law—Survey and Comment, VII," *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, January 1959, p. 185. However, it is doubtful that an aircraft has the same status as a vessel. See note 16, *supra*.

52. Whiteman, v. VI, p. 885; Alona E. Evans, "The New Extradition Treaties of the United States," *American Journal of International Law*, April 1965, p. 360-361.

53. *United States Statutes at Large*, v. LXXV, p. 466.

54. Hersch Lauterpacht, "The Law of Nations and the Punishment of War Crimes," quoted in Whiteman, v. VI, p. 853; Evans, p. 360.

55. Whiteman, v. VI, p. 799-857. See also Frank E. Krenz, "The Refugee as a Subject of International Law," *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, January 1966, p. 101; Evans, p. 360; Shigeru Oda, "The Individual in International Law," Max Sorenson, ed., *Manual of Public International Law* (London: Macmillan, 1968), p. 491.

56. Krenz, p. 101-102.

57. Extradition treaties frequently prohibit extradition if the offense is not a crime under the laws of both states.

III—THE TOKYO CONVENTION

1. Boyle and Pulsifer, p. 307-320.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 328.

3. The text of the Tokyo Convention ("Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft") is printed in Billyou, p. 651-659; McNair, Appendix 10, p. 535-542; "Official Documents," *American Journal of International Law*, April 1964, p. 566-573; U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Air Piracy in the Caribbean Area* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1968), p. 21-27.

4. Tokyo Convention, art. 1, par. 2. However, the chapter dealing with the powers of the aircraft commander applies only to international flights (art. 5, par. 1).

5. *Ibid.*, art. 1, par. 4.

6. Boyle and Pulsifer, p. 333.

7. "Crime in the Air," *The Economist*, 31 August 1963, p. 773.

8. "Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft—Removal of Injunction of Secrecy," *Congressional Record*, 25 September 1968, p. S11450.

9. Gerald F. FitzGerald, "Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft: The Tokyo Convention of 1963," *Canadian Yearbook of International Law*, 1964 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 1964), v. II, p. 195; Boyle and Pulsifer, p. 336. Boyle notes the similarity of article 4 to article 19(1) of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone.

10. Tokyo Convention, art. 3, par. 2.

11. Boyle and Pulsifer, p. 337-342; note 4, *supra*.

12. Tokyo Convention, art. 12.

13. *Ibid.*, art. 13, par. 1.

14. *Ibid.*, art. 13, par. 2.

15. *Ibid.*, art. 13, par. 4.

16. *Ibid.*, art. 13, par. 5.

17. FitzGerald, "Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft," p. 201.

18. FitzGerald, "The Development of International Rules Concerning Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft," p. 250; Boyle and Pulsifer, p. 351.

19. Boyle and Pulsifer, p. 306.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 345; Billyou, p. 188.

21. Boyle and Pulsifer, p. 317.

22. Quoted in *Shawcross and Beaumont on Air Law*, v. I, p. 706.

23. Shawcross and Beaumont, quoted in Juan J. Lopez Gntierrez, "Should the Tokyo Convention of 1963 Be Ratified?" *Journal of Air Law and Commerce*, Winter 1965, p. 13.

24. Quoted in *Shawcross and Beaumont on Air Law*, v. I, p. 26.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 32; Hackworth, quoted in Bishop, p. 31.

26. Pollock, quoted in Bishop, p. 33; O'Connell, v. I, p. 24-26.

27. "Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts . . .," p. S11449-S11450.

28. *Ibid.*, p. S11449. The six states who have ratified it are the Republic of China (Taiwan), Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Portugal, and the Philippines. Alvin Shuster, "Hijacking and What Can Be Done about It," *The New York Times*, 18 August 1968, IV, p. 5E:1.

29. Italy and the United Kingdom both ratified the convention in 1968. Interview with Mr. Harry Feehan, Office of Aviation, U.S. Dept. of State, Washington, 28 January 1969.

30. Boyle and Pulsifer, p. 305.

IV—SUPPRESSION OF HIJACKING

1. "Travel: Coffee, Tea or Rum?" *Newsweek*, 29 July 1968, p. 30-31.

2. "Jet Passengers Searched after False Hijacking Call," *The New York Times*, 8 October 1968, p. 11:1.

3. Interview with Mr. Harry Feehan.

4. *Air Piracy in the Caribbean Area*, p. 5; Robert D. McFadden, "Airlines Trying Number of Ways to Foil Hijackers," *The New York Times*, 20 January 1969, p. 16:5; "Hijacking," *The New York Times*, 2 February 1969, p. 6E:1. As one airline pilot said, "we give people a lethal weapon every time we hand out knives with the silverware." Douglas Robinson, "Hijacking Victims Term Treatment by Cuban Hosts Royal but Tiresome," *The New York Times*, 9 February 1969, p. 79:3.

5. George Horne, "Pilots Learning Arts of Defense," *The New York Times*, 7 September 1965, p. 77:1; "Riding Shotgun in the Sky," *Business Week*, 19 August 1961, p. 36; *Air Piracy in the Caribbean Area*, p. 5.

6. *Air Piracy in the Caribbean Area*, p. 4.

7. Eastern Airlines Instructions to Flight Officers, 27 March 1968, printed in *Air Piracy in the Caribbean Area*, p. 14.

8. The only recorded case in which a state prosecuted a person who hijacked an aircraft registered in some other state was one in which Mexico prosecuted a French citizen who hijacked a U.S. airliner in Mexican airspace. See discussion of prosecution in chapter I, *supra*.

9. Although the existence of such a treaty is not an absolute necessity, return of criminals in the absence of such a treaty is relatively rare. The bilateral extradition treaty between the Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1969

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United States and Cuba is listed in *Treaties in Force* (Washington: U.S. Dept. of State, 1968), p. 85, as being in effect, but U.S. Government officials have expressed doubt as to whether it is still in force. Interview with Mr. K.E. Malmberg, Office of the Legal Advisor, U.S. Dept. of State, Washington, 29 January 1969; "Cuba: Partial Solution to Hijackings 'Two-Way' Refugee Airlift?" *Foreign Policy Briefs*, 30 December 1968, p. 1; *Air Piracy in the Caribbean Area*, p. 6.

10. "Payment Made to Cuba," p. 81:4.

11. "Castro Wants his Planes Back in Return for the U.S. Airliner," *The New York Times*, 27 July 1961, p. 4:2; James Feron, "Rusk Turns Down Castro Bid for Exchange of Seized Planes," *The New York Times*, 28 July 1961, p. 1:7, 7:4. Note that this offer was made 2 days after the first U.S. airliner was hijacked to Cuba (24 July 1961) and while Cuba was refusing to release the U.S. aircraft until the United States agreed to return a number of hijacked Cuban aircraft. Thus, Cuba for this first time had some leverage for use in negotiation with the United States for return of seized aircraft. Castro publicly repeated this offer a few days later. Laurence O'Kane, "Cuba to Give Plane to U.N. to Balk U.S. 'Aggression,'" *The New York Times*, 30 July 1961, p. 1:6.

12. Cuban Government Note of 4 August 1961 to U.S. Government, transmitted through the Swiss Embassy in Havana. "Cuba Releases Electra Airplane; U.S. Returns Naval Vessel," *The Department of State Bulletin*, 4 September 1961, p. 407-408.

13. Richard Witkin, "Jetliner Seized, Flown to Havana; Cuba Releases It," *The New York Times*, 10 August 1961, p. 1:4.

14. Cuban Government Note of 11 August 1961 to U.S. Government, transmitted through Swiss Embassy in Havana. "Cuba Releases Electra Airplane," p. 408.

15. Some of these Cuban aircraft had been hijacked to the United States, and others had been seized by writ of attachment to satisfy the Harris claims.

16. Interview with Mr. Clift; *Air Piracy in the Caribbean Area*, p. 3.

17. "Cuban Opposition to Hijacking Seen," *The New York Times*, 31 July 1968, p. 2:3.

18. Interview with Mr. Clift.

19. ICAO Resolution A16-37. Text of this resolution is printed in *Air Piracy in the Caribbean Area*, p. 6-7.

20. The evidence of Cuban noncomplicity is not so clear with respect to hijacking of Colombian and Venezuelan aircraft to Cuba. However, even in these cases, the available evidence does not indicate that Cuba has actually encouraged the hijacking but, rather, has condoned it as a convenience to Castroite guerrillas.

21. "Action by U.S. Urged," *The New York Times*, 3 July 1968, p. 70:6; and "Cuba: Partial Solution to Hijackings 'Two-Way' Refugee Airlift?" p. 1.

22. De Onis, p. 1:1.

23. Interview with Mr. Feehan.

24. De Onis, p. 1:1.

25. Interview with Mr. Malmberg.

26. *Miami (Florida) Herald*, 14 January 1969, p. 1:1.

27. "What Can Be Done about Hijacking?" p. 20.

28. International Civil Aviation Organization, "Draft Proposals on Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Appendix C, LC/SC SA WD 14," *International Legal Materials*, March 1969, p. 256-257.

29. Interview with Mr. Malmberg.


30. Edward Cowan, "Accord Drafted to Curb Hijacking," *The New York Times*, 22 February 1969, p. 58:8.

31. "What Can Be Done about Skyjacking?" p. 19-20.

32. Richard Witkin, "To Combat Air Piracy," *The New York Times*, 13 August 1961, IV, p. 6E:6; "Tragedy in the Wings," *The New York Times*, 14 February 1969, p. 38:2.

33. Robert Lindsey, "U.S. Wants Accord to Return Hijackers," *The New York Times*, 6 February 1969, p. 77:3. The author was advised in interviews on 28-29 January 1969 with Mr. Malmberg and Mr. Feehan of the U.S. Dept. of State that the United States had decided to implement this new policy in the hope of inducing reciprocity by other states.





PROFESSIONAL READING

Gallup, Grace V. and Hardy, Ann A. "Chronological Bibliography of the Naval War College." Unpublished Bibliography of Articles. U.S. Naval War College, Newport, R.I.: 1969.

This bibliography of articles dealing with the Naval War College was prepared to assist students doing research on the history of the War College. The reference material consists almost entirely of periodical articles with *The New York Times* and the *Naval Institute Proceedings* providing the bulk of the material. The chronological arrangement is intended to provide an historical view of the development and growth of the War College. Any study of the history of the War College should begin with this bibliography which will spare the student many hours of index work. It is available at the Mahan Library Reference Branch, Naval War College, Newport, R.I., on a loan basis.

D.G. WHITE
Ensign, U.S. Naval Reserve

Grabner, Doris A. *Public Opinion, the President, and Foreign Policy*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968. 374p.

The American political ideal that a democratic government should keep the people well informed and then respond to public opinion is largely a myth as it applies to the problems of foreign relations. The author draws this significant conclusion from an analysis of four major foreign policy problems early in

American history. The cases she considers are Adams' determination to seek an accommodation with France in 1800, Jefferson's purchase of the Louisiana Territory, Madison's decision to fight Britain in 1812, and Monroe's enunciation of his doctrine on foreign intervention in Latin America. The case studies lead to four broad conclusions, all of which seem to hold true today. The first is noted above. Second, the early Presidents did try to gauge public opinion, but for its advisory value and not for its veto or for support of their policies. The author's third and fourth broad conclusions are that the Presidents accepted, without questioning, largely symbolic methods of information exchange between the public and themselves and that the Presidents were certain of their ability to identify public opinion and identify themselves with it. Public opinion, in each of the cases studied, was a very important factor, but it was by no means as important as the given factors of the problem in question. It was critical only when necessary to the success of implementing the President's policy. The author projects her scholarly study to the present to draw several noteworthy inferences. First, the fiction prevails that a single public opinion exists which must be heeded because it reflects the public good. "It thus turns opinions that have somehow captured the public opinion crown into tyrants that must be appeased by wooing or subduing them." Also, the cases show the need for strong

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public opinion leadership by the President. Gauging public opinion remains a shaky science at best, however, and the President still must depend upon intuition and faith in himself in formulating foreign policy. Perhaps most important is the conclusion that it is difficult to generate active support for either subtle or pedestrian policies, such as long-range economic assistance programs; but, at the same time, vocal dissenters find it much easier today to create the impression of a public opposed to such policies. The author suggests that the President must develop more effective means of communication to maintain the support of a population that is becoming better educated and more sophisticated, or he risks being forced into a policy of crisis publicity which exaggerates crises or potential benefits in order to mold public opinion and maintain public support.

While the bibliography is not all-inclusive, the book is extensively footnoted. It is a well-presented and thoroughgoing analysis of the Presidential role in early American foreign policy, and it merits the attention of any researcher in that field. The volume must be regarded as an essential reference by anyone studying the impact of public opinion on foreign policy formulation.

R.C. ELDER
Commander, U.S. Navy

Kennedy, Robert F. *Thirteen Days: a Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis*. New York: Norton, 1969. 224p.

During the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, the world was probably in more immediate danger of a major nuclear war than ever before or since. *Thirteen Days* is Robert F. Kennedy's personal account of what went on in the high councils of government during that crisis. It is a book that should be read by all those concerned with the effective and judicious use of force, and that includes—or should include—everybody.

The United States had two overriding objectives during the Cuban missile crisis: to avoid a major war with the Soviet Union and to get the Soviet offensive missiles out of Cuba. Despite the fact that withdrawal of the missiles by the Soviet Union involved a virtually unprecedented reversal of policy and loss of face by a major power, both U.S. objectives were achieved in full—and at the cost of but one American life. Most observers count this as one of the most significant successes of U.S. foreign policy—and as such it is a case worthy of careful study.

Disturbing to this reviewer, as a professional military officer, is that, as recounted by Kennedy, at every decision point the military advisers recommended more violent and potentially hazardous courses of action than those finally adopted. He states that President Kennedy

... was distressed that the representatives with whom he met, with the notable exception of General Taylor, seemed to give so little consideration to the implications of steps they suggested. They seemed always to assume that the Russians and the Cubans would not respond or, if they did, that a war was in our national interest. . . . President Kennedy was disturbed by this inability to look beyond the limited military field.

As a case study, *Thirteen Days* sometimes suffers from Kennedy's personal and perhaps somewhat biased point of view, but the immediacy and authority of the account more than compensate. Of added value is a documentary annex of photographs and communications.

J.A. BARBER
Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy

Liska, George. *War and Order*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968. 115p.

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Professor Liska, a Research Associate with the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research and Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University, presents in this small volume his very simple thesis: like it or not, the power and wealth of the United States force her to have worldwide interests and responsibilities. He proposes an approach to world order which envisions the United States as an imperial, but nonimperialistic, state using her power in a positive, mature manner, not for her own aggrandizement but to intervene whenever and wherever local conflicts threaten to escalate beyond an acceptable level. The author devotes a chapter to each of the three basic objections to U.S. global involvement as currently dramatized by the war in Vietnam. These objections are as follows: (1) global interventionism is contrary to America's unique traditions; (2) global interventionism in the nuclear age is counterproductive in that it generates conflicts which must be avoided; and (3) U.S. interventions represent an outdated anticommunism. Generally, Professor Liska's response to these objections emphasizes the need for this country to adopt a less self-centered view in her foreign policy and the importance of her being willing to accept an imperial position—one which requires all of the three elements: role, commitment, and performance. He believes, too, that the intensity of America's domestic problems will vary inversely as she fulfills her honest foreign commitments and will only increase as she continues to display weakness in her relations abroad. His proposals, although they are perhaps too extreme to be accepted at once, are refreshingly unusual in this day. Accordingly, this book (or even only the fourth and summary chapter, if the interested student is very busy) is strongly recommended for those desirous of hearing both sides of

America's current controversy.

R.W. DURFEY

Commander, U.S. Coast Guard

Rostow, Eugene V. *Law, Power, and the Pursuit of Peace*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1968. 133p.

Eugene Rostow served as dean of the Yale University Law School before joining the State Department in 1966 as Under Secretary for Political Affairs. His book is based on revisions of two Roscoe Pound lectures given at the University of Nebraska in February 1966 and has been updated sufficiently to include the August 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia among its illustrative examples. Professor Rostow's intent is to consider the interactions of law and experience and their influence on the "task of peacekeeping in the real world." Specifically, he analyzes America's efforts since World War II "to lay the foundations for a new system of international peace" to replace the system of the 19th century which finally collapsed completely in 1945. He states that all four American Presidents since 1945 have been handicapped by having to challenge head-on the American self-image formed from the historical experience of our first century and a half as a nation. Citing the tradition of isolation as a powerful part of our collective memory, Professor Rostow notes that each of our Presidents has, in turn, "been scourged by the angry protest of fellow citizens who preferred to believe that the world is flat." Despite this, he credits each of them with having the wisdom to follow the same basic foreign policy theme first enunciated by President Truman that "totalitarian regimes imposed upon free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States." Professor Rostow considers this Truman Doctrine as having evolved "into a kind of common

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law of international order, a prudent role of reciprocal safety," which, by its simplicity, minimizes uncertainty and miscalculation. He relates the major international events of the last quarter century to this theme, with emphasis on the most significant events of recent years, the Vietnamese war and the Middle East crises.

It is clear that Professor Rostow is a firm supporter of the policies followed by the Johnson administration; however, he avoids the title of "apologist" for those policies—just barely. He presents them as simply the logical result of continued adherence to a longstanding policy of proven worth—one which comprises the only foreign policy for America if international peace and order is to be attained. Professor Rostow claims that the continuing debate over our Vietnam policy is actually a screen for the real debate over whether the United States should have a foreign policy at all and to what extent force should be used in carrying it out: Are American interests worldwide, after all, or should they be confined to the small circle of industrialized and friendly nations? He believes the idea advanced by the debaters that the law can prevail without force is illusory and that "in international society, law is inconceivable without the rational and agreed control of force."

The book, concise and clearly written, contains a valuable outline of the basic themes fundamental to the continuing debate on American foreign policy. It is "must" reading for all who are concerned with the development of foreign policy. Professor Rostow's premises are brilliantly lucid, and the simplicity of his logic is obviously intended to confound the McCarthyite elements of modern American life; they will have a difficult time refuting his position short of relying on flashing but unsubstantive hyperbole. This volume should be read now, in order to provide basic background information on which

to have an appraisal of foreign policy developments which the new administration might propose. If Professor Rostow is correct, the American people must unreservedly accept the fact of their Great Power status and their obligation to exercise that power in concert with the other major powers of the world. President Nixon, as their agent, will have little practical choice but to continue the basic policy of all Presidents since 1945 and to suffer the same excoriation by the outspoken minority that has been the fate of all four of his predecessors in this new era of American international involvement.

J.F. McNULTY
Commander, U.S. Navy

Tatu, Michel. *Power in the Kremlin*.

New York: Viking Press, 1968. 570p.

Michel Tatu, self-appointed French Kremlinologist, using the Soviet press as his main source of information, reconstructs the struggle for power in the Kremlin—Khrushchev to Kosygin. Having been in Russia during Khrushchev's regime, the author researched the reported movements, actions, and published words of the top dozen or so political figures in the U.S.S.R. to evaluate their effect upon the political life of Nikita S. Khrushchev. One is impressed, as he reads this book, with the manipulative ability required of any man who rules in the Kremlin. This man must be capable of actively directing the country's foreign policy, domestic economy, ideological development, and the international Communist movement while, at the same time, protecting himself from his domestic and foreign political enemies. The downfall of Khrushchev can be traced to an overestimation of his personal popularity, an underestimation of his political adversaries, and his miscalculations in handling several of the sensitive situations and issues that confronted him during his rule. The author explores specific issues that


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affected the fate of Khrushchev: the United States U-2 incident, the de-Stalinization program, the ideological conflict with the Communist Party, the peaceful coexistence policy, the Cuban missile crisis, the allocation of national resources, the domestic economy, and the violations of the principle of collective leadership. M. Tau's portrayal of N.S. Khrushchev is that of a man dedicated to providing greater personal freedom and consumer goods for his people; living in peaceful coexistence with the West; and competing with the non-Communist world on a political, ideological, and economic basis. However, the events of the day and the political pressures from without and within forced him to deviate greatly

from these policies and eventually to surrender his political power to his successors.

This book is not for the uninitiated, as the author discusses in some depth the political and economic structures and the interwoven philosophies and issues which faced Khrushchev. Without the background knowledge of these structures of the Soviet Union, the student would be hard pressed to understand the motivating forces in much of the political interaction which took place. It is recommended for those students who are interested in studying the Soviet leadership in greater depth.

W. ABROMITIS
Commander, U.S. Navy



Knowledge of Naval matters is an art as well as any other and not to be attended to at idle times and on the by . . .

Pericles, fl 460 B.C.



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